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ABSTRACT
JOHN BANKHEAD MAGRUDER AND THE DEFENSE OF 
THE VIRGINIA PENINSULA 1861-1862
Leonard W. Riedel, Jr.
Old Dominion University 
Director: Dr. Harold Wilson
The v ia b ility  of the Confederacy depended on its  ab ility  to 
organize a government and m ilitary defense force. Two early concerns 
were the operation of Gosport Naval Shipyard and protection of the 
Confederate capital at Richmond. Poised between them was Fortress 
Monroe.
With undisputed Union mastery of the Chesapeake Bay, Fortress 
Monroe was a constant reminder of the tentative security of these 
critica l points. The man chosen to protect the Peninsula was Virginian, 
John Bankhead Magruder. Less than one year la ter, his efforts were 
denigrated by Commanding General Joseph E. Johnston who wanted to pursue 
his own strategic plan.
Under constant stress, Magruder performed with alacrity . Although 
the Peninsula was evacuated in May 1862, Magruder did an admirable job 
of defense. Magruder’s place in history has been discolored by 
perceived battlefie ld  failures at Savage’ s Station and Malvern H ill. 
These are an unfortunate footnote to an otherwise solid m ilitary career.
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CHAPTER 1 
SETTING THE STAGE
The American Civil War helped establish a national identity 
uniquely American. The internal struggle had international 
ramifications and when i t  was over the American way of l i f e  was 
enhanced.
Some populists have presented the war as a good versus bad 
confrontation with heroes and v illa in s . The war is frequently 
represented as having been fought by amateurs; this was a misleading 
representation.
The leaders and senior officers in the Civil War were generally 
graduates of m ilitary institutions. Many officers had fought in the 
Mexican War and some had over 30 years m ilitary service. When the 
country began to fragment the old Union army was in turmoil. One of the 
"career" officers caught in limbo was Virginian, Lieutenant Colonel John 
Bankhead Magruder.
Magruder was born in 1807 in Front Royal, Virginia and was one of 
eight children. He pursued a college education for one year as a member 
of the f irs t  class to attend the University of Virginia but transferred 
to the United States M ilitary Academy at West Point.1
Cadet Magruder achieved academic success in the class of 1830. A
1Thomas M. Settles, "The M ilitary Career of John Bankhead Magruder" 
(Ph.D. diss., Texas Christian University, 1972), 2-5.
1
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cadet captain, he ranked 15th In academics but near the bottom In 
discipline. I t  may have been this la ter distinction which raised his 
v is ib ility  with some prominent members of the class of 1829, like  
Robert E. Lee, who graduated 2d without a demerit and Joseph E.
Johnston, who graduated 13th. Two years senior to Magruder In the class 
of 1828 was Jefferson F. Davis.
One year after graduation in 1831, Magruder married a prominent 
Baltimore socialite, Henrietta Von Kapff. He fathered three children 
but frequent remote assignments estranged him from his family and in 
1850 Henrietta moved to Europe with their children. Magruder visited  
infrequently, once going five years without seeing them; consequently, 
he lived his own l i f e  and many people believed he was unmarried.2
Magruder’ s m ilitary career was a progression of unmemorable 
assignments with a single promotion to f ir s t  lieutenant in 1836. At the 
start of the Mexican War in 1846, he was the senior lieutenant in the 
army.
Since he lived alone, he frequently courted society and earned a 
reputation as a bon vivant. Regular attendance at parties, flashy 
dress, and an engaging personality earned him the fla ttering  sobriquet 
"Prince John."
Magruder was a typical member of the southern gentry; he 
entertained frequently and often drank to excess. Many people told 
exaggerated stories concerning Magruder’ s supposed bouts with alcohol. 
Some stories originated with Magruder himself and seemed to feed a
2Ib id ., 22.
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legend that he was not adverse to accepting.3 Magruder had a 
pronounced lisp and his fractured speech could have easily been mistaken 
as a sign of intoxication.4
Magruder’ s strong performance as an a rt ille ry  o fficer in the 
Mexican War earned him two brevet promotions beyond the captaincy which 
he received in 1846. He rose to major at Cerro Gordo and attained a 
lieutenant colonelcy after the capture of Mexico City. His sparkling 
performance resulted in the State of Virginia presenting him a gold 
sword.5
Magruder’ s career remained positive until the start of the Civil 
War and he occupied numerous command positions from San Diego,
California to Newport, Rhode Island. His social grace and flamboyant 
dress earned him entrance to high social circles. The start of the 
Civil War found him in Washington, D.C., debriefing the results of a 
sabbatical to Ita ly  where he studied Garibaldi’ s siege of Naples.
3Magruder’ s reputation as a drinker is adequately documented and 
w ill not be repeated here. However, the issue of alcohol followed him 
throughout the Civil War. I t  is unreasonable to believe Magruder 
practiced abstinence during the war as there were a number of social 
opportunities to drink, but there is only one, hearsay, declaration of 
Magruder taking a drink during the war and i t  is related by Colonel 
Benjamin Ewell in a post-war reminiscence. Benjamin S. Ewell, 
"Reminiscences of John Bankhead Magruder and the War," D, Benjamin S. 
Ewell Papers, Special Collections, College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg.
4The classic lisp , "thir" for s ir could easily be mistaken as the 
slurred speech which characterizes intoxication. Mary B. Chesnut, A 
Diarv From Dixie, ed. Ben Ames Williams (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1980), 230; Settles, 5.
5Settles, 140.
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On 20 April, he resigned his Federal commission6 and on 25 April 
was commissioned a colonel of Virginia forces ranking third behind 
Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston. The same day he joined Johnston, 
Richard S. Ewell, Samuel Barron, and Sydney Smith Lee, a ll prominent 
Virginians, in a jo in t commission of army and naval officers to 
recommend "efficient and worthy" citizens for commissions In the state 
forces.7
General Lee faced immediate problems. Union held Fortress Monroe 
at the tip  of the Virginia Peninsula was less than 100 miles from 
Richmond. I t  was a strong position even when inadequately manned. A 
moat surrounded casemates which bristled with guns. Lee had worked on 
the construction of the fort and understood that i t  could not be overrun 
by the Virginia m ilitia .
The Union command structure also understood Fortress Monroe’ s 
importance and before rebels seized Gosport Naval Yard, Union general- 
in-chief Winfield Scott warned Colonel Justin Dimick to take covert 
actions to protect the fort from seizure.8 Fortress Monroe’ s location 
at Old Point Comfort meant i t  could easily be supplied and reinforced by 
sea, especially in the absence of a rebel naval challenge. Thus, Lee’ s
6After the war, Northern newspapers published reports that Magruder 
promised Lincoln that he would not leave the U.S. Army. However, 
Magruder refuted the statement. Magruder said he attempted to v is it 
Lincoln to render his resignation in person but was unable to see him. 
Settles, 174-75.
7U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of 
the O fficial Records nf the Union and Confederate Armies 128 vols. 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880-1901; reprint, 
Harrisburg: Historical Times, Inc., 1985), series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 
35. Hereafter referred to as OR.
80R, series 1, vol. 51, part 1, 326.
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challenges 1n eastern Virginia were:
1. To hold Norfolk and the shipyard for the use of Confederate
Navy,
2. Protect Richmond from a land or sea assault by the Federal s.
Lee understood that Virginia was at a material disadvantage and needed 
to husband as much manufacturing capability as possible. He also 
understood the political and m ilitary significance of Virginia. 
Confederate envoys throughout Richmond were visible confirmation of that 
re a lity .9 Thus, fortifications were under construction around Norfolk 
before the survey of the James River was in itia ted . This action 
inspired a contemporary historian’ s assertion that "Norfolk was the most 
important point in the state."10
State m ilitary o ffic ia ls  emphasized the point. Lee’ s adjutant, 
Richard Garnett, asked General Gwynn to devise ways to prevent a rear 
door attack on Norfolk.”  Three days later Richmond o ffic ia ls  told 
Gwynn that due to the threat to Norfolk, strategic materials such as 
copper, lead, and zinc had been evacuated to a place of safety.12 
Letcher wrote Lee from Norfolk on both 4 and 5 May and asked him to
9Virginia was not yet a member of the Confederacy and did not 
become so until a statewide referendum on 23 May 1861. S t i l l ,  there 
were numerous envoys in Richmond reporting every action the state took. 
The most prominent of these men was Confederate Vice President Alexander 
Stephens of Georgia. These representatives had only one purpose, ensure 
Virginia joined the Confederacy.
10Louis H. Manarin, "Lee in Command: Strategical and Tactical 
Policies" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1964), 66.
110R, series 1, vol. 2, part 2, 791.
12Ib id ., 795.
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divert newly arriving Georgia and Alabama troops to Norfolk.13
Richmond’ s vulnerability was manifest on 21 April when the Yankee 
gunboat Pawnee was allegedly discovered sailing up the James River to 
shell the c ity . The trauma of that event created a demand 1n Richmond 
to secure Virginia’ s waterways immediately.14 Talcott was again 
dispatched this time to survey the James River.15 A coalition of 
engineers and naval officers accompanied him to complete his 
recommendations without delay.16
The James River was not the only threat to Richmond via water 
routes. As early as January 1861, Virginia engineer Andrew Talcott 
surveyed vulnerable positions in the state and identified the York 
River. Talcott followed this up with a tr ip  on 18-20 April in which he 
determined Gloucester Point could mount up to 34 guns and was a suitable 
position for a land defense.17
The disorganization of the Peninsula m ilit ia  and the sophistication
130R, series 1, 2:801, 804.
uJohn B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk’ s Diarv. ed. Howard Swiggett, 2 
vols. (New York: Old Hickory Bookshop, 1935), 10; Clement A. Evans, 
ed., Confederate M ilitary History (Confederate Publishing Co., 1899; 
reprint, Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot, 1987), vol. IV, V irginia, by Jed. 
Hotchkiss, 126.
150B, series 1, 2:788-89.
16During the in it ia l preparations on the James River, Lieutenant 
Catesby ap R. Jones was placed in command of Jamestown Island. Major 
James Patton was tasked to provide infantry support. U. S. War 
Department, O fficial Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the 
War of the Rebellion (31 vols., Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1894-1927; reprint, Harrisburg: Historical Times, 
Inc., 1987), series 1, 6:697-702. Hereafter referred to as 0RN; QR, 
series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 70.
170R, series 1, 2:781-82.
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of the naval armament captured from Gosport Shipyard led Governor 
Letcher and General Lee to conclude as a matter of practicality ,
Virginia naval officers should build and manage river defense batteries. 
Assignments were made quickly and by the end of April prominent naval 
officers were 1n command at Jamestown Island, Gloucester Point and West 
Point. Naval captains received complete command of the James and York 
River defenses.18 Those officers not only had to mount the Gosport 
guns, but establish control of the rivers by determining the status of 
the vessels operating on them. A few vessels such as the Jamestown. 
Yorktown. Teaser and Logan la te r became part of the Peninsula 
transportation network.
The need to harness in it ia l war enthusiasm was c ritic a l to Lee’ s 
plan to organize a viable force. In it ia l commissions issued to men like  
Major Harrison Ball Tomlin, Professor Benjamin Stoddard Ewell, Major 
John Baytop Cary, Major Edgar Burwell Montague and Colonel William Booth 
Taliaferro were l i t t l e  more than recruiting commissions and early 
reports from them focused on the status of recruiting.
Many counties had prewar m ilitias; in Gloucester five  companies 
regularly assembled for d r i l l .  In Hampton Cary formed four companies, 
one a rtille ry , one calvary and two infantry.19 Ewell was able to raise 
six companies; however, none of the volunteers could be considered an
18The following naval officers commanded as indicated: Captain H. 
Cocke, Commander of James River Defenses; Lieutenant Catesby Jones, 
Jamestown Island; Captain William Whittle, Commander of York River 
Defenses; Commander P. R. Page, Gloucester Point.
19Donald Ransone Taylor, Out of the Past—The Future. A History of 
Hampton. Virginia (Hampton: Prestige Press, 1960), 23. Ludwell Lee
Montague, Gloucester Countv in the Civil War (Gloucester, VA: The
Dehardit Press, 1965), 5.
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effective m ilitary fighting force.
In fact, the state of discipline was so poor and the equipage so 
limited that Ewell was unable to support Catesby Jones’ s request for 
infantry protection. Cary wrote after the war, " [ I]  had 4 volunteer 
companies, 200 men, 1 a rtille ry  [battery] had no guns, [ I  was] poorly 
equipped, almost without ammunition . . . My orders were to avoid 
hostilities ."20
Not every area of Virginia was imbued with martial sp irit and some 
areas such as Poquoson were reluctant to support the Virginia 
government. In Gloucester General Lee was compelled to send Thomas 
Lewis Preston as a personal envoy to assist in recruitment.21
Considering the volume and complexity of his organizational 
problems, Lee did not contemplate offensive actions; however, some 
a rtille ry  exchanges in the York River did occur. On 7 May, a battery 
under command of Captain J. Thompson Brown of the Richmond Howitzers 
arrived from West Point on the steamer Logan and at approximately 2:00 
P.M. opened fire  on the Federal steamer Yankee. After a short exchange 
of shots in which none h it, the Yankee retired back to the vicin ity  of 
Old Point Comfort.22
20Benjamin F. Butler, Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of 
Maior General Beniamin Butler. Butler’ s Book (Boston: A. M. Thayer and 
Co., 1892), 262-63.
2t0R, series 1, 2:876-77.
22Many of the f irs t  encounters of the war were dramatically 
documented, far in excess of their m ilitary importance. The incident 
with the Union vessel Yankee is an excellent example. Defenses at 
Gloucester Point were in the earliest stages of development with l i t t le  
a rtille ry  or support personnel. A detachment of the Richmond Howitzers 
were enroute on the transport steamer Logan to man i t .  The best 
eyewitness description of the encounter is by Private James Peter
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Brown’ s f ire  created concern 1n the naval hierarchy and resulted 1n 
accusations that he violated Lee’ s orders to act only on the defensive. 
The report of Colonel Taliaferro stated that Brown, acting under 
authority from Captain Whittle, opened fire ; a charge Whittle vehemently 
denied.23 Faced with these paralytic reactions, Lee provided guidance 
for future engagements. Lee advised that the defenders should f irs t  
shoot across the bow of the approaching ship, then over the ship’ s head 
and fin a lly  into the ship.24
Hany well to do and patriotic citizens recognized the state’ s needs 
and they either commenced building their own fortifications with their 
own slaves or they generously offered their advice. On 22 April, A. 
Bisbee wrote a le tte r  to chief engineer, Andrew Talcott, and suggested 
they immediately organize a workforce to build earthworks in Norfolk.
The workforce would consist of white men w illing to protect their homes, 
slaves volunteered by their masters, organized laborers, such as those 
constructing the Covington and Ohio railroad, criminals secured by ball 
and chain and free Negroes impressed from their peacetime pursuits. 
Bisbee suggested that 20,000 laborers could be delivered within a 
week.25 C. M. Hubbard in James City County recommended to Governor
Williams, Gloucester Point, to his sister, 8 Hay 1861, THs in the James 
Peter Williams Papers, Archives, Virginia State Library, Richmond.
^This note is only of interest in demonstrating the rig id ity  of 
the existing m ilitary structure. Colonel Taliferro ’ s seemingly innocent 
report of the action threatened the Navy hierarchy commanding the York 
River. Instead of working to protect a point the Federals coveted, 
there was a rush to apportion the blame. ORN, series 1, 4:374-82.
240R, series 1, 2:815-16.
25A. Bisbee, Norfolk, to Andrew Talcott, Norfolk, 22 April 1861,
ALS in Andrew Talcott Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond.
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Letcher in a le tte r of 26 April the use of free Negroes to build 
entrenchments and complete other public projects. Hubbard strongly 
believed the slaves should stay on the farms to help raise food. This 
way they would be less like ly  to be Involved 1n insurrections.26 
Hubbard’ s attitude was particularly Instructive In view of subsequent 
challenges to the Impressment of slave labor for m ilitary purposes.
The progress on the defensive works was remarkable considering the 
organizational problems that the various rebel commanders faced. The 
shortage of laborers, tools and transportation a ll caused significant 
problems. The experiences of Catesby Jones at Jamestown Island were 
typical.
Jones took over the protection of Jamestown Island from William 
Allen a local resident. Allen had begun construction of a private gun 
battery before Andrew Talcott decided to place a m ilitary position 
there. When Jones took command, Allen coordinated slave labor support; 
however, Jones soon found himself confounded by his superior o fficer, 
Captain H. H. Cocke. Cocke aggressively pursued the development of Fort 
Powhatan which was much farther up the James River and far less 
important. Cocke refused to send materials to Jones and even seized 
c ritica l block and tackles needed to l i f t  guns into place at 
Jamestown.27
The heavy responsibilities of command pressed on General Lee; the 
m ilitia  and volunteers were l i t t l e  better than mobs. Camps of
260R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 47.
270RN. series 1, 6:700-703.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
111
instruction needed to be established. Commanders from a ll points sent 
requests and Inquiries directly to Richmond. Lee knew chaos had to be 
replaced by organization. Naval and land force commanders had to be 
harmonized. Lee needed professional soldiers to guide men like  Ewell, 
recently president of William and Mary, and Cary, who had run Hampton 
Hale and Female Academy.28 Into this cauldron Lee inserted Bankhead 
Magruder.
Colonel Magruder had been busy since his 25 April commission and on 
29 April, he was placed in command of a ll the a rtille ry  in and about 
Richmond. Just a week la ter, he dispatched a portion of a local 
a rtille ry  organization, organized by George Wythe Randolph called the 
Richmond Howitzers, to Gloucester Point to support m ilit ia  Colonel 
William Taliferro, who was constructing a defensive battery. This 
detachment immediately engaged the U.S.S. Yankee on both 7 and 9 May. 
Captain Henry Coal te r Cabell wrote to Magruder and explained the nature 
of the engagements and the terrain. No apparent damage had been done 
and the position seemed to be well suited for defensive purposes.
Cabell also noted the fragmented command relationships and asked 
Magruder for reporting instructions.29 However, Magruder had been 
elevated on 8 May to command a ll forces in and around Richmond.30
Command of forces in and around Richmond was one of the most 
significant posts in state service and was certainly an appropriate job
28Les Jensen, 32d Virginia Infantry (Lynchburg, Virginia: H.E. 
Howard, Inc., 1990), 1, 13.
^Cabell’ s correspondence is in ORN, series 1, 4:406-7; OR, series 
1, 2:830-81; OR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 79-81, 83.
30OR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 817.
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for the state’ s third ranking officer. Therefore, the significance of 
Magruder’ s 21 May assignment to the new Department of the Peninsula at 
Yorktown reflected the state’ s view of the position and was a clear 
statement of Richmond’ s defensive strategy.
Lee understood that Federal forces could not be permitted to 
operate on the upper Peninsula. Such a concession would render both 
Norfolk and the shipyard untenable since Union forces could cross to the 
south side of the James River and cut railroad lines between Norfolk and 
the rest of the South. Penetration by a Federal flee t towards Richmond 
on either the York or James River would stretch Lee’ s ground forces to a 
breaking point. Since the York River was constricted to three quarters 
of a mile at Yorktown i t  was a logical place to defend.
Magruder was assigned to the Peninsula by Special Orders number 95, 
dated 21 May 1861. He was placed in command of a line from Yorktown to 
Hampton. His headquarters were at Yorktown. Detailed orders required 
him to provide manpower to protect the workers constructing batteries 
under Catesby Jones at Jamestown Island, on the York River presumably at 
Gloucester Point and Yorktown. He was expected to expedite completion 
of a short defensive line between College and Queen Creeks in front of 
Williamsburg. When combined with the James and York River batteries, 
Richmond would be secure from land or water attack. Lieutenant Colonel 
Benjamin Ewell and Major John Cary were placed under his command. Three 
regiments of infantry, Colonel L. G. DeRussy’ s Louisiana volunteers, 
Colonel Daniel H. H i l l ’ s 800 North Carolinians and Colonel Thomas P. 
August’ s Virginians, were also placed under Magruder’ s charge. Finally, 
General Lee tasked the commanding officer to send "authentic information
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of what occurs at Fort Honroe, and the operations of U. S. Forces, i f  
important . . .  to headquarters.”31 These orders modified as 
circumstances changed, were the essence of Magruder’ s command charter 
and he immediately pursued their implementation.
Colonel Magruder arrived in a command that was active with 
intrigue. His forward outpost commanded by Major Cary was actively 
conversing with General Butler at Fort Monroe. On 23 May, Butler sent a 
force of approximately 800 men into Hampton. This created an indignant 
controversy. Cary viewed the action as an invasion of Virginia soil and
he sought to c larify  Butler’ s intentions. Of greater consequence in the
meeting scheduled for 3:30 P.M. between Butler and Cary on 24 May, was 
the status of several slaves belonging to Colonel Mallory that escaped 
while working on the fortifications at Sewell’ s Point and presented 
themselves at Fort Monroe. Cary sought but failed to win custody of the 
slaves. Butler advised that since the slaves were materially aiding the 
Virginians’ treasonous efforts, they represented a tangible asset and 
were "contraband" of war.32
The commanding officer immediately oriented himself with the 
geography by hiring the local sheriff as a guide.33 He was not
impressed by what he saw. He advised Richmond on 25 May that the work
310R, series 1, 2:865.
32The contraband issue was one of General Butler’ s best moments.
He recognized the material value of slave labor and lobbied the 
Washington government for guidance which permitted retention and 
employment of defer+ing slaves. Butler, 256-59, 262-63; Tinsley 
Spraggins, "Mobiliz. tion of Negro Labor for the Department of Virginia 
and North Carolina, 1861-1865," North Carolina Historical Review 24 
(April 1947): 160.
330R, series 1, 9:38.
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on the Yorktown battery was slow. He planned to select the Interior 
Yorktown defensive positions on the 26th. He then planned a meeting 
with Ewell to discuss the Williamsburg works. Magruder also advised of 
another problem that would hamper his efforts to construct 
fortifications and build a fighting force. Negro workers having 
completed the ir agreed upon time of service had been returned to their 
masters; to prevent a lapse In the work, Magruder tasked 400 soldiers in 
their place.34
Even as Magruder was completing his f ir s t  day on the lin e , Lee 
wrote him several le tte rs , one of which emphasized the importance of the 
Williamsburg lin e . Lee sent Magruder two 12 pound Napoleons and two 8 
inch Columbiads to use as Magruder saw f i t .  The anxious Lee also 
assigned two engineers, Captains Alfred Rives and Richard K. Meade.35
Less than a week after receiving command on 21 May, Magruder 
encountered the f ir s t  movement of the enemy. A force of 2,500 Federal 
troops marched from Hampton to Newport News on 26 May to establish Camp 
Butler. This generated a flood of refugees moving toward Confederate 
lines at Yorktown and Williamsburg and the advance guard under Cary fe ll 
back in disorder. Although Cary had nearly 200 men on his roster, about 
65 moved as an organized m ilitary force; the rest helped refugees.
Cary’ s troops abandoned their a rtille ry  and Magruder had to retrieve i t .  
Magruder candidly advised Richmond that he had less than 1,000 men in 
and about Williamsburg and breastworks which were far from complete. He
“ OR, series 1, 2:878.
35Ib id ., 876.
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advised he could attack the Yankees on their flank and then fa ll back 
while burning wharves to hamper Union amphibious operations. He wrote, 
"I know troops are needed on every line , but I believe I cannot overrate
the importance of preserving a numerical superiority.*36 Since
Magruder believed the Federals had 5,000 men and his defenses were
inadequate, he asked for 8,000 to 10,000 men.37
Magruder faced a direct challenge. The movement of Union troops to 
Newport News and their subsequent forays into the countryside suggested 
contempt for Magruder’ s force. Even worse, Magruder believed failure to 
stand up to the invaders would demoralize the c iv ilian  community. I f  he 
were to execute his mission, then he needed the support of the populace; 
therefore, he decided to move toward Hampton to stop the marauding. He 
believed that a check to the Federals combined with modest 
reinforcements would permit him to hold his line.
I am satisfied that i t  [Yorktown] cannot be taken by any 
number of men that can be brought against i t ,  i f  i t  is properly 
entrenched and defended by a sufficient number of men; that is , as 
long as the mouth of the river is secured by batteries on this side 
and on Gloucester Point.38
Magruder had inherited a rudimentary defensive scheme. Although he 
believed Yorktown could be made a citadel, he noted that the positioning 
of the Williamsburg and Jamestown defenses were such that a Federal 
force could cut o ff Yorktown from the interior by landing on the James
“ ib id ., 885-87.
37This perspective reflected the maturity of Magruder’ s thinking.
He understood the need to maintain a superior force in an open fie ld  
fight. His request for another 4,000 to 6,000 troops was a modest 
request, and i t  was couched with acceptance of Lee’ s overall manpower 
demands.
“ OR, series 1, 2:893.
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River at Grove Wharf, without crossing either the Williamsburg or 
Jamestown lines. I f  Yorktown were captured, the York River would be 
open and the Peninsula would become untenable.39
As the commanding officer worked through the in it ia l challenges of 
his command, his authority was challenged by one of his chief 
subordinates. Colonel Daniel Harvey H ill ,  Commanding the First 
Regiment, North Carolina volunteers near Yorktown, was in a unique 
situation. North Carolina had agreed to a m ilitary alliance with 
Virginia preparatory to both states’ formal alliance with the 
Confederacy. Magruder held a Virginia commission and although General 
Lee was dual-hatted as Commander of Virginia forces and Chief of 
Confederate Operations in Virginia, H ill was not convinced of the 
legitimacy of his subordination to Magruder.
D. H. H ill vented his dissatisfaction in a le tte r of 30 May to his 
wife, Isabella, "Colonel Magruder in command is always drunk and giving 
foolish and absurd orders."40 Three days la ter, Magruder advised 
Richmond that he believed H ill had problems with their dates of rank, "I 
think I rank him, but am of the impression that i t  is a subject of some 
feeling on his part."41
Despite H i l l ’ s dissatisfaction Magruder moved decisively to control 
his command. On 31 May, he issued seven General Orders of which five
39After Yorktown was evacuated on 3 May 1862, McClellan attempted 
to organize an amphibious expedition up the York River to get ahead of 
the retreating General Johnston.
40Hal Bridges, Lee’ s Maverick General Daniel Harvey H ill (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1961), 28.
410R, series 1, 2:900-901.
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are mentioned here: unnumbered, 4, 5, 6, and 9. The f ir s t  three 
established controls around Yorktown, Stafford Cook became chief of the 
c iv il police; c iv ilian  movements were restricted within m ilitary areas 
and civilians were ordered to destroy spirituous liquors. General 
Orders number 6 placed Major John Bell Hood in command of the 
Department’ s cavalry. General Orders number 9 established a mandatory 
four d r il l  a day schedule for everyone; skulkers were to be arrested.42
After Magruder was named commander, he discovered that no formal 
s ta ff had been provided. Between 24 May and 1 June, he accomplished 
what he could with volunteers. He formed a s ta ff during the f ir s t  week 
of June and issued another nine general orders. In General Orders 
number 10, Major Hood was ordered to establish permanent picket posts to 
watch for Federal movements at Wormley’ s Creek, Upper Grafton Court 
House, McCauley’ s Creek, Warwick Road, Lebanon Church, and Williamsburg. 
General Orders number 14 delegated limited authority to commanders to 
grant furloughs and authorized the impressment of slaves, free Negroes 
and horses. General Orders number 15 established a quarantine hospital 
for measles; General Orders number 16 placed Captain J. Thompson Brown 
in charge of the a rtille ry ; and General Orders number 18 established 
furlough procedures for the army.43 The pace of organization in just 
two weeks by any reasonable standard was outstanding.
Magruder had advised Richmond that he intended to strike the 
Federals when he could. He performed personal reconnaissances to survey
42U.S. War Department, Rebel Records, "Correspondence of the 
Department of the Peninsula," Record Group (RG) 109, chapter 2, vol.
229, National Archives, Washington, D. C.
43Ibid.
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the country and his intent was clear. Refugee Benjamin West wrote of an 
encounter with Magruder in early June:
He stopped and inquired as to the number and position of 
the Yankees, whether they had thrown up entrenchments, and 
intimating he would attack them. He seemed to feel very 
sorry for father and told him to go to Yorktown, and he 
would supply a ll our wants as long as he had anything to eat
himself . . .  In fact, he was kind to a ll the refugees and
did a ll in his power to help them.
On 3 June, Magruder wrote Richmond that he had bu ilt an integrated 
line of defense from Grove Landing to Yorktown. At Yorktown Magruder 
reported a small, enclosed work nearly completed with three guns mounted 
in the naval battery. He declared his intent to strengthen the fort so 
to make i t  impassible by water. "When once strongly fo rtif ie d , I shall 
always be able to defend this work at least until an army from the 
in terior can raise the siege by beating the besiegers."45 Magruder 
further cemented the defensive scheme by obstructing and closing a ll 
roads with abatis to the lower Peninsula except two public use roads.
In pressing his requirement for an additional 4,000 troops to support 
his 3,400, he noted the small m ilitia  (no more than 150) and the lack of 
enthusiasm for the Confederacy in Elizabeth City County and in lower 
York County.46 He was now ready to strike.
Magruder had previously decided to anchor his forward defenses near 
Bethel Church. Its  location behind a branch of the Back River made
i t  defensible. On 6 June, he ordered D. H. H ill and his 800 North
^George Benjamin West, When the Yankees Came. Civil War and 
Reconstruction on the Virginia Peninsula, ed. Parke Rouse, Jr.
(Richmond: Dietz Press, 1977), 64.
450E, series 1, 2:902-3.
“ Ibid.
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Fig. 1. Map of V ic i n i t y  of Big Bethel from The Of f ic ial  Mi l i t a ry  Atlas 
of the Civi l  War Map 2, Plate 18.
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Carolinians to move with Hajor George Wythe Randolph’ s Richmond 
Howitzers to Bethel and fo rtify  i t .  To prevent a turning movement on 
his right from Newport News, he sent a cavalry unit to destroy bridges 
and block roads.
Magruder had deployed with 1,200 of his 3,400 men. A shortage of 
wagons forced him to delegate the entrenchment of Bethel to D. H. H ill 
while he sought to establish a supply line from the Poquoson River to 
Bethel.
After two days of work, H ill sent word to the commander that the 
Federal army was moving. Magruder immediately proceeded to Bethel to 
take command in person.47 When the Federals did not appear, Magruder 
decided to seek them and he moved toward L itt le  Bethel three miles 
distant. Late in the evening of 9 June, Magruder and H ill were blindly 
moving forward unaware that Union forces were also seeking to attack. A 
local resident arrived to advise them that the Yankees were near and in 
large force.48 Based on that intelligence, Magruder instructed his 
1,200 man force to return to Big Bethel and await their appearance.
They did not have to wait long.
Despite bold intentions, the Federal force under the command of 
Brigadier General Ebenezer Pierce moved tentatively. They did not know
47Major Edward J. Hale, "The Bethel Regiment, The First North 
Carolina Volunteers," Histories of Several Regiments and Battalion from 
North Carolina in the Great War 1861-65. ed. Walter Clark, vol. 1 
(Raleigh: E. M. Uzzell, 1901; reprint, Wendell, NC: Broadfoot, 1982), 
1:83-87.
^ Ib id ., 86. The lady who warned Magruder and H ill of the presence 
of the enemy force was Hannah Tunnell, a local resident. After the 
battle, the officers and men of the Bethel Regiment collected a $225 
reward to thank her for her gallantry.
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where the Confederates were or with what force they would be opposed.
To make matters worse, two Federal columns had Inadvertently stumbled 
Into each other and opened f ire  k illin g  several comrades. This caused 
leading elements of the bluecoats to rush back to the ir supporting 
columns. When the Union columns did arrive at 9:00 A.M. on 10 June and 
emerged from a tree line, they were ripped by f ire  from Major Randolph’ s 
howitzers.
Magruder was a useful commander, making decisions when they were 
required and moving units from one sector of the works to the other. A 
contemporary biographer of D. H. H ill said disparagingly that Magruder 
gave few overall orders and allowed H ill to control the ba ttle .49 
However, testimony to the contrary was presented by a participant, Major 
Edward Hale of the North Carolina "Bethel" Regiment in his 1901 history 
of the North Carolinians.
Major Hale described three instances where Magruder observed 
conditions deteriorating and where he made dispositions to check the 
danger. The f irs t  occurred when forces of 5th New York and 1st Vermont 
approached a picket of 40 men on H i l l ’ s le f t .  Magruder dispatched 
Captain William H. Werth’ s company of Montague’ s Battalion to support 
them. Werth drove the Yankees back with one shot. The second instance 
occurred when Lieutenant Colonel William D. Stuart reported the threat 
of a flanking movement on his right; Magruder immediately ordered Stuart 
to withdraw to Montague’ s position behind the church. Finally, in 
response to a serious move on Magruder’ s le ft  led by Major Theodore
"Bridges, 29.
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Winthrop, commanding a column of Vermont and Massachusetts troops, 
Magruder ordered three companies of the North Carolinians to support the 
two companies facing the assault. The combined forces promptly checked 
Winthrop’ s assault and Winthrop was killed. Hale claimed that this last 
effort was a key to the battle .50
The encounter lasted approximately four hours and ended at one 
o’ clock in the afternoon of 10 June. The Confederate losses were one 
dead and several wounded, the Yankees had 18 dead and 53 wounded. The 
Union retreat was disorganized.
The Confederates handled themselves well under f ire . Just 400 of 
Magruder’ s force of 1,200 actually got to fight and they fought well for 
their f ir s t  time under fire . H ill justifiab ly  lavished praise on his 
North Carolinians and the supporting troops. Magruder was no less 
laudatory,
I cannot omit to again bring to the notice of the general 
commanding the valuably services and gallant conduct of the 
First North Carolina Regiment and Major Randolph of the 
howitzer batteries. These officers were not only prompt and 
daring in the execution of their duties, but most industrious 
and energetic in the preparations for the conflict."
In Richmond, d iarist Sallie Putnam recorded, "Colonel Magruder 
occasionally excited and impetuous as is his custom to be, calmly smoked 
his cigar and gave orders with coolness and deliberation."52
Just 17 days before on 24 May, Magruder had arrived to take command
50Hale, 93, 94, 96, 98.
51Ib id ., 95.
52Sallie Putnam, Richmond Purina the War. Four Years of Personal 
Observation by a Richmond Lady (New York: G. W. Carleton and Co., 1867; 
reprint, Time-Life Book, Inc., 1983), 53.
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of a newly created department. He had formed a s ta ff, promulgated 
organizational directives and thrashed the Federals who lost nearly nine 
killed , wounded, or captured for every one the Confederates lost. A new 
Southern folk hero was born.
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CHAPTER 2
BASKING IN THE LIMELIGHT
The 13 June 1861 Richmond Dispatch proclaimed Big Bethel, "The 
greatest victory in the annals of modern warfare." The New York Times 
harshly critic ized the ineptitude of the Union generals.1 The small 
skirmish at Bethel seemed to prove conclusively that one southerner 
could beat twenty Yankees. Jubilation in the South sharply contrasted 
to anger and despondency in the North.
Magruder was placed center stage to receive the accolades due a 
conquering hero. A battlefie ld  correspondent called him a "brave and 
daring o fficer."2 Richmond d iaris t, Mary Chesnut wrote from Camden, 
South Carolina, "Colonel Magruder has done something splendid on the 
Peninsula."3 His laurel was be a general’ s wreath.4 However,
As might be expected the earlier encounters received extensive 
coverage. The Southern papers were exultant, representative articles  
are referenced in Douglas S. Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. A Study in 
Command. 3 vols. (New York: Scribners, 1943), 1:18-19 and are fu lly  
presented in the "The First North Carolina Volunteers and the Battle of 
Bethel," Southern Historical Society Papers (Richmond: William E llis  
Jones, 1891), 19:212-46. Hereafter referred as SHSP. Union accounts 
are represented by extended criticism of General Butler and the 
administration in The New York Times between 13 June and 20 June 1861.
2SHSP. 19:228.
3Chesnut, 58.
4Magruder was commissioned Brigadier General on 17 June 1861. 
Joseph H. Crute, J r ., Confederate Staff Officers. 1861-1865 (Powhatan, 
VA: Derwent Books, 1982), 128.
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Magruder’ s actions after the battle reflected his concern with Issues 
more significant than this skirmish. While General Butler apologized 
for General Pierce’ s mismanagement of the expedition, Magruder wrote a 
short, Incomplete summary of the battle. He did not overstate Its  
value, nor did he claim credit for the victory. Instead, he strongly 
praised the performance of Colonel H ill ,  the First North Carolina and 
Major Randolph of the Richmond Howitzers.5 Without the summaries of 
Union Colonel Carr in Battles and Leaders and Confederate Major Hale in 
North Carolina Regiments 1861-65. there would not be a detailed account 
of the action.
The Commanding General had successfully met his f ir s t  challenge. 
He had perceived a deteriorating condition on the lower Peninsula. In 
response, he acted decisively to check the Federal army and stabilize  
the morale of the c iv ilian  populace.
Consequently Magruder’ s legend began to grow. The few combined 
casualties, 19 killed and 60 wounded, allowed Magruder to clear the 
fie ld  before Butler’ s 11 June request for a truce.6 In response, 
Magruder criticized Butler for imprisoning civilians who defended their 
homes and the Union troops whom he accused of looting.7
Butler retreated before this moral assault. He defended the 
actions of his troops, agreed to exchange one soldier, advised he would
sThe sum of Federal and Confederate reports is contained in OR, 
series 1, 2:77-104.
^ a r  Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. M ilitary  
Departments and Command 1861-65. vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: War 
Department Printing Office, 1877), 8.
7Ib id ., 9-11.
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punish marauders and assured Hagruder that "loyal citizens" rights would 
be protected. Magruder refused to accept Butler’ s assurances and he 
closed the correspondence calling the Federal troops "bushwhackers," 
praising the civilians who defended their homes and ridiculing the 
Yankees’ capture of a sleeping vidette saying that he was one of four 
men opposing the advance of 5,000 Federals, "Had Private Carter been 
awake perhaps a retreat would not have been necessary."8
Richmond papers gleefully reported Magruder’ s and Butler’ s 
correspondence9 and rumors spread that Magruder had challenged Butler 
to a duel.10 These reports bu ilt Magruder’ s legend; one newspaper said 
he looked "every inch a king."11
The greatest impact of Magruder’ s high principled response was 
reflected by Private J. M. Drake of Company A, Fourth Massachusetts 
Volunteers. Private Drake participated in a truce to recover personal 
effects of the Union dead. A 25 June le tte r to his father said in part,
I t  is a fact that much injury and wrong has been committed 
by our soldiers. Just contrast our course with theirs. Our 
wounded that were le f t  in that murderous and disgraceful a ffa ir  
at Bethel were by the enemy sent to Yorktown and well cared 
for. Our dead they decently buried not even so much as taking 
from their persons the least thing, I know this to be true 
because we went there with a flag of truce . . .  we dug them 
up. One man had in his pocket quite a sum of gold.12
aIbid.,  11.
9Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:19.
10Henry Carter, Denbigh, to William Carter, 3 July 1861, TD in 
Carter Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond.
11Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:19.
12J.M. Drake, Camp Butler, Newport News, to his father, 25 June 
1861, ALS in Federal Soldiers Letters in the Southern Historical 
Collection of the Manuscripts Department, University of North Carolina,
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Drake continued by reporting his personal encounter with Magruder,
Colonel Magruder, the Secession Commander of Bethel Forces 
gave us a good dinner, the best I have seen since I le f t  Boston 
and sent by us word to our Commander that he was ready for us 
1f we desired to attack him and that he should send as many of 
us to bloody graves as he was able to do.
The high profile aftermath of Bethel obscured Magruder’ s continuing 
actions to consolidate and organize his department. On 10 June Richmond 
ordered Lieutenant Colonel George A. G. Coppens’ s Louisiana Zouave 
battalion and eight more companies of Alabama volunteers to Yorktown.14 
These Deep South volunteers established disreputable records enroute and 
caused disciplinary problems almost Immediately after a rr iv a l.15
Lee responded to Magruder’ s request for central control and by the 
end of June expanded his command to Include Gloucester Point, Jamestown, 
and West Point, in effect the entire Peninsula.16 H ill continued to 
bicker over his rank and Magruder again addressed the problem to General 
Samuel Cooper, the Adjutant General, in Richmond,17 but more important
Chapel H il l ,  North Carolina.
13Ibid.
14QB, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 137.
15Activities of the Louisiana Zouaves are detailed in Terry L. 
Jones, Lee’ s Tigers. The Louisiana Infantry in the Armv of Northern 
Virginia (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1987), 18-19. The train rides from 
Louisiana were wild, raucous, and violent. I t  was not surprising that 
these ruffians were some of the toughest fighters in the Confederacy.
16Manarin, 87.
17H ill had argued that his rank in the North Carolina Volunteers 
was 24 April while Magruder’ s in the Virginia Volunteers was 27 April. 
Magruder noted that he understood his provisional army rank was of 
higher precedence than volunteer ranks. Magruder asked Richmond to 
clearly state the seniorities. However, H ill remained disaffected 
during the entire period of his subordination to Magruder. War 
Department, Rebel Records, "Letters Sent Confederate Army of the
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Issues pressed the commanding general.
The Virginia Peninsula was bordered on the north by the York River 
and Chesapeake Bay and the south by the James River and Hampton Roads. 
The coastal areas were cut by numerous estuaries and finger rivers.
Dense underbrush was occasionally blazed by a main d ir t  road and 
numerous secondary lanes. Bethel Church, site of the 10 June skirmish, 
was on the road from Hampton to Yorktown approximately 8 miles from 
Hampton and 16 miles from Yorktown.
Magruder had previously ordered Major John Cary to re tire  to the 
vic in ity  of Bethel Church. The commander knew that the northwest branch 
of the Back River was navigable and he feared a Union amphibious 
movement would cut o ff his troops from Yorktown. After the success at 
Bethel Church, he selected i t  as his forward entrenched position and on 
13 June instructed Major Cary to strengthen the existing fortifications. 
Cary’ s task included building traverses to protect entrenched troops 
from enfilading f ire , a dam to control the water flow and a flood ravine 
to enhance the defensive character of the ground. Magruder instructed 
Lieutenant Colonel Coppens’ s newly arrived Louisiana troops to provide 
manpower. He encouraged Cary to establish outposts at New Market 
Bridge, Poquoson and any other place where his position might be 
turned.18
Magruder’ s concern over a passing movement caused him on 14 June to
Peninsula," Record Group (RG) 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, 13 June 1861, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C..
18John B. Magruder to Major John Cary at Bethel, 13 June 1861, John 
Cary Letterbook, Eleanor S. Brockenbough Library, Museum of the 
Confederacy, Richmond, Virginia.
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recommend establishment of a water battery at Day’ s Point on the south 
bank of the James River south of Land’ s End. Magruder claimed 
this action would prevent Union ships from passing up the James 
River.19 Although not stated, Magruder implied such an action would 
prevent Federal operations on the south bank of the James River. Lee 
quickly grasped the essence of Magruder’ s suggestion and within two days 
advised him that the battery, la ter to be known as Fort Boykins, would 
be b u ilt .20
The encounter at Bethel convinced Magruder that he needed more men. 
Meager reinforcements brought the Army of the Peninsula up to 5,500 men 
or 55 percent of the force he thought necessary.21 To augment his 
force Magruder decided to "mobilize1' the local m ilit ia .
Magruder’ s 15 June proclamation invoked the Governor’ s authority 
and called Colonel Charles Mallory’ s 68th and 115th regiments to 
assemble at Yorktown on 24 June.22 This action, which would be repeated 
several times over the next year, was apparently sensitive to the 
Governor and gentry of the Tidewater region because i t  infringed on the 
state government’ s prerogatives and the landowners’ freedom of choice 
concerning m ilitary service.
Although Letcher legitimized Magruder’ s de facto action, he
19QB, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 139.
20OB, series 1, 2:930.
21 Ib id ., 927.
22QE, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 140.
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critic ized i t . 23 S t i l l  the action appeared justified  since recruitment 
on the lower Peninsula was languishing. Some men answered the call and 
volunteered to serve in organized, mustered in units; however, Colonel 
Ewell claimed others seemed unwilling to serve. Just three weeks prior 
on 25 Hay, Lee had sent agents to Gloucester Point to help recru it.24 
Magruder’ s action represented the f ir s t  formal m ilitary training many of 
these men received and provided a roster of available manpower. 
Magruder’ s concern was obvious in his 16 June le tte r to General Cooper,
I cannot too urgently impress upon the consideration of 
the headquarters the immediate necessity of having heavy guns 
from Norfolk or elsewhere at this place. The defense of 
Richmond is here at Williamsburg and Jamestown, and the men and 
guns are necessary to that defense.
As Lee wrestled with Magruder’ s problems, the Peninsula commander 
faced more immediate problems bordering on insurrection. Coppens’ s 
Louisiana troops continued their undisciplined approach to army l i fe ,  
looting and slaughtering unprotected cattle . At a unit parade on 
17 June, Magruder publicly denounced them and promised to shoot every 
guilty person.26 On 18 June, Coppens’ s subordinates said he had no 
capacity for command and requested that Magruder replace him as their 
colonel.27 At Yorktown, H ill found that the Alabama troops, under 
former Governor, now Colonel, John A. Winston, did not want to help
^Magruder’ s action and Letcher’ s reaction are described in F.N. 
Boney, John Letcher of Virginia. The Storv of Viroinia’ s Civil War 
Governor. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1966), 150-51.
24QB, series 1, 2:876-77.
25Ib id ., 931-32.
26Jones, Tigers. 32.
270R, series 1, 2:938.
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unload the ships at the wharf. Winston likened 1t to slave labor. In 
response, H ill insisted that i f  his North Carolina troops could unload 
ships, the Alabamians would do likewise or face the consequences of 
disobedience of Magruder’ s orders.28
The commanding general’ s departmental organization was enhanced by 
the publication of General Orders number 25 on 20 June. This document 
established the organizational structure of the Army of the Peninsula 
and prescribed disciplinary procedures needed to command. A short 
review is necessary to appreciate the order.
Magruder in it ia lly  established four subordinate commands: Colonel 
D. H. H il l ,  Yorktown; Colonel T. P. August, Williamsburg; Colonel C. A. 
Crump, Gloucester Point; and Colonel J. G. Hodges, Jamestown. He 
ordered each of them to complete their assigned defensive works and 
provide progress reports every three days. Ewell’ s lack of progress on 
the Williamsburg defenses caused him to be subordinated to August. 
Perhaps in an attempt to mollify H ill ,  he was authorized a separate 
headquarters at Yorktown. Commanders were instructed to d r ill  the 
soldiers three times daily i f  they were not at work on fortifications. 
Soldiers were ordered to carry two days’ rations constantly. This 
distribution problem was caused by a shortage of wagons. Wagon usage 
was limited to essential food stuffs and supplies; no tents were 
permitted on the wagons i f  wood was available to build huts. Finally, 
Magruder instructed officers to lim it personal baggage to that which
28RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, 19 June 1861.
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could be carried in carpetbags.29
Shortages continued to surface. The day after Magruder Issued 
General Orders number 25 he authorized H ill to purchase scythes and 
other reapers to gather forage. Although the Peninsula commander did 
not have specific authorization from Richmond, he Instructed H ill to 
Issue Confederate vouchers In payment for the materials.30
Not a ll southern men readily adapted to the requirements of 
m ilitary discipline, nor did a ll accept Magruder’ s authority. Three 
examples in two days represent Magruder’ s acceptance of this rea lity  and 
his f le x ib ility  in tailoring a response. On 22 June, Magruder dealt 
with the case of Captain Welles of the Wythe Rifles, 32d Virginia 
Infantry. Welles refused to report for duty and belligerently boasted 
of his "inherent rights." After declaring he would not be treated in an 
ungentlemanly manner, he deserted to Richmond. Magruder recommended 
dropping Welles from the roles and appointing a subordinate in his 
place.31 Yet on the very same day, Magruder faced a mutiny in Company 
F of the 15th Virginia.
Captain William Lloyd reported that on 20 June subordinates had 
circulated a petition to deprive him of his command. The result was 
refusal to march under Lloyd’ s orders. Lloyd was unable to find a 
senior officer to support him and he subsequently relinquished command 
to a subordinate. Magruder’ s response was prompt and decisive. He 
ordered Lieutenant Colonel William Stewart of the 15th Virginia to take
^OR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 144-45.
30RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, 21 June 1861.
31 Ibid.
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troops from the Georgia ranks i f  necessary, disarm the mutinous company 
and bring them back under guard. He then harshly critic ized  Stewart for 
fa lling  to take prompt action to maintain order. He also ordered 
Stewart to send a guard to Richmond to return four deserters to camp.
Magruder insisted on court-martials for a l l .32
Finally, Magruder decided to assuage Lieutenant Colonel Ben Ewell 
who had been superseded in command at Williamsburg by his General Orders 
number 25. Progress on the defensive line in front of Williamsburg was
unsatisfactory. The position was regarded by both Lee and Magruder as a
critica l defensive point. Ewell had failed and as he correctly believed
had been demoted. Magruder tactfu lly  explained to Ewell that he had
placed him on special duty to complete the defenses of Williamsburg. He 
also told Ewell that he was to be the colonel of the 32d Virginia,
Peninsula Guards who were soon to be formed. Magruder declared to
Ewell, "Of your competency, I never entertained a doubt."33 Magruder 
then authorized Ewell to urge requisitions forward using Magruder’ s 
name.34 Magruder’ s tactful handling of Ewell earned him a loyal 
subordinate.35
The enlisted men had great confidence in their commander. Despite 
the disciplinary problems just described, common soldiers praised
32War Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 11-13.
33Ib id ., 13-14.
“ Ibid.
35Ewell wrote a lengthy and warm memorial to Magruder some years 
after the war. There was no hint of criticism. Benjamin Stoddard 
Ewell, "Reminiscences of John Magruder," AMs, Ewell Papers, Special 
Collections, Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg.
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Magruder in correspondence home. Private James Williams of the Richmond 
Howitzers wrote his Aunt Mary on 24 June,
Captain Brown’ s and Stanard’ s companies went down from here 
to Bethel Church yesterday week. After staying there a day or 
two with a small force of infantry, the enemy were advancing on 
them In large numbers trying to cut them o ff from Yorktown and 
surround them, but old [McGruder] was too keen for them and 
ordered his force back to Yorktown.
Williams continued,
This place [Yorktown] is very strongly fo rtified  and we are 
receiving reinforcements from R everyday. I myself do wish 
they would attack us right now . . . a l l  the fortifications are 
about finished and I understand that [McGruder] has received 
orders from headquarters not to carry his forces to Bethel 
again, but to hold theni where they are and to defend this place 
to the last extremity.
Magruder’ s influence and command presence resulted in a successful 
m ilitia  muster and nearly 1,000 men were mobilized. To minimize the new 
troops’ disaffection, Magruder used most of them to defend advanced 
positions near their homes by the Poquoson River at Harrod’ s Mill and 
Young’ s M ill .37
Although Magruder was expanding his picket, he chose to remain 
beyond the view of the Yankees for the time being. Lee’ s orders had 
been to act on the defensive. At this stage with insufficient manpower 
and underdeveloped defensive positions, Magruder did not want to provoke 
another large scale Union expedition. On 26 June, he advised Major John 
Bell Hood of his intention to fo rtify  Harrod’ s M ill and Young’ s Mill 
when he received sufficient digging spades. He told Hood not to
36[ ] Represents apparent word. Williams, Yorktown, to Aunt Mary, 
24 June 1861, Williams Papers.
370R, series 1, 2:957-58.
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overexpose his troops or lose his a rtille ry  because he had no plans to 
attack Hampton.38
Magruder appreciated Hood but believed he needed someone more 
experienced to lead his cavalry. So he sought a cavalry appointment for 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Johnston from Alabama. The appointment was 
soon made, but Johnston did not Immediately command the cavalry.39
Despite Magruder’ s efforts the Williamsburg defensive positions 
s t i l l  were not progressing. Both Lee and Magruder recognized the 
u til ity  of a defensive line across the three or four mile neck of the 
Peninsula between College and Queen’ s Creek. The shorter line would be 
easier to defend with Magruder’ s small force of less than 10,000. 
Magruder hoped that by relieving Ewell of administrative command of 
Williamsburg, he could devote fu ll attention to the earthworks. Ewell, 
the college professor, was unable to work together with his engineer, 
Captain Alfred Rives; thus Magruder was forced to make another change. 
General Orders number 33 dated 27 June ordered Georgia Colonel Lafayette 
McLaws to assume command at Williamsburg and "See that the defenses in 
that neighborhood are prosecuted with vigor."40 Magruder also tasked 
McLaws to supervise proficiency training on a rtille ry . Magruder
“ QE, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 147-48.
39R£ 109, chapter 8, volume 236, 27 June 1861.
40A frequent criticism of Magruder is that he wanted or attempted 
to do a ll his staff work alone. Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:XXXIV. 
However, he personally invited men to join his staff as volunteers. The 
absence of other experienced army officers may have compelled him to 
stay active in all aspects of his command. The military inclinations of 
many cavalier officers were less than disciplined. Magruder, H ill ,  and 
other commanders were forced to insist that these officers live in camp 
and fie ld  conditions. OR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 149-50.
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challenged the lax attitude of fie ld  grade officers by demanding they 
live  with their troops Instead of 1n private homes.41
McLaws’ s f irs t  le tte r from the Peninsula to his wife on 2 July 
provided Insight Into the types of problems Magruder had been trying to 
solve,
Hy duties here are exceedingly onerous as my command 1s 
never more than three regiments and a ll kinds of troops,
Irregular and organized . . . [the headquarters of the Tenth 
Georgia are 1n an] Immense redoubt now 1n the course of 
erection under my control. . . .  The Virginia Regt [regiment] 
here are very sociable, cleaver gentlemen and [frequently] go 
to their camp and enjoy society. A good many have Invited me 
to their houses, but I have no time to think of going.
Magruder realized that the Federals had many offensive options and that
the v ia b ility  of his defense was based on reducing those options.
McLaws’ s In it ia l assessment agreed with his commander’ s; there was no
way to prevent the Federals from landing between Yorktown and
Williamsburg. McLaws exclaimed,
Parties of the enemy are constantly making in roads around 
Newport News and from Hampton stealing Negroes and a ll kinds of 
property and committing so many depredations that the 
inhabitants have fled leaving their houses and fields and le f t  
all their worldly goods behind.
As July arrived Magruder encountered further medical and 
organizational problems. The weather and terrain were hostile. One 
soldier exclaimed, "This is the hottest place I ever saw, we are right 
down in the sand and there is not a shade tree on the place, the water
41Ibid.
42[ ] Represents apparent word. Lafayette McLaws, Williamsburg, to 
his wife, 2 July 1861, LS in Lafayette McLaws Papers in the Southern 
Historical Collection of the Manuscripts Department, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel H ill,  North Carolina.
4JIbid.
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1s also very mean.”44 Another soldier said, *The country reminds me of 
the descriptions I have read of the jungles of India. The Yankees w ill 
have a day here crawling through the swamps.”45 McLaws described the 
dramatic Impact of communicative diseases on country boys writing his 
wife on one occasion that he was going to the hospital to v is it  "over 
200 sick with measles, diarrhea, etc.* and on another that *The measles 
and mumps are prevalent to be sure but they are of a very mild type and 
men [tolerate] them and walk about from morning to night without caring 
an iota for their very disagreeable appearance or thought of risk to 
their health."46
Magruder was a proactive commander. Private Henry C. Carter of the 
Richmond Howitzers writing from Denbigh to his brother William claimed,
General Magruder has his headquarters at this place, he is 
constantly riding day and night sending out scouts and videttes 
i f  the [Yankees] can catch him napping, they w ill have to be 
smarter than I give them credit for being.
Part of the reason Magruder was so active was because of the slow
adjustments of his officers and soldiers to m ilitary discipline.
Despite Magruder’ s repeated and specific orders concerning 
soldiers’ laboring on the earthworks, subordinate commanders continued
to bypass him and attempted to appeal to General Lee. Colonel Hodges’ s
^James P. Williams, Yorktown, to Aunt Mary, 24 June 1861, Williams 
Papers.
45Henry Carter, Denbigh, to William Carter, 3 July 1861, Carter 
Family Papers.
46[ ] Represents apparent word. McLaws, Williamsburg, to his wife, 
8 July 1861 and 18 July 1861, McLaws Papers.
47[ ] Represents apparent word. Henry Carter, Denbigh, to William
Carter, 3 July 1861, Carter Family Papers.
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14th Virginia was suffering terrib ly  in the Jamestown swamps and he 
petitioned Lee to provide Negroes to work In the ditches. Fortunately, 
Lee sustained Magruder as he would 1n future correspondence.48 Lee 
referred the issue back to Magruder with an indorsement recommending the 
use of Negroes, whenever possible, but reminding him of his 
responsibility for completing the earthworks.49
As Magruder was clearly in control, his orders are informative. The 
twenty general orders issued 1n July reflected his view of the proper 
discipline of army l i f e .  General Orders number 35 prohibited officers 
from skipping court-martial duty and General Orders number 36 forbid 
officers and soldiers from revealing the details of m ilitary affa irs to 
newspaper reporters. The la ter order was so effective that articles  
from and about the Department of the Peninsula rarely appeared in 
Richmond newspapers after July 1861.50
Before July 1861, o ffic ia ls  in Richmond were inclined to respond 
directly to inquiries from fie ld  commanders and their subordinates. In 
July, Lee successfully attempted to impose discipline on subordinate 
officers. He referred correspondence which bypassed Magruder back to 
him without taking action, thus he strengthened Magruder’ s command 
presence.
49R£ 109, chapter 8, vol. 236, 2 July 1861.
50Operations security was a constant problem throughout the war.
The security of operations was frequently compromised by ambitious 
reporters who lived with the army and filed  stories under pseudonyms.
Lee frequently complained of the negative impact on operations. In 
General Orders No. 36, Magruder ordered his men not to speculate on 
operations to reporters. The following example illustrates the problem. 
A 29 June 1861 artic le  by "Howitzer" in the Richmond Examiner said, "The 
colonel in command here [Magruder] made a requisition this morning for 
two detachments of howitzers to proceed as early as practicable down the 
Hampton Roads at a given point...The other w ill be stationed at the 
junction of Hampton and Warwick Roads." The Virginia Gazette in 
Williamsburg was either forced to or voluntarily ceased operations until 
after the Yankees took over the town. Magruder’ s censorship seemed to 
be very effective.
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Magruder acknowledged the Increasing Impact of illness on his 
overtasked force and established a new hospital at Bigler’ s M ill on the 
south bank of the York River. He insisted on assigning Negro women as 
nurses and cooks since male Negroes were working on the trenches. The 
Department Medical Director received guidelines in General Orders number 
45. Magruder acted to further lim it officer abuses of rank by 
forbidding wooden floors 1n officers quarters until the enlisted 
quarters were completed.51
General Orders numbers 41, 44, and 48 granted commanders greater 
latitude to ease the movement of supplies, personnel and projects. In 
General Orders number 41, Magruder lifte d  the ban on soldiers on the 
wharves. He apparently believed the prospect of rotting food and 
materials in the hot July sun represented a greater waste than the 
threat of pilferage. General Orders number 44 delegated commanders the 
authority to grant passes and number 48 authorized members of the 
cavalry to pull fatigue details whenever they were in camp.
The dichotomy of democracy and military discipline began to 
surface. In June, two of the colonels of the Louisiana regiments 
resigned.52 General Orders number 49 announced the election of Colonel
51A11 the General Orders of the Department of the Peninsula are 
located in R£ 109, chapter 2, vol. 229. This specific citation was 
General Order number 39, 7 July 1861. All future references to general 
orders w ill c ite , General Orders number __ , date [ i f  known].
52The Louisiana officers were in constant turmoil. Previously 
Coppens’ subordinates had requested he be replaced. Colonel Louis 
DeRussy, 2d LA, discovered his brother was stationed at Fort Monroe. 
Rather than risk fighting him, he resigned and ended up on Leonidas 
Polk’ s s ta ff out West. Colonel Marigny resigned when he perceived 
favoritism in Richmond. Later, Colonel Valerie Sulakowski of the 14th 
LA resigned Feb 62 when Howell Cobb was appointed a general before him. 
Jones, Tigers. 42.
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William Mallory Levy as the new commander of the 2d Louisiana. Levy 
received 23 of 38 votes cast.53 Conversely, on 18 July, General Orders 
numbers 50 and 51 reported the results of two court-martials. For 
desertion Magruder approved a sentence of hard labor with a ball and 
chain for the duration of war, suspended to two months, and a drumming 
out of the service. Sleeping on post resulted 1n 14 days solitary
confinement on bread and water. Magruder turned down a sentence of
dismissal from the service 1n the 15th Virginia’ s mutiny t r ia l as "too 
lig h t."  In general, Magruder exhorted officers to treat problems that 
undermined the discipline of the army with the gravity they deserved, 
despite any personal revulsion they f e l t .54
The last Magruder order in July concerned sanitation. He 
instructed commanders to le t men bathe and cleanup. Soldiers were 
forbidden to excrete body wastes anywhere other than latrines and he 
recommended commanders establish latrine details. Later to assist in 
decomposition of fecal material, Magruder ordered the use of lime from 
oyster shells.55
Magruder strove to detect any Federal troop movements and 
discourage them. This was not a d iff ic u lt task in light of the recent 
Federal fiasco at Big Bethel. Union movements were small and tentative 
with the major objective of encouraging Negro defection to Hampton where
53General Orders number 49, 19 July 1861.
54General Orders numbers 50 and 51, 18 July 1861.
55General Orders number 54, 29 July 1861.
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they could be used to support Butler’ s labor requirements.56 The 
infrequent Union forays seemed to make them quarry like  a fox in a 
southern hunt.
One of the units seeking glory was Dreux’ s Louisiana Battalion led 
by a brash young officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Dreux. Dreux 
had accompanied Magruder on an unsuccessful reconnaissance on 
28-29 June. The mission revealed more Instances of Yankee pillaging and 
resulted in a sternly worded le tte r from Magruder to Union Colonel 
Phelps commanding at Newport News.57 Dreux seemed to take this as a 
personal challenge and he sought an opportunity to strike a blow for 
Southern honor.
The match that l i t  the powder keg was a rowdy 4 July barbecue 
celebration at Dreux’s camp. The v is it  of Magruder, who stayed only a 
short while, and McLaws combined with the bravado of patriotic speeches 
led the apparently liquor impaired Dreux to decide to ambush the 
Yankees’ daily patrol.
Dreux, accompanied by approximately 125 men, a piece of the
Fort Monroe offered a safe haven for slaves wishing to escape 
bondage. As the slaves le f t  the Confederate workforce, they joined the 
Union workforce. Both sides took actions to encourage/counter this 
situation. Confederate cavalry patrols swept the countryside and sent 
recaptured slaves back under escort to Williamsburg and Yorktown. In 
Matthews County slaves were picked up by Union landing parties. Slaves 
also cast themselves ad rift in boats. Navy Captain 0. S. Glisson 
reported, on 18 July 1861, that he picked up nine slaves who were adrift 
in the Rappahannock River. Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, 
authorized them to be employed rather than returned to slavery. ORN. 
series 1, 6:8-10. By July 1861, Butler encouraged slaves to seek refuge 
in the fo rt. This increased the Negro population to 900 of which about 
72 percent were employable. The figure grew to 1,500 by March 1862. 
These defecting slaves brought not only labor but m ilitary intelligence. 
Tinsley Spraggins, 160-197.
57QB, series 1, 2:960-61.
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Richmond Howitzer a rtille ry  and some cavalry, moved toward Newport News. 
Just after dawn on 5 July, Dreux, frustrated by the enemy's failure to 
appear, led a scout of five men forward. In the restricted v is ib ility  
cavalry Captain William Col11ns lined up his men and prepared to charge. 
Sporadic f ire  broke out from the rear stampeding the s t i l l  Umbered 
howitzer and the cavalry. Within five minutes the a ffa ir  was over, but 
Dreux and one other man were k illed ; they were the only casualties of 
the unlucky adventure. Magruder tersely demanded reports from the 
concerned parties and reported to Richmond that Dreux had exceeded his 
orders.58
Despite Dreux’ s misadventure, Magruder worked with an energy that 
revealed a dedicated understanding of his purpose. On 5 July, he 
Instructed the b rillia n t Captain J. Thompson Brown59 to take charge of 
the a rtille ry  and entrench I t  as he saw f i t  with a caution to complete 
the works without delay as the spades were required elsewhere by 10:00
58The activities at the barbecue are covered by McLaws le tte r  to 
his wife, 8 July 1861, McLaws Papers, and Jones, Tigers. 45-48.
Numerous reports exist in OR, series 1, 2:188-92. Magruder’ s o ffic ia l 
report is in QR, series 1, 2:964-67. A Union newspaper account, New 
York World, appeared in Frank Moore, The Rebellion Record, vol. 2, (New 
York: G. P. Putnam, 1862; reprint, New York: Arno, 1977), Document 
70 1/2, 251. Hereafter referred to as RR-
59Captain J. Thompson Brown was a well connected 26 year old 
University of Virginia graduate. He in it ia lly  commanded a company of 
the Richmond Howitzers and was involved in the 7 May exchange of fire  
with the Union vessel Yankee at Gloucester Point. He was entrusted with 
a lo t of responsibility and would eventually rise to the rank of colonel 
in charge of Longstreet’ s a r tille ry  reserve. He was killed  at the 
Battle of the Wilderness. Robert Krick, Lee’ s Colonels (Dayton: 
Morningside Press, 1979), 62.
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A.M. on 6 July.60
Douglas S. Freeman criticized Magruder for his voluminous 
le tte rs .61 On closer examination they were fu ll of well developed 
strategic Insight that seemed to meet Lee’ s original tasking for 
information. The level of detail reveals Magruder was often seeking 
approval to reach beyond or change his guidance from Richmond. Often 
Magruder carried his point. The best example of this was his 7 July 
1861 le tte r to the Adjutant General 1n Richmond, Colonel George Deas.
The le tte r is lengthy but i t  e ffic ien tly  addressed five issues: The 
Dreux skirmish; Negro intelligence reports; the situation at 
Williamsburg and Yorktown, with a recommendation to build new batteries 
that would protect Grove Landing; the movement of heavy guns at 
Yorktown, to reflect his perceived priority to cover the land 
approaches; and the establishment of forward defensive points along the 
Poquoson River. He concluded by advising of his plans to survey the 
progress of defensive works at Gloucester Point and Williamsburg.
On 9 July, Magruder finished his survey and reported Gloucester 
Point would be weak against land assault and that the Williamsburg 
works, originally misengineered, were progressing. Magruder then 
pressed for a decision on a new battery at Mulberry Point and closed 
with an apology for increasing the demands on an overtaxed Richmond.
Lee accepted Magruder’ s reports and provided the materials and 
authorization needed to implement the recommendations for Gloucester
“ John Magruder to J. Thompson Brown, 5 July 1861, ALS in J. 
Thompson Brown Papers, Eleanor S. Brockenbrough Library, Museum of the 
Confederacy, Richmond.
61Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:16.
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Point and Williamsburg. Although four days la ter, Lee refused to allow 
Magruder to relocate guns from Jamestown Island to an advanced work 
protecting Grove Landing; Magruder argued his point to Richmond. 
Eventually, he satisfied Lee’ s concerns and was permitted to proceed as 
he desired.62
I t  1s easy to be critica l of Magruder’ s maverick actions. Issues 
such as slave Impressment and m ilItta  muster appeared to have exceeded 
his command authority. Although he showed l i t t l e  patience with 
bureaucracy, he would eventually coordinate his activ ities  with the 
appropriate political and m ilitary structure. Several events in July 
are illu s tra tive .
On 24 July, one month after calling up Letcher’ s m111t1a, Magruder 
formally advised Letcher of his action and asked for approval. Yet, 1n 
the time before he contacted Letcher, Magruder forced the mil1t1a to 
assemble three times a week and stationed them near their homes. By all 
measures these men had been impressed into Confederate service.63
Simultaneously Magruder took on the government’ s commissary and 
financiers. Earlier in the month, Magruder had issued specific
The following references taken as a group illu s tra te  a point. 
Magruder, as so many other commanders, specifically reported activ ity  in 
his department. However, Magruder was close enough to Richmond to 
occasionally v is it  or be visited. Lee made trips to the Peninsula to 
review the progress of the works. Conversely as Magruder became better 
acquainted with his command, he discovered nuances which he fe lt  
compelled to pursue. The most marked example was the development of 
works at Spratley’ s Farm to support naval efforts on the newly initiated  
works at Mulberry Island. Magruder was aware of the possibility of 
flanking maneuvers and he sought to counter them. The sources cited are 
representative of the strategic debate between Lee and Magruder. OR, 
series 1, 2:964-67, 970-71, 975, 977-79, QR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 
185-86.
“ OB, series 1, 2:988.
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instructions governing the procurement, Issuance, and storage of food 
stuffs. He was particularly concerned with Richmond’ s Inab ility  to 
establish a predictable supply line . Colonel Lucius Northrup, 
Confederate Commissary General, heard of Magruder’ s orders and on 
18 July forbid Captain J. H. Hope, the commissary representative in 
Williamsburg, from obeying them. Magruder was furious and within a day 
wrote a scathing personal attack on Northrup and the distribution  
system. He rationalized the need for his action on the impending 
malnutrition of his army. He advised Cooper of interim actions he had 
taken to become self-suffic ient, including the letting  of contracts with 
price fix ing . Magruder’ s justification  was on target when he advised 
that:
1. the enemy would not get the cattle  and corn;
2. he now had an emergency food source;
3. the total cost was cheaper than Richmond could get the goods;
4. the people in the region profited from government money; and
5. the ground wheat would provide food for the horses.
Magruder closed by warning of the consequences i f  Cooper did not sustain 
him.64
In another instance, Magruder browbeat the venerable Edmund Ruffin 
into paying for contracts Magruder had le t without prior authority. An 
inadequate land transport system forced Magruder to rely on commercial 
shipping. The few boats that routinely supported him were insufficient 
for his needs so he impressed schooners. In asking Ruffin to support 
him, he warned that a commander in the fie ld  must be permitted the
wWar Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 21-23.
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latitude to make contractual obligations to support his force or he 
would be hampered 1n the execution of his duties.65 Although 
bureaucrats may not have gone out of their way to support him after he 
had usurped the ir authority, direct logical appeals usually convinced 
people In Richmond that Magruder should be sustained.
Magruder enhanced his reputation as a compassionate provider by his 
actions concerning the welfare of the slaves. After establishing the 
hospital at Bigler’ s M111, he sought to employ Negro women to do 
hospital duty. Unfortunately, he lacked sufficient funds to pay them so 
he decided to use the hospital’ s general operations and maintenance 
funds.66 A few weeks la ter, he implored Richmond for funds to pay the 
free Negroes, "Many of them are free Negroes, who have families who must 
starve i f  they are not paid, and to a ll I promised prompt payment."67
Magruder’ s frustration with Richmond was understandable when 
Colonel Oeas advised that he was unable to provide Magruder with a copy 
of army regulations. Deas told Magruder there were not any [copies of 
the] regulations.68 This confession helped explain Magruder’ s 
unilateral actions in the Department of the Peninsula.
Chaotic conditions continued to hamper Magruder’ s effectiveness. 
Petty bickering seemed to consume some of Magruder’ s key subordinates. 
Now Colonel Ewell and his engineer engaged in charges and countercharges 
over the shortfalls of the Williamsburg defensive line . Although McLaws
65Ib id ., 21.
“ RG 109, chapter 8, vol. 236, 24 July 1861.
670R, series 1, 4:573.
“ RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 236, 15 July 1861.
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was now In charge of the defenses, Ewell wrote to Lee and claimed that
engineer A. L. Rives was responsible for the poor site selection. A
short Investigation by Chief Engineer, Andrew Talcott, sustained Rives 
In his response that Ewell as the commander of the line for the past six 
weeks should have corrected the deficiencies. Rives noted optimistically 
that since Magruder had temporarily relocated his headquarters to 
Williamsburg, he expected the works to progress rapidly.69 Seventeen 
days later on 30 July, McLaws reported to his wife,
Our coast 1s well guarded so that any advance would be 
immediately reported and our fortifications are fast assuming 
proportions that w ill make them exceedingly formidable. The 
main work here called Fort Magruder is fast approaching 
completion and on the le f t  and right redoubts of formidable 
strength are either already finished or w ill be within a 
week.
Despite apparent progress there were setbacks. Following a severe 
storm on 24 July, McLaws reported heavy water damage to earthworks and 
pools of water everywhere. Fields of f ire  had to be cleared and some 
work had to be redone, McLaws stated
[ I  was] obliged to have and go o ff about a mile to put a 
working party with axes to cutting down a grove of trees that 
obstructed our fie ld  of f ire  from one of the batteries and to 
entangle a ravine that led up to within a few hundred yards of 
our redoubts. . . . [ I ]  took a ride along our le f t  flank to 
examine into the work on our mill dam we are building over 
again in order to raise the water over a part of the country 
where we have to fear the approach of the enemy. Found the dam 
nearly completed but the water does not raise as much as I want 
i t . 71
The soldiers continued to suffer profoundly. The unsanitary
69QS, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 174-75.
^McLaws to his wife, 30 July 1861, McLaws Papers.
71McLaws to his children, 25 July 1861, McLaws Papers.
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conditions, exposure and cramped living quarters caused disease and 
Illness. Some of the Illnesses were mumps, measles, typhoid, dysentery, 
malaria, pneumonia and occasionally consumption [tuberculosis]. The 
effects were dramatic; the 7th Louisiana reported 645 of 920 111, 
Coppens’ s Louisiana Battalion 500 of 600, at Gloucester Point 1,250 of 
1,500 and the 5th North Carolina 960 of 1,150. Typhoid at Jamestown 
forced evacuation of the Island.72 William Corson of the 3rd Virginia 
cavalry wrote, "We cannot remain long 1n one place now on account of the 
flies  which collect In such myriads at the camp as almost to eat our 
horses a live .*73 James Williams reported a local remedy to cure
diarrhea, *1 try  to eat as l i t t l e  and as light food as I  can and am
drinking Bakers Bitters, two bottles of which I wrote to Uncle George 
for, and a bottle of blackberry brandy."74
As commander, Magruder took several steps to relieve the 
suffering. First he dispersed sick troops to private homes in counties 
from West Point, to Gloucester and Williamsburg. He established an 
ambulatory system to get troops back to their units when they were again 
healthy. He also made impassioned pleas to Richmond for medicines like
quinine. He scoured newspapers and sent his surgeons to Richmond with
^The misery endured by the soldiers was beyond comprehension, and 
anyone who wrote of or from the Peninsula mentioned i t .  Steamy hot 
conditions, hard manual labor, stagnant water, mosquitoes, flie s , 
inadequate sanitation, inadequate medicine, and exposure a ll contributed 
to the epidemic spread of diseases. Physically exhausted men living in 
close quarters spread disease as rapidly as the pests did. Typical 
references are OR, series 1, 4:569-73; OR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 
246; Montague, 6; Jones, Tiaers. 25.
^William Clark Corson, Mv Dear Jennie, ed., Blake W. Corson 
(Richmond: Dietz Press, 1982), 28-29.
74Williams, Yorktown, to his sister, 31 July 1861, Williams Papers.
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clipped ads and Instructions to purchase whatever was available, whether 
1t was 10,000 ounces in New Orleans or 100 ounces 1n Richmond.75
Spot shortages of clothing le f t  the troubled 15th Virginia 1n an 
awful state. Over 100 men were barefoot, others needed blankets, 
overcoats and underclothes. Colonel Robert Johnston, acting Inspector 
General, wrote Magruder and advised him that he had sent one o fficer 
from each company to Richmond to purchase anything which was available. 
As Confederate authorities might not be able to meet a ll the 
requirements, Johnston advised the officers to execute private contracts 
with c iv ilian  merchants.76
Despite these shortages the men made the best of the situation.
Some soldiers reported great success in foraging; Corson reported to his 
beloved Jennie, "Our boys amuse themselves at leisure hours bathing and 
fishing. A foraging party goes out nearly everyday and brings in a load 
of watermelons and roasting ears. We can buy plenty of nice fish and 
vegetables."77 On another occasion, Corson advised that Confederate 
pickets had killed  a "Yankee steer," and that camp wagons had 
vegetables, butter, milk, eggs, chickens, shoats, watermelons, sweet 
potatoes, and fresh fish. Fixed prices, such as eggs 9 cents a dozen, 
butter 25 cents per pound, chickens 9 cents each, and watermelons 10 
cents each prevented price gouging. Corson noted that a ll anxiously 
awaited the start of the oyster season.78 Generous food parcels from
^QR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 246.
76War Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 37-38.
^Corson, 29.
^ Ib id ., 33-35.
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home helped keep spirits high. James Williams told his sister, "The 
boys get fried chicken 1n boxes right often.*79
The free spirits  of the soldiers corresponded to the disciplinary 
problems that continued into August. H ill criticized his officers for a 
lack of leadership. He carped that while soldiers seemed to realize the 
need for entrenchments, officers did not. He promised to arrest any 
officer who was caught seeking personal comfort while the troops were 
working.80 Magruder continued to have problems with subordinates. He 
reprimanded Colonel Hodges of the 14th Virginia for sending him a report 
via an ignorant staffer who could not answer questions. Magruder told 
Hodges to put his messages in writing.81
Magruder’ s men continued to wreck havoc. Foraging deteriorated 
into lawlessness. During a short twelve hour deployment to Jamestown 
Island, the 10th Louisiana k illed  and ate all the livestock except two 
horses.82 Colonel McLaws told his wife of an instance where a 
homeowner caught some Louisiana Zouaves stealing boards from his house. 
The owner asked what unit they were in, one soldier g lib ly replied, "Ve 
belongs to the f ir s t  Georgy. Nonsense, Georgians do not have that 
accent the owner replied. Vera well shrugged the soldier, bon jour and 
the soldiers ran away."83 Near West Point, Lieutenant Colonel Tomlin
^Williams, Yorktown, to his sister, 31 July 1861, Williams Papers.
mD. H. H ill to the officers of his command, Cary Letterbook, 30 
July 1861.
81War Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 39-40.
“ Jones, Tigers. 31.
“ McLaws to his wife, 18 August 1861, McLaws Papers.
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sent twenty-two members of the Barhamsville Greys and four Taylor Greys, 
both of Tomlin’ s Battalion, to Yorktown to face charges of 
insubordination.84
In the midst of these problems, Magruder expressed his concern to 
the troops in General Orders number 57. He said the recent moves of the 
army provided temptations to the troops, and unfortunately a small 
number had committed depredations such as looting homes stealing corn 
and poultry. The entire army was shamed by these actions and he hoped 
everyone would work to stop i t .  Sentinels were to be posted at private 
homes, and he exhorted all officers and men to bring the culprits to 
summary justice.85
Magruder tried on many occasions to bait Butler into a battle 
beyond the range of Fortress Monroe’ s guns, but the Union forces showed 
no inclination to accept the challenge. The primary theater was
Northern Virginia and after the rebels’ victory at Manassas Butler
contracted his lines and burned a part of Hampton.
On 2 August, Butler confided to Washington that he feared a rebel 
attack was imminent; indeed on 3 August Magruder departed the 
Williamsburg, Yorktown area with 4,400 troops and made camp at Bethel.
On 6 August, Union cavalry reported Magruder in force at Whitney’ s Farm 
near the New Market Bridge just 2 1/2 miles from Hampton.86 Private 
Williams reported to his Aunt Mary,
“ Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Tomlin, West Point, to General Magruder, 
Yorktown, 13 August 1851, Tomlin’ s Battalion Letterbook, Eleanor S. 
Brockenbrough Library, Museum of the Confederacy, Richmond.
85QR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 222-23.
“ OR, series 1, 4:567-68.
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We started at daybreak, marched by Hampton, halted within 
two miles of Newport News, drew our army up In line of battle  
and just dared the cowardly rascals out of their den . . .
There we were with only about half our whole army down here In 
a great big fie ld  right between Fortress Monroe and Newport 
News with no fortification  or masked batteries.
The next day Magruder demonstrated near Newport News. Williams 
reported,
We had about three hundred cavalry and the whole number 
galloped round right under the guns at Newport News daring them 
out, without even being fired at. We stayed there about two 
hours waiting for the enemy to advance, and then went around 
and drew up the line again on the outskirts of Hampton, but the 
cowards had actually le f t  the place although strongly fo rtified  
and retired to the fortress.
Magruder commented,
This [demonstration] was kept up the entire day but no 
attack was made, and with the exception of occasionally a 
horseman seen at a distance speeding away as i f  to carry 
information to Old Point or Newport News none of them were 
v is ib le .89
At this point while meeting at Major George Wray’ s house on Back 
River Road, he received a copy of The Tribune, a northern newspaper. I t  
contained a le tte r from Butler to the Secretary of War in which he 
declared an intention to colonize Negroes for the winter in the deserted 
homes in Hampton. Magruder was furious. Since Hampton was in range of 
Fort Monroe’ s guns, he could not hold the c ity  i f  he captured i t .  So he 
decided to destroy the town instead of letting the Federals use i t .
Magruder assigned the mission to the Old Dominion Dragoons, who were 
from Hampton, the Mecklenburg Cavalry, the Warwick Beauregards and the
87Williams, Bethel Church, to Aunt Mary, 9 August 1861, Williams 
Papers.
“ Ibid.
89QB, series 1, 4:570.
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York Rangers. The 14th Virginia provided the covering force.90
The evening of 7 August, Captain Jefferson C. Phillips led the 
force across a rebuilt New Market bridge into Hampton to St. John’ s 
Church. Phillips sent Lieutenant George Booker Jones to inform the few 
remaining citizens that the town was about to be burned. Twenty men 
were stationed at Hampton bridge to prevent Federal interference and 
each company was given a quadrant of the town to torch.
Just after midnight the flames began to crackle and Phillips 
reported, "Flames were seen bursting from the buildings on a ll sides 
t i l l  i t  appeared the town was one mass of flames from one end to the 
other."91 Robert Hudgins, a member of Phillips’ company recalled, "As 
the smoke and flames ascended to heaven. I was reminded of the ancient 
sacrifices on the a ltar to many deities and I thought of how our l i t t l e  
town was being made sacrifice to the grim God of war."92 Williams 
recounted,
About one o’ clock, i t  was the grandest sight I  ever beheld, 
though I could hardly drive back the tears when I looked round 
at the officers and privates right there on the ground who had 
been born and raised in the place and were now seeing the very 
homes of their childhood, the very houses which had so long 
sheltered and protected them burnt to the around. To them the 
scene must have been heartrending indeed.
Phillips’ s men reassembled at the church and le f t  with an elderly
90Colonel J. C. Phillips, "How I Destroyed the Town of Hampton in 
[1862]," Daily Press, date unknown, Hampton Fine Arts Society, Hampton.
91Ibid.
92Robert S. Hudgins, "Burning of Hampton During the War Between the 
States August 1861," TMs, p. 32, Hampton Fine Arts Society, Hampton.
93Williams, Bethel Church, to Aunt Mary, 9 August 1861, Williams 
Papers.
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resident via the Sawyer Swamp road to Colonel Mallory’ s Farm. Most of 
the town was destroyed.
Butler in his report alleged the residents got only 15 minutes 
notice and that he had to care for "The old and infirm, who by this 
wanton act of destruction are now le f t  houseless and homeless."9*
Butler justified  not defending the town by not wishing to be a part of 
this "heathenish outrage." He admitted that a few of his troops had 
been guilty of minimal looting "less than a hundred dollars and all 
[stolen] property has been stored in the seminary."95 Butler evaded 
answering the Negro question that provoked Magruder’ s action by denying 
that he intended to winter Federal troops in Hampton. While no mention 
was made of Magruder’ s action in o ffic ia l Richmond, he apparently 
pleased his troops and embarrassed the Yankees and Butler again.
By the end of August Magruder had made great progress unifying his 
command. Lee had cooperated fu lly  and Magruder repaid him with a 
cogent, integrated defense that bottled up the Federal force at the tip  
of the Peninsula. Magruder had so mastered the byroads and water 
passages of the lower Peninsula that he was able to provide his 
subordinates with detailed warnings of possible traps. He disposed his 
forces so that most positions supported each other and every navigable 
waterway was defended. A rtille ry  batteries, r i f le  pits and breastworks 
dotted the landscape along the Newport News and Hampton roads. After 
Hampton was burned Williams wrote from Bethel,
I think old [McGruder] intends fortifying this place and
W0R, series 1, 4:567-58.
" ib id .
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make 1t a strong point to fa ll back upon 1n case he should be 
able to provoke an attack from the enemy 1n any of these 
expeditions through the country and 1t Is probable we w ill stay 
here until the works are finished.
Although only a private, Williams understood his commander. The very
same day, 9 August, Magruder wrote Richmond and explained that his
movements had been designed to distract the Federal government.97
Magruder was suspicious of a ll possible Yankee moves; perhaps his 
own m ilitary Intuition told him that an enemy which made regular aerial 
reconnaissances and received regular intelligence reports from defecting 
Negroes had to know of his weak force and Incomplete fortifications. To 
prepare for a Federal movement against his lines which he considered 
inevitable, the commanding general refused to allow his troops to become 
complacent. McLaws’ s 18 July le tte r to his wife typifies Magruder’ s 
proactive posture,
I was awakened at three o’ clock by a dispatch from Magruder 
to move the Second Louisiana at once without breakfast to a 
point seven miles away. Also sent two six pounders with them.
Also moved two other cannon to another of his works four miles 
away. All took until eight th ir ty .98
McLaws praised Magruder in saying,
Every commanding officer has been put on alert by the 
alertness of the commanding general. I t  is meant that he has 
taken a ll possible precautions to prevent the enemy from 
landing at any place on the coast or approaching from any
w[ ] Represents apparent word. Williams, Bethel Church, to Aunt 
Mary, 9 August 1861, Williams Papers.
97QB, series 1, 4:570.
Magruder was proactive in orienting troops to their possible 
fie ld  of combat. He frequently ordered troops be taken to their 
entrenchments to orient them to the route of march and the 
strengths/weaknesses of the position. This citation reflects the 
practical application of Magruder’ s philosophy. McLaws to wife, 18 July 
1861, McLaws Papers.
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direction without being Informed beforehand 1n sufficient time 
to make the best possible use of his means of defense.
But clearly HcLaws expressed the thoughts of a ll when he said,
The enemy have been extraordinarily quiet and no doubt are 
In contemplation of some grand movement . . . However, I am 1n 
rapid preparation for his coming and 1f allowed another week 
w ill be in a very strong position.
Magruder clearly articulated Colonel Johnston’ s role as the cavalry 
eyes of his shield. Johnston was tasked to repress marauding parties of 
the enemy, sweep the lower Peninsula of Negroes, return them to work and 
destroy Yankee outposts. As time permitted Magruder told him to 
strengthen the works at Bethel, Young’ s M ill and Harrod’ s M il l .101
Magruder was severely undermanned for the amount of work which 
needed to be done. While soldiers did admirable work, Magruder depended 
on agents to comb the countryside and provide him large numbers of 
Negroes. While the slaves constituted a security risk, they did free 
the soldiers for the multiple d r ills  they needed to learn the art of 
soldiering.
Magruder sought as many workers as he could get. Proclamations 
tasked counties to release as many as half, but usually a third of their 
total black male population. A typical call was sent to Colonel Crump 
at Gloucester Point. Crump was told to direct citizens in Gloucester, 
Middlesex and Matthews counties to turn out 50 percent of a ll male 
slaves. Agents were instructed to hire or impress the free blacks. Pay 
was 50 cents per day plus rations. To appreciate the scope of
" ib id .
100Ibid.
101QB, series 1, 2:990-92.
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Magruder’ s expectations he told Crump that a similar call netted 800 
Negroes at Williamsburg. Magruder suggested that 600 Negroes could make 
Gloucester Point Impregnable in ten days by deeping ditches, thickening 
parapets and constructing traverses.102
Activities like  these were bound to cause hard feelings between 
Magruder and the slave owners. A le tte r on 26 August from former 
President John Tyler and H ill Carter, Robert E. Lee’ s cousin, followed 
up a personal interview with Secretary of War, Leroy Walker. They 
reported disaffection with Magruder’ s 15 July call to Charles City and 
New Kent County for 50 percent of their slaves to work on breastworks in 
Williamsburg. Since the call Interfered with the wheat harvesting, they 
questioned Magruder’ s legal authority to requisition the Negroes.
Walker quickly affirmed Magruder’ s authority to call the slaves out, but 
noted he expected Magruder to issue property receipts.103 Magruder 
did as he was told and in September his impressments were fu lly  
sanctioned. Magruder’ s only restriction was not to impress 
Indians.104
Magruder’ s great work on land was being matched along the state’ s
102Ib id ., 1007.
103The issue of slave impressment was controversial throughout the 
war. The issues frequently boiled down the requisitioning agents’ 
inab ility  to guarantee the safe return of the slave property on demand, 
and the interference impressment had on the operation of the owner’ s 
business. Tyler’ s and Carter’ s letters did not appear to originate from 
a lack of patriotism. OR, series 1, 4:636; OR, series 1, 51:252. Two 
articles provide more insight into this vexing problem, Harrison A. 
Trexler, "The Opposition of Planters to the Employment of Slaves as 
Laborers by the Confederacy," Mississippi Valiev Historical Review 27 
(Sep 1940): 211, and Bernard Nelson, "Confederate Slave Impressment 
Legislation, 1861-1865," Journal of Negro History 31 (Oct 1946): 392.
104OR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 306.
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rivers. Although Magruder did not correspond frequently with the naval 
officers commanding the James River and York River, he was aware of 
their activities and he frequently requested their support, usually 
through Richmond. In mid-June at Magruder’ s request, Lee directed the 
steamer Teaser to support the batteries at Jamestown and Grove Wharf and 
not venture beyond the range of the Jamestown cannons.105 Lee also 
asked naval officers to fa c ilita te  getting naval ordinance to Magruder 
to cover land approaches.106
Magruder was an a r t il le r is t  and he understood the complexities of 
the big naval guns. Colonel George W. Randolph, his chief a r t i l le r is t ,  
managed the placement and transfer of the big guns. Magruder sought but 
never received an adequate training cadery or sufficient manpower to 
service the guns he had.107
Apart from requesting untested a rtille r is ts  who were training in 
Richmond, Magruder embarked on a vigorous program of cross-training.
Infantry companies were detailed to learn about servicing a rtille ry
pieces. Some units were told to sp lit their d rills  between infantry and 
a rtille ry . In addition to the army a rtille r is ts  naval gunners helped 
train the soldiers.108
105QRU, series 1, 5:808-9; QR, series 1, 2:935-36.
106ORN, series 1, 5:808-9.
107Magruder and Randolph made several requests to secure any type 
of instructor cadery. In the absence of any support from Richmond, men 
such as Randolph, a former naval officer, J. Thompson Brown, and naval 
Lieutenant Catesby Jones frequently crisscrossed the Peninsula to 
provide on-the-job training. War Department, Confederate Correspondence 
and Orders. 11, 29, 34; Williams, Yorktown, to sister, 31 July 1861, 
Williams Papers.
108OR, series 1, 4:634-35.
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Hagruder did not control the activities of the Navy, but he was 
heavily dependent on them. Their roles were complementary; both sought 
to prevent the Yankees’ from reaching Richmond. Naval schemes to close 
the rivers served the dual purpose of covering Magruder’ s flanks. 
Consequently, Magruder began to show great Interest 1n encouraging the 
Navy to take actions which would be compatible with his plans.
The York River did not penetrate completely to Richmond and i t  was 
in it ia lly  protected at several points, the most prominent being the 
Yorktown/Gloucester Point defensive complex. The James River on the 
other hand was wide, long and i t  passed Richmond. Efforts to constrict 
the James River would force Union vessels to cross narrow channels under 
the f ire  of Magruder’ s guns at Mulberry Island and Jamestown. The Fort 
Boykins battery on the south side of the river would help steer Union 
vessels into the trap.
In early July, chief engineer Andrew Talcott tasked naval 
Lieutenant P. R. Page to develop a hydrographic chart and recommend 
areas of the James River for obstruction. Just over a week la ter on 
10 July, Lee assigned Captain George Hollins the command of the James 
River defenses with a task to close the Swash Channel and, i f  suitable, 
develop a Mulberry Island s ite .109 Magruder completely concurred and 
he pressed Lee for a decision.110 Once the Mulberry Island battery 
was approved Magruder worked hard to support i t .  Magruder sought to 
make his right flank on the James secure by closing the mouth of the
109ORN. series 1, 5:811; Andrew Talcott, Richmond, to Lieutenant P. 
R. Carter, 1 July 1851, Andrew Talcott Papers.
110OR, series 1, 2:970-71.
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Warwick River, while Talcott and Hollins tried to close the Swash 
Channel.111 Eventually, the Navy completely supported Magruder’ s plan 
on the James.
Magruder’ s meddling disturbed Captain William C. Whittle commander 
of the York River defenses. Magruder had established control of the 
land forces on either side of the York. He also presumed to control the 
placement of a ll ordinance. When he removed two 14 Inch guns from 
Whittle’ s battery at Gloucester Point and relocated them to his land 
battery at Yorktown, Whittle exploded. Whittle tersely asked Captain D. 
N. Ingraham in Richmond for Magruder’ s authority, closing with a 
declaration that i f  Magruder could move weapons without consulting 
Whittle then Whittle’ s authority was false!112 The guns were not 
returned.
Magruder appreciated the Navy’ s need for support and he 
provided manpower as he could. In mid-August, Magruder advised Captain 
Thomas J. Peyton commanding Peyton’ s Battery in Yorktown, that a rtille ry  
companies supporting the naval batteries would answer to the naval 
officer commanding the battery. They were subject to naval d r il l  and 
fatigue duty on fortifications; but retained the right to d r il l  as an 
a rtille ry  company on their own time.113
As August began to wain Magruder spread his authority further. 
Reports of undisciplined m ilitia  and Yankee raids for Negroes in
1110R, series 1, 4:634; ORN, series 1, 6:717; Andrew Talcott, 
Richmond, to T. M. R. Talcott, 26 August 1861, 3 September 1861, Andrew 
Talcott Papers.
1120RN, series 1, 5:812.
1130R, series 1, 4:634-35.
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Matthews County north of the York brought a request for help from 
concerned citizens. Magruder sought from Richmond and received command 
of Gloucester, Middlesex, and Matthews counties. He Immediately ordered 
Colonel Crump to extend his authority to the P1ank1tank River In 
Matthews County and to take command of the m ilit ia  there. After a site  
survey, Crump was ordered to provide Magruder with recommendations for 
fortifications to protect his le f t  flank.114
As Crump wrestled with his new responsibilities, Magruder 
contemplated forward basing near Bethel. Because of his pathetic 
shortage of wagons, he lobbied Northrup for forward commissaries stocked 
with 20 days rations of pork, bacon, flour, beans, peas, rice, coffee, 
sugar, candles, soap, salt and whiskey for 6,000 men. Three days la ter, 
Magruder amended his request to 60,000 rations at both Warwick Court 
House and Harrod’ s M ill, 100,000 at Yorktown and 50,000 at Williamsburg. 
He added the requirement for 60,000 more rations every five days, 50,000 
going to Yorktown and 10,000 to Williamsburg.115 The reason for all 
this activity was a suspected Yankee advance. On 26 August, McLaws 
wrote,
There is a rumor that the enemy have landed about 300 
horses at Fortress Monroe and i t  is believed that i t  is their 
intention to attempt forays along the coast, stealing Negroes, 
and chickens, k illing  cattle, and burning houses as seems to be 
their practice now whenever an opportunity offers.
One day la ter, Magruder reported that a naval expedition was afloat at
114Ib id ., 634, 636, 649.
11sIb id ., 635.
116McLaws to his wife, 26 August 1861, McLaws Papers.
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Fort Monroe.117
Despite the demanding pace of the summer, Magruder was unaware that 
he was fighting his greatest enemy sight unseen. Even as ugly rumors 
spread about Magruder’ s drunkeness, a llies were rallying support in 
Richmond as September arrived.
1170RN. series 1, 6:717.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM
The end of the summer inaugurated a lengthy period that was devoid 
of m ilitary action. The new federal general-in-chief, George McClellan, 
had no thoughts of testing the Confederacy via the Peninsula and with 
the main Confederate army behind entrenchments in northern Virginia, 
President Lincoln seemed to favor action there. This sh ift in emphasis 
created d ifficu lties  for Magruder.
In the absence of m ilitary activ ity , Magruder and his diminutive 
force moved to the back rank of Richmond’ s prio rities . General Lee le ft  
his advisory position in Richmond to assume command in western Virginia 
and la te r South Carolina. When he le f t  Magruder lost a supportive a lly . 
Lee understood the complexities of the Peninsula and when he departed, 
myopic national leadership lost sight of Magruder’ s needs. Magruder had 
been in the spotlight, but the success at Manassas focused attention on 
others.
Although Magruder was not receiving the supplies he needed, he was 
highly visible within Richmond’ s "official c ircle." Social cliques were 
a fact in the Confederate Capitol and various regions maintained 
considerable political power bases. Magruder ran afoul of Governor 
Letcher, a resident of Lexington, over the m ilitia  issue. He also 
crossed swords with the powerful gentry of the Tidewater region over 
slave impressments. In Richmond he faced vicious rumors concerning his
67
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drinking. I t  seemed Magruder’ s antebellum reputation with old West 
Point contemporaries such as Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee may have 
carried over. Surely, D. H. H ill had specific, negative feelings about 
Magruder. Nonetheless, formal society spoke frequently about members of 
their clique and Magruder was " fa ir game."
Magruder was from Albemarle, near Charlottesville, and he 
circulated in a preeminent social circle which included George Wythe 
Randolph, his chief a r tille ry  officer. Randolph was an unsuccessful 
candidate for the Confederate Congress and a future Secretary of War.
In late August Randolph, following a v is it to Richmond, wrote Albert T. 
Bledsoe, another Charlottesville native and undersecretary in the War 
Department,
He [Magruder] is currently represented as being very 
dissipated. . . . Upon my own knowledge, Genl Magruder since 
his appointment as a Brigadier General, has not used 
intoxicating liquors of any sort and has been as rigid a 
temperance man as Father Matthew himself.
Randolph encouraged Bledsoe to speak out against any rumors he might
hear concerning Magruder’ s sobriety. S till rumors persisted and in late
November a member of Magruder’ s medical s ta ff wrote to the editor of the
Richmond Examiner.
Interrogatories put to me have insinuated that he 
[Magruder] is generally under the influence of intoxicating 
draughts . . .  I saw General Magruder at the Battle of Bethel.
I have probably seen him twenty times since at different places 
within his command. I have seen him in his headquarters and 
partaken of his hospitality when he was unreserved in his 
manners and I declare I have never seen him intoxicated.
10R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 251.
2"Letter to the Editor," The Richmond Examiner. 27 November
1861.
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The author challenged Magruder’ s detractors and questioned their 
motives,
I f  i t  Is a fact that he 1s addicted to this vice, why not 
court martial him? Why attack a generous and gallant soldier 
at night with the stileto? . . .  I am aware of officers who 
would like  to have his position; I  know there are parties who 
would rejoice to have him superseded.
I t  is not like ly  Magruder abstained from alcohol completely, but
evidence suggests he acted responsibly. Two incidents emphasize the
point. Lafayette McLaws described a dinner party held for Magruder and
the commanders of McLaws’ s Second Division: "The dinner was magnificent
and would have graced a New Orleans’ restaurant. A great many toasts
were given and speeches made 1n reply."4 The other incident described
his participation in a Louisiana Mardi Gras celebration in Williamsburg.
Some of the enlisted men set Magruder up to meet a feminine looking
soldier who was dressed in lady’ s clothes,
The gallant Magruder quickly took the "lady’ s" [Campbell] 
hand and began entertaining Campbell with food, drink, and 
live ly  conversation. During this interlude other battalion 
members entered the room above Magruder, ripped apart a feather 
mattress and shoveled the feathers through cracks in the floor. 
Magruder was covered with feathers, but the Tigers simply 
laughed and yelled that i t  was a Louisiana snowstorm.5
Although these incidents imply alcohol might be involved, no one
3Ibid.
4McLaws, Young’ s M ill, to his wife, 7 February 1862, McLaws 
Papers.
5Jones, Tigers. 33-34. While this incident certainly 
suggests alcohol may have been involved, the event was a festive 
one which Magruder was apparently willing to share with the 
enlisted personnel. On another occasion, cited in chapter 2 (see 
note 58), McLaws was unable to catch up with Magruder, who made an 
appearance at a barbecue banquet but continued on to examine his 
defensive works. McLaws to his wife, 8 July 1861, McLaws Papers.
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documented any consumption or excess on Magruder’ s part.
The longer the Yankees Ignored the Peninsula, the more Magruder’ s 
priority  for supplies and manpower decreased. The period from September 
1861 until February 1862 severely tested the morale and discipline of 
the department. Magruder refused to compromise with flagging spirits  
who were unwilling to endure the months of tedium. As early as 
September, some officers 1n the 3d Virginia Cavalry contemplated 
drafting a petition to spend the winter at home. In compensation, they 
proposed to extend their enlistment by three months the following 
summer.6
Clearly, Magruder faced a formidable challenge. Discipline was of 
the f irs t  order. Over 50 court-martials were reported and Magruder 
sought to c la rify  the status of prisoners held at Yorktown.7 The rigid  
camp schedule of 10th Louisiana regiment shows how he ran his 
department,
Reveille at 5:00 A.M., ro ll ca ll, then we cook our 
breakfast which of course we are supposed to eat. Half past 
eight, guard mounting, which is equal to a small parade as i t  
each day consists of forty men, one lieutenant, one sergeant, 
and three corporals. At 9:00 A.M. company d r il l  until 10:00 
A.M., after which we are free until 12:00 P.M. when we have 
dinner ca ll, after which comes what is called fatigue duty 
which means spades, and when there is no digging to be done, we 
have to clean up quarters. After which we are again free until 
6:00 P.M. Then dress parade and dismiss to cook our supper, 
eat, loaf, and spin yarns t i l l  9:00 P.M. when tattoo beats and 
a ll are sent to bed like a parcel of school boys.8
Richard H. Watkins to his home, 26 September 1861 and 
2 October 1861, TD in Watkins Papers, Virginia Historical Society, 
Richmond.
7General Orders numbers 70, 72, 73, 78, and 79; War 
Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 57.
8Jones, Tigers. 22.
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Freeman critic ized Hagruder for attempting to do a ll s ta ff work 
himself.9 Basic army management was s t i l l  foreign to many of 
Magruder’ s officers. In General Orders number 71, Magruder emphasized 
the necessity of forwarding a ll communications into and out of the 
department through department headquarters. This order la ter needed to 
be reissued. On another occasion, he chastised Colonel Levy for 
abandoning 4,000 rounds of ammunition and entrenching tools when he 
relocated his camp.10
As Commanding Officer Magruder faced an endless multitude of tasks. 
The existing slave labor force was inadequate to meet the manual labor 
requirements. He used a ll his resources to uncover sufficient labor; 
soldiers did double duty as ditch diggers. The primary labor source was 
the black man. The commander employed c iv ilian  agents to contact civic 
leaders in counties within and beyond his command. After the Secretary 
of War overruled John Tyler’ s challenge,11 Magruder embarked on an 
aggressive recruitment campaign that lasted the duration of his command. 
He constantly called for tools and slaves. On 2 September, he asked
Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:XXXIV. There are many 
instances when Magruder could have reasonably expected officers to 
execute their assigned tasks, but rea lity  was d ifferent. One 
September le tte r was particularly illu s tra tive , Magruder wrote to 
his engineer, a Captain Myers at Hardin’ s Bluff. He expressed 
concern that work was not starting on Mulberry Island defenses 
until after 9:00 A.M. Magruder insisted i t  start at sunrise. 
Unfortunately, Myers was commuting from the southside of the James 
River. Magruder told Myers that he should stay in accommodations 
near Mulberry Island. RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to 
Myers, 2 September 1861.
10General Orders number 71; RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, 
Magruder to Colonel Levy, 7 September 1861.
110R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 252.
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Confederate Quartermaster Abraham C. Heyers for 500 digging spades.12 
These supplies were supplemented, sometimes reluctantly, by local 
farmers.13 Slaves that had been Impressed usually had to bring tools 
from their farm.
Magruder’ s relentless pursuit of the black labor force created 
disciplinary and security problems. Many slaves used the opportunity to 
escape to Union lines. This forced Magruder to place armed guards in 
the slave camps, remove slaves from details that provided temptations to 
escape and establish cavalry details to sweep the countryside for 
runaways.14 Fear of runaways increased owners’ reluctance to release 
slaves for army service. When the Confederate government temporarily 
withdrew lia b il ity  for slave property resistance to impressment 
increased.15 Deterrent measures for slaves included "a whip and f i f ty  
lashes."16
Magruder knew that the slave owners in York County, James City 
County and others within his jurisdiction would complain about regular 
levies for slaves. Such actions would impact various plantation 
activities and crop harvests. So he sought to employ free Negroes to 
the maximum extent possible. He offered 50 cents per day plus meals. 
Later he in itiated a scheme to hire free Negroes and slaves for 100
1ZR£ 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to Colonel A. C.
Meyers, 2 September 1861.
13Ib id ., 23 September 1861.
uGeneral Orders number 79.
1S0R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 458.
16(RG) 109, chapter 2, vol. 68, Special Orders number 698, 25 
March 1862.
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dollars per year; monthly rates varied from 10 dollars to 40 dollars per 
month.17
When these labor bids fa iled , Magruder was forced to impress the 
number needed. A. T. Bledsoe, Assistant Secretary of War, wrote "Your 
course in impressing labor for work upon fortifications in cases of 
absolute necessity and for a fa ir  price is fu lly  approved."18 Magruder 
followed by reaching out to King William, King and Queen, Gloucester, 
Mathews, Surry, Lancaster, Sussex, Chesterfield, Dinwittie and 
Petersburg. Whenever individual owners refused to support him, he sent 
dragoons to guarantee slave owners’ "support" for Negro musters.
Assembly points were usually Yorktown, Williamsburg or Gloucester Point. 
Slaves were examined and unhealthy candidates returned to their 
masters.19 Suitable workers were retained to complete specific tasks 
or were kept for a period of time and returned to their masters.20
17Magruder worked a number of schemes to raise sufficient 
Negro workers. A sample proclamation was "Workers needed—send 
them with spades, shovels, picks, hoes, axes. Pay is f i f t y  cents 
per day and food. Will pay free Negroes and masters of slaves the 
same rate. Send to the nearest wharf and thence via 
Williamsburg." OB, series 1, 4:654. Magruder believed direct 
hire of Negroes would work better and in December 1861, and 
January 1862 he sought approximately 600 employees. When the 
direct hire schemes failed to produce sufficient laborers, he 
fin a lly  received authority to again impress slaves. OB, series 1, 
4:715-16; QB» series 1, vol. 51, part 2 ,  472-73.
18Q B, series 1, 4:654; OB, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 310.
19There is plentiful documentation of this point. The 
following citations are representative. E£ 109. chapter 2, vol. 
227, 29 October 1861; OB, series 1, 4:654.
20B£ 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to I .  M. St. John,
25 November 1861. Later Magruder was compelled to convince 
Richmond that the impressed slaves were being properly treated;
OB, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 475.
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Magruder's aggressiveness earned him several rebukes from Richmond. 
Indians claimed an exemption from the work force and Governor Letcher 
supported them. He advised Magruder that the Indians would volunteer to 
work on boats, i f  solicited.21 Unfortunately many Indians were unable 
to produce proof of race and Magruder impressed them as colored labor.
On another occasion, Secretary of War, Judah Benjamin, denied Magruder’ s 
request to draft 500 slaves to work on the defensive works. Benjamin 
cited both their responsibility to produce food and the low probability 
of attack in Magruder’ s front.22 Political meddling got so bad 
Magruder ordered the release of Negroes belonging to Turner Curtis and 
the Chief Justice of King William County.23
Secretary Benjamin earned Magruder’ s lasting distain when he 
ordered him to rescind an order impressing slaves from Chesterfield. 
Despite an impassioned plea and a documented shortfall of nearly 600 
hands, Benjamin told Magruder he was wrong to cross d is tr ic t boundaries. 
Benjamin sharply admonished Magruder to, "Confine the exercise of your 
power of impressment to the geographical lim its of your own command."24 
Undaunted, Magruder unsuccessfully solicited Richmond’ s authority to 
impress 600 Negroes from Mecklenburg, Lunenburg and Brunswick counties.
21QR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 306.
220R, series 1, 4:697.
a R£ 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to St. John, 16 November
1861.
24An obviously b itte r Magruder on sick leave before the Seven 
Days campaign, openly criticized Judah Benjamin. Rebel war clerk
Jones wrote on 23 Jun 1862, "He is too open in his censures of the
late Secretary of War." Jones, Diary. 135. This chapter w ill
document other clashes between Benjamin and Magruder. The
citation herein is OR, series 1, 9:33-34, 36.
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He argued slave owners would prefer Impressment with government 
l ia b il ity  to direct hire schemes.25 One week la ter, Colonel Ewell 
advised his friend Professor Joynes, working 1n the War Department, that
while 1,500 Negroes could finish the fortifications in 6 weeks; work was
at a standstill because of Richmond’ s intransigence.26 A week after 
Ewell’ s le tte r , Richmond authorized Magruder to impress slaves at ten 
dollars per month to complete the Peninsula defenses.27
Clearly Magruder did not make any po litical friends over the slave 
impressment issue. Additionally, he began to alienate some of his
p o litica lly  connected subordinates. He curtly advised the former
governor of Alabama, now colonel of the 8th Alabama, John Winston, to 
stop whining about being displaced from his camp. He advised Colonel T. 
R. R. Cobb of the influential Georgia clique that Georgians could be 
detailed as carpenters or any other task that needed to be done.28
Just as Magruder was unburdened by the reassignment of D. H. H ill 
on 24 September, he inherited other problems. The Cobb brothers would 
be good fighters, but they were po litica lly  in fluentia l. Howell was 
president of the Confederate Congress and he frequently clashed with 
Magruder, who did not believe Cobb could do justice to his command and 
direct the legislature. Although he in it ia lly  supported Magruder,
250R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 456-57.
26QB, series 1, 9:42-43.
270R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 472-73.
28War Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 61-62.
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Howell Cobb later cane to believe Magruder was an alarmist.29 
Lafayette McLaws of Georgia testified  to their Influence when he wrote,
The Cobbs are coming over to the Peninsula and I suppose 
their worships must be provided for before the claims of any 
others can be considered. Thomas R. R. Cobb with his Legion 
has already arrived and reports say that Howell 1s to follow 
and w ill come as a Brigadier General. I do not wish to be 
under any politician.
Although the Cobbs did exert Influence Magruder’ s team had been 
previously established. McLaws’ s loyalty resulted in his promotion to 
Brigadier General with a divisional command,
I am Indebted to General Magruder particularly for the 
honorable position I am now occupying. To his favor alone, I 
owe the fortune of being in command all the time since my 
arriva l.
Magruder also solicited authority to reorganize his a rtille ry  into two 
regiments under a brigade with his friend, Randolph, in command as a 
brigadier. Magruder asked Letcher to intervene on Randolph’ s behalf 
with President Davis.32 Although some people considered this appeal to 
be blatantly p o litica l, Randolph’ s considerable experience in naval
H ill was reassigned to command in North Carolina on 24 
September 1861. The North Carolina, "Bethel Regiment" were six 
month volunteers and would leave within six weeks. Magruder and 
H ill exchanged curt correspondence before H ill departed. War 
Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 44-45, 48; RG 
109, vol. 2, chapter 227, Magruder to H ill ,  17 September 1861; OR, 
series 1, 4:656; John Eddins Simpson, Howell Cobb. The Politics of 
Ambition (Chicago: Adams Press, 1973), 153-54.
30McLaws, Young’ s Farm, to his wife, 29 September 1861, McLaws 
Papers.
31 Ibid. Previous McLaws correspondence revealed his 
unbridled ambition for promotion to general officer. In late 
July, Magruder promised McLaws a promotion. Magruder was true to 
his word and he actively solicited/procured McLaws’ commission.
32War Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 48-49.
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weaponry allowed him to make repeated and specific recommendations for 
employment of Magruder’ s a r t il le ry .33
By early October Magruder decided to reorganize his forces Into 
brigades. General Orders number 89 created eight brigades under the 
commands of McLaws, Hunt, August, Colquitt, Winston, McKinney,
Sulakowski and Ewell. Command posts were established at Young’ s M ill, 
Harrod’ s M ill, Land’ s End, Ship’ s Point, Mulberry Point, Spratley’ s 
Farm, Lee’ s M ill, Williamsburg and Yorktown. A cavalry outpost was 
created at Bethel, under Colonel Robert Johnston.34 When the 
reorganization did not produce promotions for many colonels, now Major 
General Magruder,35 superseded General Orders number 89 with General 
Orders number 105. The First Division was headquartered at Yorktown 
under Brigadier General Gabriel Rains and the Second Division at Young’ s 
Mill under Brigadier General McLaws. This organization remained in 
effect for the duration of the Department of the Peninsula’ s l i f e .36
^Randolph was not a political ornament. Although he did not 
particularly care for fie ld  service, having expressed his feelings 
to J. Thompson Brown, he was active in the management of heavy 
ordinance. He frequently sought permission to relocate heavy 
a rtille ry  when he thought i t  was misused. Magruder relied on 
Randolph and obviously preferred his company. Randolph was 
rewarded with a brigadier general’ s wreath and command of the 
Suffolk expedition in March 1862. Soon after, he became the 
Secretary of War. Biographical information is contained in Ezra 
Warner, Generals in Gray. (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1959), 252-53.
^QR, series 1, 4:668-70.
35Magruder was promoted to Major General 7 October 1861.
“ SB, series 1, 4:697-98.
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Magruder’ s conflicts with Richmond continued and at times were 
acidic. In early July, Magruder identified a problem with the pine 
construction of the naval gun carriages. After seeking details about 
the durability of the carriages he solicited replacements, "[They] w ill 
not stand ten discharges of the gun.*37 When replacement carriages 
were not immediately sent, he badgered the Secretary of the Navy,
Stephen Mallory. Responding on behalf of Mallory, George Minor,
Director of the Bureau of Ordinance and Hydrography, advised Magruder 
that he would get replacements after other requisitions were f il le d .  
Magruder was outraged and sharply endorsed the le tte r to President Davis 
with a request that Davis determine the p rio rities .38
By 25 October Magruder was again at Richmond’ s throat. He bluntly 
complained to General Cooper that three of his agents had been unable to
draw $179,000 to pay his troops. He noted the lack of pay since 30 June
was "inexcusable." He continued by saying his "cannons are drawn by 
miserable horses and the carts by miserable mules,"39 100 a rtille ry  
horses and harnesses were needed immediately. Magruder continued by 
alleging the friction  primers from the Ordinance Department for the guns 
were worthless and his transportation shortage remained acute. He
37The seizure of unmounted naval guns was a windfall for the 
Confederacy, but Richmond was immediately pressured to provide the 
mounts. Use of soft pine wood limited the size of the charge 
which could be used in the guns. The recoil would demolish the 
gun mounts. Magruder invested two months in the problem and he 
fin a lly , in frustration, elevated the problem to President Davis.
The audit tra il of correspondence was OR, series 1, 2:1008-9; OR, 
series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 209; OR, series 1, 4:646-47; Ib id .,
653; QR, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 306-7; QR, series 1, 4:656.
“ 0B, series 1, 4:656.
39Ib id ., 691.
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completed his c ircu it of blame by noting his need for reinforcements, 
blasting the procurement system and expressing contempt for Richmond’ s 
policy that required him to get his own forage, while agents from 
Richmond worked his d is tric t for other commands. He concluded by 
saying, "I was w illing to submit to these things at the commencement 
after a reasonable time, but further neglect 1s criminal."40
When Magruder experienced troubles with his telegraph line to 
Richmond he asked William Morris, President of the Telegraph Company, to 
act swiftly to repair 1t. A week later after Morris had not fixed the 
line, he asked General Cooper to force Morris to cooperate. Eventually, 
Magruder hired a man to ride constantly along the telegraph route and 
report its  status.41
Magruder also fe lt  compelled to remotivate Captain Hope at 
Williamsburg. Northrop’s previous orders to Hope to disobey Magruder 
had been overridden and Magruder continued to coerce Hope’ s support. A 
requisition for 100 beeves and other rations for Cockletown was 
accompanied by a threat of s tric t disciplinary action i f  Hope did not 
execute Magruder’ s orders.42 In the absence of m ilitary action, 
Magruder’ s demands seemed presumptuous and made few friends. His 
"mailed fis t"  handling of hapless and harried bureaucrats most like ly  
fed the rumors of his drinking problem.
40Ibid.
41R£5 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to William Morris,
Richmond, 9 November 1861; Ib id ., Magruder to Captain Archer, West 
Point, 16 November 1861; OR, series 1, 4:701.
42RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder, Bethel, to 
Quartermaster Hudgins, Williamsburg, 11 November 1861.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Despite the problems with Richmond, Magruder continued to work on a 
river defense scheme. The James River defenses Improved with the 
strengthening of Fort Boykins and fo rtification  of Mulberry Island. 
Magruder believed the river would be effectively closed I f  Yankee 
vessels could be forced to pass the fire  of the forts.
Once the navy commenced actions to close the Swash Channel of the 
James River, Magruder lobbied Richmond to authorize the use of 25 stone 
vessels to simultaneously close the mouth of the Warwick River. During 
a v is it  to Richmond on 1 September, Magruder advised President Davis of 
his plans concerning Mulberry Island. He further advised Davis that 
both Jamestown and Gloucester Point were vulnerable to land assault. To 
counteract the shortfall, he proposed to build strong earthworks that 
when properly manned would protect the river batteries.43
As the engineers and navy moved to sink more boats and drive 
pilings into the river, Magruder revealed his James River strategy. On 
7 September at Magruder’ s request, Captain Tucker moved the James River 
Squadron consisting of the Patrick Henry. Jamestown and Teaser to a 
point near Mulberry Island.44 Almost simultaneously, Colonel Hodges,
14th Virginia on Mulberry Island, received detailed instructions to
43QB, series 1, 4:644-45.
wThe James River Squadron was established to protect the 
James River from ascent by Union vessels. None of the three were 
legitimate ships of war, the Jamestown and Patrick Henrv were 
seized at the start of the war. The Teaser was purchased. The 
commanders were Patrick Henrv [flagship], Commander J. R. Tucker, 
Jamestown. Lieutenant J. N. Barney, and Teaser. Lieutenant J. H. 
Rochelle. The Patrick Henrv had 10 guns, 1 10", 1 64 pounder, 6 
8", and 2 32 pounders. The other two vessels had two small guns 
each. Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, vol. 2 
(Washington: GPO, 1963), 538, 555, 573.
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defend 1t. Hodges was told to keep McLaws Informed and not get Isolated
by an enemy movement. He comforted Hodges by advising him that 2,500
men would be stationed 1n supporting distance at both Warwick Courthouse 
and Cockletown. Magruder then ordered Colonel Henry Forno, Fifth  
Louisiana, to support Hodges from the v icin ity  of Denbigh Church.45
Now that the ground and naval forces were positioned on the James 
River, Magruder bombarded Richmond with determined requests for stone 
boats and rations. He also requested an allocation of four canal boats
to use as quarters for the Mulberry Island troops.46
While the James River defenses rightfu lly  attracted attention 
because of the implications for Norfolk and Richmond, the York River was 
potentially more troublesome. Consequently, Magruder attacked the 
problem of its  defense with equal enthusiasm.
The York River, unlike the James River, was deep in its  main 
channel and was not as like ly  to develop shoals or sandbars. By natural 
design, i t  had a forward choke point. The distance between Yorktown and 
Gloucester Point across the York was barely three-quarters of a mile and 
was easily within range of Magruder’ s armament. Elevated terrain  
rendered well placed batteries nearly immune to counterbattery fire . 
Assaulting vessels faced the unenviable prospect of hostile f ire  from 
two or more positions. Yet, i f  either Yorktown or Gloucester Point were 
captured the task would not be as daunting. The terminus of the York
450R, series 1, 4:640-41, 646; ORN, series 1, 6:712, 715-17,
723-24; Andrew Talcott, Richmond, to T.M.R. Talcott, 3 September 
1861, Andrew Talcott Papers.
^ a r  Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 60-
61.
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River was West Point [Eltham] described by Janes Williams:
The river and everything together was the prettiest sight I 
ever beheld. As you approach West Point, the Mattaponl cones 
down on your le f t  and on the right the Panunkey and just at the 
end of the railroad, they both unite and form the York River, 
the prettiest and grandest looking thing I ever saw.
The Pamunkey River led to the v ic in ity  of Richmond, but since i t  was not
navigable by deep water vessels, a railroad ran from Richmond to the
wharf.
Magruder had previously seen his Department extended into Matthews 
County on the middle Peninsula, but with insufficient manpower to cover 
even the Peninsula lines, he sought the most economical means of
defending Gloucester Point. Sufficient guns were placed 1n the seaside
batteries but a rtille ry  companies did not have enough manpower to defend 
the overland approaches. Early in September, Magruder advised General 
Cooper that Colonel Crump had enough guns, but he needed five companies 
of a r t il le r is ts . In addition, Colonel Randolph in Yorktown had 21 guns 
without manpower. The only three companies available, Peyton’ s, 
Bouton’ s, and DeGournay’ s were assigned to the naval batteries.
Randolph was particularly concerned about the a r tille ry  serving redoubts 
four and five between the main Yorktown line and the Warwick River. I f
those positions were captured, the Union forces would be within 800 
yards of the main Yorktown works. Normally 10 men served one gun, but 
because of the high percentage of illness Randolph sought 15 per gun.48
In less than a week, Crump’ s needs were satisfied by the addition
47James P. Williams, Gloucester Point, to his sister, 8 May 
1861, Williams Papers.
^OR, series 1, 4:638-40.
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of units from Richmond and Staunton. Magruder was advised that five 
regiments were being sent to him and that four companies of a rtille ry  
were being detached from Colonel Ewell’ s command to be replaced by 
m ilit ia .49
To prevent Yankee operations on the rivers, tributaries and creeks 
in front of Yorktown, Magruder instructed Randolph to place three 32 
pounders on barbette carriages at Ship’ s Point between the Poquoson 
River and Cheesman’ s Creek. Magruder believed this forward position 
could delay any Yankee movement long enough to permit relocation of some 
cannons from the river batteries; thus, he told Randolph to delay his 
work on the approaches to Yorktown until a Yankee movement was 
confirmed.50 He then instructed Colonel Mallory of the m ilitia  at 
Ship’ s Point to report a ll enemy movements.51
Now that Magruder had his flank positions in order, he devoted 
himself to extending his sensors beyond Gloucester toward Matthews 
County. The Rappahannock River had proven to be a profitable pickup 
point for Federal vessels seeking Negro refugees.52 Magruder was 
unable to spare any manpower from his main works so he again looked to 
mobilize the county m ilitia .
This time Magruder did not receive enthusiastic support. The 
colonel of 21st Virginia m ilitia  in Gloucester County, Werner Jones,
490R. series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 287-90.
50War Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 51;
QR, series 1, 4:652-53.
51RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to Colonel Mallory,
Ships Point, 12 October 1861.
5z0RN. series 1, 6:8-10.
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told Colonel Crump that he did not believe he was subject to Magruder’ s 
authority and that he would disband the m ilitia  instead of allowing them 
to be conscripted.
Magruder attempted to keep the m ilitia  from melting away. He 
immediately wrote to Jones and promised to relay Jones’ s concerns to 
Richmond, but Magruder also appealed to Jones’ s ego and patriotism. He 
said the best contribution of the m ilitia  was its  willingness to defend 
their county and their fam iliarity  with the features of the area. He 
pleaded with Jones not to discharge the m ilitia  over a difference of 
opinion and closed with a request for Jones’ s valuable insights should 
he choose to resign his commission.53
Less than two days la ter, Lee advised that Governor Letcher had 
confirmed Magruder’ s authority over Jor.es.54 Two weeks la te r Magruder 
successfully pursued Letcher’ s permission to organize and enroll the 
m ilit ia .55 Unfortunately, Crump did not use Magruder’ s authority and 
when questioned a month later on the status of the m ilit ia , admitted 
that they had not yet been formed into a regiment.56
Now that Magruder had established control on the York River and its
surrounding areas, he determined i t  was safe to build a wharf at
Gloucester Point. He also advised Colonel Valerie Sulakowski at Ship’ s
Point of his impending reinforcement by Colonel Tomlin’ s 53d Virginia
530R, series 1, 4:652.
54R£ 109, chapter 8, vol. 236, Lee to Magruder, 21 September
1861.
550R, series 1, 4:675.
56RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, T. J. Page [Magruder] to 
Colonel Crump, Gloucester Point, 8 November 1861.
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infantry and ordered hint to defend his position to the last man.57 I t  
seemed certain that a 9 September Richmond Examiner artic le  had been 
accurate when i t  reported, "The whole of the York River has riverside 
batteries . . . you w ill never hear of Magruder’ s capitulation 
there."58
Magruder worked hard to maintain a veil of secrecy over his 
operations. Refugee civilians and local residents were particularly 
troublesome. Fishermen and oystermen moved into and through the shallow 
waters to make their liv ing . Their daily activ ities enabled them to 
track the progress of various rebel projects. Refugees desiring to go 
north were often granted passes to proceed to the Union lines via Fort 
Monroe. Spies with forged passes also sought passage between the lines. 
Yet, Magruder and his commanders achieved reasonable success.
Circulars identified specific persons for arrest and provosts kept 
busy escorting prisoners to Richmond under charges. Magruder encouraged 
Richmond to send emigrants via Kentucky or other routes north. He 
instructed Tomlin at West Point to prevent people from proceeding on the
57Ib id ., Magruder to Captain Page, CSN, 12 October 1861; 
Magruder to Colonel Sulakowski, Ship’ s Point, 22 October 1861.
58Although this citation is early in Magruder’ s command, i t  
is useful in two ways; f ir s t ,  i t  reflects the manifestation of 
Magruder’ s industrious pursuit of the challenge of fortifications. 
Early in his command, he promised to build fortifications which 
could be held until supporting troops could reach his position.
The second point is the level of expectation which was building 
throughout the south [and north as w ell]. Magruder was ready for 
a Union assault, the navy was ready, his men were ready, and the 
public was ready. When Union challenges failed to materialize, 
Magruder saw a marked deterioration in his command morale.
Unknown author, reprint of a Louisiana newspaper, Richmond 
Examiner. 9 September 1861. Navy Captain Whittle reported a fu ll 
complement of armament under his command at Gloucester Point, West 
Point, and Yorktown. 0RN» series 1, 6:734-45.
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Logan. Some people refused to be denied and were Intercepted on private 
vessels. In order to cut down on these Incidents, Magruder at numerous 
times directed the Impoundment of a ll private vessels.59 On the whole, 
Magruder’ s efforts were successful as no Union movements were attempted 
and many slaves were Intercepted and returned to camp. General Orders 
number 114 praised the vigilance of the cavalry for the "entire security 
within which we have been able so far, to prosecute our works of 
defense."60
Progress had a price and the 54 year old Magruder would pay I t  for 
the duration of his tenure as commander. McLaws commented, "General 
Magruder was over to my camp today and gave me a long ta lk . He appears 
worn and sick, Indeed he has a great many things to try  him and many 
arrangements to deal with and contend against."61 Special Orders 
number 516, signed by Magruder, provided explicit Instructions 
concerning the conduct of men on picket duty. Some soldiers were
59Magruder advised Colonel Hodges of the 14th Virginia to 
arrest a man named White who was enroute to Newport News and had 
information about a Confederate steamer. War Department, 
Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 42. Magruder arrested a 
seaman Clark trying to escape down the York River with his family 
and detained him at Gloucester Point. Another 10-12 people 
presented passes authorized by Richmond authorities. War 
Department, Confederate Correspondence and Orders. 46. A Frances 
Dennis was arrested three times. Magruder recommended his 
confinement. RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, Magruder to Cooper,
7 November 1861. McLaws questioned the loyality  of local 
residents several times. McLaws to wife, 23 December 1861, McLaws 
Papers. This vigilance was not relaxed as shown by a 6 March 1862 
tasking to arrest suspicious characters and place them in close 
confinement at Gloucester Point. RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 67.
“ General Orders number 114, 24 November 1861.
61McLaws, Youngs M ill, W illie , 18 October 1861, McLaws Papers.
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sleeping on duty and others deserting their posts for the seductions of 
private homes and pretty g ir ls . Management of sentinels needed 
standardization to maintain the security of the department.62
Lee reported to Letcher 1n June 1861 on the state of Virginia 
defenses and praised the responsiveness of citizen soldiers who were 
awakened from the slumber of peacetime pursuits. For Magruder and other 
commanders, the transition of recruits to soldier l i f e  was a continuous 
challenge. When not foraging to rectify shortfalls In government 
provisions, Magruder was seeking the right people to help manage the 
various activ ities . Several men volunteered to serve with Magruder with 
no formal rank and Magruder sought commissions for them. Yet, Richmond 
was slow to respond and some volunteers were tested to the lim its of 
their gentlemanly respectability.
One group that was particularly abused were the engineers. In late 
November, Magruder b itte rly  complained that they were not getting rank 
equal to their responsibilities and that some could not even get a 
commission. One man had been lost to Confederate service, because the 
commission would have made him junior to two subordinates. Magruder 
viewed the situation with deep concern.63
Magruder’ s professional demeanor was matched by compassion for his 
subordinates. A number of the activities that he pursued improved the
“ Special Orders number 516 in Cary Letterbook, 18 November
1861.
“ Men such as Joseph L. Brent and George Noland among others 
came to Magruder as civilians. He did his best for them, but when 
Richmond failed to commission Noland, he le ft  his post and had to 
be enticed back. Noland was eventually commissioned. The 
background can be followed in RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227,
6 November 1861 and 25 November 1861.
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quality l i f e  for his soldiers. In it ia lly , morale was very good. McLaws 
reported, "The Louisiana regiment Is 1n Williamsburg giving parties, 
singing, and serenading."64 Corson wrote Jennie, "We get plenty of 
oysters to eat with fresh beef and baker’ s bread fresh. Some of the 
boys brought a big lo t of chickens."65 On another occasion Corson 
wrote,
I  have a delightful time on the bay fishing. The last time 
I  was there, I  went out in a canoe about a half a mile and 
caught a fine string of fish.
Henry Carter wrote to his brother,
We had a regular old breakdown dance, our captain performs 
splendidly on the banjo and one of the men on the v io lin . We 
have the best band on the Peninsula.
Captain Richard Watkins of the Third Virginia Cavalry wrote,
Saw the Pecoson fslcl river, an arm of the sea quite broad.
Saw lots of fish , schools and schools of them . . . Many offers 
for dinner with men and officers serving fish, oysters, 
chickens, potatoes, tomatoes, corn, and peas in abundance.
Yet, there was cause for discontent. Soldier l i fe  was not all 
parties and relaxation. In October, after a "pitiless rainstorm," 
Carter informed his brother,
By the middle of the night water was three or four inches 
in my tent, and to complete our discomfort the tent gave way 
and caught us in a trap. . . . The ground was so saturated the
“ McLaws, Young’ s M ill, to W illie , 18 October 1861, McLaws 
Papers.
65Corson, 50-51.
“ ib id ., 38-39.
67Carter, Deep Creek, to brother, William, 30 November 1861, 
Carter Family Papers.
“ Watkins, to his family, 23 September 1861, Watkins Family 
Papers.
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pegs would not hold and the tent fe ll several more tines.69
As correspondence accumulated from lonesome homes many soldiers 
sought furloughs. Magruder believing himself 1n Imminent danger of
Yankee attack made a morale crushing decision that would erode his
support; he decided to cancel a ll furloughs until at least January.
The soldiers did not see things the same way Magruder did and 
comments were freely offered from Magruder’ s Division commanders down 
through the lowest private. Corson wrote:
I expect to come home soon but General Magruder has Issues 
that no one shall leave the Peninsula on furloughs t i l l  the 
f irs t  of January. Our boys are well and amuse themselves 
squirrel hunting, playing cards, marbles, pitching quoits, etc.
He have big Brunswick stews very often.
Watkins added:
Captain Thornton was denied a two day furlough by General
Magruder on the death of his brother—may indicate a
forthcoming battle.
Carter reflected the discontent in the ranks:
[Its  being debated i f ]  this high sounding order really  
means anything or is intended to stop the increasing demand for 
furloughs. . . .  I f  this kind of program is persisted in, i t  
w ill throw a damper on the volunteer service for the next 
twelve months.
Even general officers were not exempted, McLaws advised his wife:
I have never been anywhere i t  rains so much . . . The 
General s t i l l  places great confidence in me and I try  to
69Carter, Deep Creek, to brother William, 4 October 1861, 
Carter Family Papers.
70Corson, 47-48.
71Watkins, to his family, 15 October 1861, Watkins Family 
Papers.
^Carter, Deep Creek, to his brother, William, 16 October 
1861, Carter Family Papers.
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deserve 1t . . . I  asked General Hagruder for a leave . . .  and 
he said no, he would give no leaves to anyone now.
Seven weeks la te r on 11 December, Carter commented:
I cannot think we are on the eve of an important battle but 
the General thinks so and that is enough to k i l l  the furlough 
system dead as a hammer.
Even General McLaws began to sour on Magruder:
I confess that the idea of going to see you a ll a short 
leave 1s repugnant to me In the extreme, when I may be recalled 
at any moment by the vanity of a commanding o fficer who 1s a 
sensationalist because he 1s constantly afraid he w ill be 
forgotten unless by startling paragraphs he keeps himself 1n 
front of the country. . . . I f  I can get away, I w ill ask to be 
put gp duty in Georgia as the Peninsula is not a place to long 
for.
The somewhat jaded opinions just expressed may have resulted from 
boredom and impatience with an enemy who for its  own reasons refused the 
joust. Magruder had met the original challenge and bu ilt a labyrinth in 
which one admiring subordinate proudly wrote, "Every road is being 
fo rtified  and before long the Peninsula w ill be one masked battery."76 
Howell Cobb wrote Secretary of State, R. M. T. Hunter,
You may rest assured that there should be reinforcements 
sent here . . .  I have conversed fu lly  and freely with General 
Magruder . . .  You could not have a better man here. Rely 
fu lly  upon his judgment.
Although Magruder was unyielding on the furlough issue, he worked
McLaws, Youngs M ill, to his wife, 23 October 1861, McLaws 
Papers.
74Carter, Deep Creek, to his brother, William, 11 December 
1861, Carter Family Papers.
^McLaws, Youngs M ill, to wife, 20 December 1861, McLaws Papers.
76Carter, Deep Creek, to his brother, William, 4 October 
1861, Carter Family Papers.
"fiB, series 1, 4:685.
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hard to support his troops. In October, he requested Postmaster Regan 
establish a new post office at Young’ s M111. He sought to consolidate 
as many hospitals as possible at Williamsburg to assure a fu ll range of 
supplies were available In sufficient quantities. Supply depots were 
fu lly  stocked and he urged quartermasters to keep rations coming.
Forage wagons ventured Into the countryside and returned with provisions 
for the animals and he sought permission to sell excess beeves to 
civilians. Commanders were Instructed to build huts for the troops 
without delay. When 1t was rumored that the men were suffering from 
exposure at the forward outposts, he dispatched a brlckmason to make the 
necessary repairs.78
By October 1861, Hagruder and his men had accomplished herculean 
tasks. A framework for defense had been crafted; a ll i t  lacked was an 
enemy. I t  was that very deficiency which chipped away at Hagruder’s 
command and cred ib ility . After countless hours in the saddle surveying, 
directing and planning defenses, Magruder knew every nuance of his 
scheme. The multiple scenarios that could unfold caused Magruder to 
move his forces from place to place. These marches helped condition his 
officers and men for the upcoming rigors of campaigns. Unfortunately, 
all was for naught.
Magruder received regular intelligence of possible Yankee
^Less than a month later, General Orders number 113 
authorized the establishment of company morale funds to purchase 
various necessities and niceties. General Orders number 114 
moderated the furlough policy but Union activities in early 
December prevented widespread implementation of a furlough system.
Review of RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 227, provides a regular diet of 
"people" actions. The examples cited here are between mid- 
September and mid-November.
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movements. Deserters reported plans to move with large numbers of 
troops by land and or sea against Yorktown. Hagruder du tifu lly  reported 
them In accordance with General Orders number 95. On 7 October,
Hagruder advised the new Secretary of War Judah Benjamin of the 
following Yankee plans which were provided by deserters.
1. The Yankees w ill attack Yorktown by water and 1f unsuccessful 
by land and water.
2. Reinforcements of 30,000 are coming, 5,000 having already 
arrived.
3. Seventy brass fie ld  pieces were at Fort Honroe.
4. Yankees at Newport News had been told they w ill winter in 
Yorktown.
5. General Wool told his troops they w ill march on Yorktown.
6. Yankees are being ferried each night to Camp Butler at Newport
News.
Of course in the face of the upcoming engagement, the commanding 
general did not hesitate to l is t  several items which he needed to 
successfully defend his position.79 Simultaneously, Hagruder in 
General Orders number 96 advised his troops that an attack was imminent, 
"Let us, therefore, stand ready to welcome these strangers to hospitable 
graves."80 He also announced the infamous furlough policy.
Subordinates received detailed instructions in correspondence that 
clearly showed a skittish commander.81 Eleven days later on 22 October
^OR, series 1, 4:672-73.
“ OE, series 1, 4:677.
81 Ib id .,  678-79.
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his troops were s t i l l  on war footing and Magruder Issued a circular 
praising the victory at Ball’ s Bluff and exhorting his troops saying, 
"There 1s the enemy, destroy him."82 Unfortunately, nothing happened 
and Richmond advised him that no reinforcements were coming.83 One 
soldier commented, "Something has got ole Magruder stirred up, probably 
whiskey.*84
The fa ilu re  of Union forces to advance after Magruder’ s repeated 
warnings severely hurt his cred ib ility  with Richmond, his commanders and 
his men. When Magruder resumed his panicky calls 1n early December, 
Benjamin responded on 9 December with another ta rt reply, " I t  1s not 
believed that any such force as represented by you can possibly be 
within the enemy line . . . but are glad to find you are vigilant and 
hopeful."85 McLaws wrote his wife,
Of course we are on the a lert and General Magruder favors 
us with stampedes very generally, but we have become so much 
accustomed to his cry of wolf that i t  w ill be very d iff ic u lt  to 
arouse us from our apathy even when the enemy does come. I 
have more to fear from that than from anything else.
Soldiers in the ranks commented as well, Carter confided in his brother
that,
General Magruder is in daily expectation of a general 
battle on the Peninsula. I don’ t  know what reason he has for
“ Og, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 353.
“ QB, series 1, 4:687-88.
“ Watkins, to his family, 25 October 1861, Watkins Family 
Papers.
85QB, series 1, 4:706.
“ McLaws, Youngs M ill, to his wife, 4 January 1862, McLaws 
Papers.
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supposing that there w ill be an advance of the enemy.87 
Williams complained that,
Old Hcgruder fsicl expected the attack within that time, 
but no advance was made by enemy. . . .  We are stationed on the 
outposts a ll the time and are continually being pulled and 
hauled about from one place to another.
and William Corson wrote Jennie that,
Gen Hagruder certainly expects a fight. He is constantly 
in the saddle inspecting the batteries. I believe the old 
fellow is scared out of his wits.
Hagruder was not responding irrationally . He reacted to direct 
intelligence from his forward outposts. On 4 December, Colonel Johnston 
with the cavalry reported nine Yankee ships passing up the bay.90 Hany 
people from generals to common soldier agreed with Hagruder’ s 
preparations. From Young’ s H ill on 8 December, HcLaws wrote his wife,
1 believe that within the next two days or twenty at the 
furthest, the enemy w ill put further their greatest strength, 
but whenever i t  is done, i t  w ill be done very cautiously and 
with great preponderance of strength.
William Corson confided to Jennie,
I found here considerable excitement in consequence of an 
appearance of a large Federal flee t in the mouth of the York 
River. Active preparations were being made for a warm 
reception and everything assumed the a ir  of hurry and
87Carter, Lands End, to his brother, William, 11 December 
1861, Carter Family Papers.
“ James Williams, Broken Bridge, to his Aunt Mary,
27 December 1861, Williams Papers.
89Corson, 54-55.
^QE, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 404-5.
91McLaws, Youngs M ill, to his wife, 8 December 1861, McLaws 
Papers.
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confusion.92
Hagruder Ignored Benjamin’ s rebuff regarding Imminent danger and 
continued to prepare for the expected attack, "the commanding general 
w ill station himself 1n the midst of his troops, and having the greatest 
confidence 1n their gallantry, congratulates them on their approaching 
triumph."95
When the attack did not come the men could scarcely confine their 
disappointment. The f irs t  Christmas of the war provided a welcomed 
interlude. Private Williams wrote his Aunt Mary, "You never saw men eat 
like we did in your l i f e ,  I declare I liked to have killed  myself.*94 
Corson described his holiday,
I have had quite a merry time during the last ten days.
The excitement, warlike, prevailing when I got back entirely  
subsided about the evening of the twenty-fourth and Christmas 
was duly celebrated in the different encampments. Eggnog was 
the order of the day . . . We danced a ll night and went home 
with the g irls  in the morning.
But frustration crept into Corson’ s missive,
The enemy thinking Hagruder and a ll hands were tight, I 
suppose, sent up a scouting party a few days ago and set f ire  
to Bethel Church. . . .  I think Hagruder is greatly to blame 
for taking his forces from Bethel as one regiment could easily 
whip 5,000 of the enemy there.96
Corson was not alone in commenting; others expressed combinations 
of frustration and wishful thinking. When Carter’ s company was ordered
92Corson, 52-53.
^QB, series 1, 4:712-13.
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to march from comfortable quarters in Yorktown to fie ld  conditions he 
noted the mood, "Magruder is consequently d-md to fearful extent."97 
In Watkins company i t  was rumored, "General Magruder with War Department 
approval w ill send men home for the balance of winter for lack of horse 
forage and to recruit for the regiment generally."98
The forces Magruder feared were the in it ia l assembly of General 
Ambrose Burnside’ s force that would ultimately assault the North 
Carolina Outer Banks. Magruder’ s proximity to Fortress Monroe demanded 
a higher state of readiness than may have been required elsewhere; 
however, the absence of a m ilitary confrontation discredited Magruder 
further. Unfortunately, the positive actions Magruder took to offset 
Benjamin’ s refusal to reinforce him placed him in d iffic u lty  with 
President Davis.
On 24 December, Magruder issued a circular advising of the 
impending Union threat and tasking all m ilit ia  units to muster in and 
report their numbers of Colonel Ewell. Internal documents in Richmond 
questioned Magruder’ s authority and Davis ordered him to cancel the 
order.99 Although Burnside’ s fle e t was reported to be 150 to 200 
sails, about 50 vessels; Benjamin refused to believe Magruder would be 
attacked.100 On 10 January, Magruder wrote a le tte r to Davis
97Carter, Deep Creek, to his brother William, 16 December 
1861, Carter Family Papers.
^ a tk i  ns, to his family, 28 December 1861, Watkins Family 
Papers.
"flB, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 430-31.
1oo0RN. series 1, 6:753-54. Benjamin was criticized for 
failing  to take positive actions to prevent the capture of Roanoke 
Island. The resulting furor may have led to Benjamin’ s departure
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explaining his actions and requesting a delay In discussions of his 
efforts until he could provide a fu ll report.101 With Lee assigned to 
South Carolina, Magruder was clearly at the nadir of his command. 
Benjamin challenged his cred ib ility  by refusing to provide either 
reinforcements or slave labor.
Magruder responded on 1 February with a lucid, cogent document that 
most lik e ly  saved his command. In 1t he described his 'grand strategy." 
He said that from the beginning he had a river based defense and since
the possible points of contact were so extensive, he needed both fixed
and mobile batteries. The weakness of his force and lack of preparation
demanded he mask his efforts; thus, he established Bethel as his forward
outpost. After securing Bethel, he decided the Warwick River line 
anchored on Mulberry Island and Yorktown was the best true line of 
defense since the original position at Jamestown would permit a landing 
below i t  and the encirclement of Yorktown. Unfortunately, tremendous 
manual labor was required. I f  Magruder could keep the Yankees beyond 
Bethel, he could work without restriction; however, the more Magruder 
learned about the lower Peninsula, the more he concluded a point defense 
for the Poquoson and Back Rivers was required. Because of logistical 
problems, Magruder had established forward supply points to allow 
himself to operate forward and defend forward. Blocking the entrance to 
the Warwick River protected his advanced positions. Magruder thus had 
three lines of defense, a forward position anchored on Young’ s M ill and
from the War Department. After Benjamin’ s resignation, Magruder’ s 
sponsor, George Randolph, was named Secretary of War.
101OR, series 1, 4:720.
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Harrod’ s H ill;  a second line beyond the Warwick River between Mulberry 
Island and Yorktown; and a final line before Williamsburg anchored on 
Fort Hagruder.
Magruder concluded his explanatory remarks by describing the work 
which remained to be done and commenting on Burnside’ s expedition. 
Hagruder concluded that Burnside’ s movement was a diversion, while 
McClellan moved via the Rappahannock River. Hagruder suggested 
Theopholls Holmes from Fredrlcksburg and he could attack McClellan’ s 
flank or rear and i f  pursued retreat to Gloucester Point drawing 
McClellan into a siege. Conversely, i f  Suffolk was Burnside’ s ultimate 
destination, then Magruder could cross the James River to support 
Norfolk. The success of either plan was contingent on completion of the 
fortifications; hence, the need for Negroes, and sufficient manpower, 
hence, the muster of m ilit ia .102 The end of January found Magruder 
with 14,801 men and 125 pieces of a r t i l le ry .103 Within weeks, the 
great Yankee spring campaign began to unfold and Magruder faced his 
toughest challenge.
102QR, series 1, 9:38-42.
103Ib id ., 36-37.
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CHAPTER 4 
CENTER STAGE
I t  Is Impossible to portray the transition from antebellum 
attitudes to a war mentality. Southerners expected the results to be 
quick, bloodless and decisive. Since no one expected the war to last 
longer than one battle, the cream of Southern society flocked to the 
ranks for service of up to 12 months or the duration of the war— 
whichever was shorter. There were certainly no illusions le f t  when the 
in it ia l terms of enlistment began to expire in March and April 1862. A 
string of Confederate reverses in the West, both Fort Henry and Fort 
Donaldson in Tennessee, began to create the f irs t  shadows of uncertainty 
for rebel arms. However, nothing prepared them for the shock that 
accompanied the loss of Roanoke Island and subsequent Federal operations 
in the North Carolina coastal area.
Burnside’ s expedition assembled at Fort Monroe and after creating 
great consternation in Tidewater sailed out of Chesapeake Bay on 
11 January. When the fleet reappeared o ff Hatteras Island and moved 
into the Pamlico Sound between 13 and 25 January, the Carolinians were 
unable to offer effective resistance. On 8 February, Burnside quickly 
defeated former Virginia Governor, General Henry Wise’ s small force 
capturing 2,500. Since Wise had asked for and been denied adequate 
reinforcements, Secretary Benjamin was further embroiled in a 
controversy that would lead to his resignation before the end of March.
99
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The strategic implications of Burnside’ s success completely skewed 
Magruder’ s defensive scheme and Impacted every decision Richmond made 
until McClellan moved against Magruder’ s lines two months la te r. 
Officials in Richmond logically concluded Burnside’ s maneuver was 
undertaken to provide a southern approach to Norfolk. Burnside’ s 
subsequent advance to New Bern and Washington positioned him to move 
towards Suffolk. When the move was executed, Norfolk would be isolated 
and ripe for capture.
Loss of Norfolk and the shipyard would severely damage the 
Confederacy’ s warfighting capability. The construction of the 
revolutionary ironclad C.S.S. Virginia rMerrimackl and a sister ship 
C.S.S. Richmond was a poorly kept secret. Although these ships’ 
capabilities were unknown, o ffic ia ls  hoped they might break the blockade 
and open southern ports for European commerce. The potential rewards of 
this technology justified  a ll decisions relating to Norfolk.
Early in February intelligence reached Richmond that confirmed both 
Richmond’ s and Magruder’ s fears. Edward Moore, a p ilo t on the James 
River, wrote Secretary of the Navy, Stephen Mallory, advising of a 
conversation with a Yankee friend. Moore reported that his friend said 
the attack at Roanoke Island was preparatory for a subsequent 
attack on Jamestown Island. The move would have the dual purpose of 
flushing the rebels out of both Norfolk and Yorktown.1
Confederate o ffic ia ls  in Richmond logically reacted to meet the 
Burnside threat by dispatching troops to North Carolina and the vicin ity
10RN. series 1, 6:767. Normally, correspondence which says, "a 
reliable source" is by nature unreliable. However, this intelligence so 
paralleled what Richmond expected that i t  may have been credited.
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of Suffolk. In doing so, Hagruder lost his f le x ib ility  to operate on 
any limited offensive basis.
The Merrimack was commissioned on 17 February 1862 but she, like  
her sister ships, was plagued by a shortage of gunpowder. Anxious 
offic ia ls  suggested that she come out at night and ram the Federals’ 
wooden vessels. For whatever reasons, she was prudently kept unemployed 
in the Elizabeth River. Subsequent experiences with her deep draught 
and limited maneuverability validated this decision.2
On 25 February, Special Orders number 45 alerted Magruder to 
prepare troops for deployment to counter Burnside’ s threat to Suffolk.3 
The rapidity of this decision superseded previous plans to which 
Magruder had responded earlier in the day. In those plans, Richmond 
suggested Magruder move against Newport News in coordination with the 
emergence of the Merrimack. Magruder noted the exceptionally poor 
condition of the roads and the paucity of his force. He concluded by 
suggesting that since Newport News had been reinforced, i t  might be 
prudent to pull back to his secondary line on the Warwick River.4
Magruder’ s force remained relatively static throughout February. 
While reports showed an increase of about 800 men to 15,664, they were
2Ib id ., 771-80.
30R, series 1, 9:44-45.
40R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 479-80. There was general 
knowledge of the proposed action against Newport News and Magruder 
certainly knew of the options. Corson noted on 18 February 1862 that 
"General Magruder is in Richmond on business," Corson, 65-66. Henry 
Carter wrote, "We w ill certainly make a move in the direction of Newport 
News . . . everything forces me to the conclusion that we w ill attack 
Newport News and that we w ill be aided in the attack by the Merrimac. 
Patrick Henry, and Thomas Jefferson." Henry Carter, Deep Creek, to his 
brother, William, 25 February 1862, Carter Family Papers.
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dispersed at 19 locations and over half, 7,837, were at the 
Yorktown/Gloucester Point complex and Wynne’ s or Young’ s M111.5
Richmond offic ia ls  did not share Magruder’ s concerns. Magruder’ s 
old friend, George Wythe Randolph was appointed Brigadier General and 
placed in command of forces that were to be assembled at Suffolk. 
Magruder warned Richmond o ffic ia ls  that intelligence reports indicated a 
Yankee move against him. Consequently, Magruder requested the 
deployment of the Merrimack to a point above Newport News to close the 
James and the Warwick Rivers.6
Benjamin’ s response was direct. Despite a personal plea from the 
anxious commander, Benjamin curtly replied, on 25 February, "We do not 
believe you are in the slightest danger of an attack at present, either 
in front or by being outflanked by naval forces . . . Suffolk is the aim 
of the enemy."7 In the wake of this latest disagreement i t  seems 
remarkable that Magruder did not offer to resign. Magruder’ s 
convictions would not permit him to leave in the face of the enemy.
The pace of activ ity  quickened during the f irs t  week of March. 
Burnside’ s movement against the North Carolina mainland seemed to 
confirm a pending move towards Suffolk. Although Magruder complied with 
orders to prepare a large number of his troops for deployment, on 
4 March he attempted to stay the execution of the order by writing to 
General Cooper. He detailed the implications for his command and 
reminded him of his inab ility  to cooperate with the Merrimack or act
50R, series 1, 9:49.
6Ib id ., 50.
7Ib id ., 52-53.
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offensively. Magruder noted that the deployment of 5,000 troops to 
Suffolk would leave him with barely 4,000 troops to cover the twelve 
mile Warwick River line, exclusive of the Yorktown/Gloucester Point 
garrisons. He advised that he might have to withdraw to Williamsburg.8
Although disappointed, Magruder did not retreat from his defensive 
engineering efforts. He Immediately sought to compensate for his 
pending manpower loss by soliciting the recruitment of 1,000 m ilitia  
which he offered to arm. In response, Benjamin promised to send him a 
combat regiment In lieu of the m ilit ia .9 At the same time, Benjamin 
advised General Huger in Norfolk that he would send 5,000 of Magruder’ s 
men and 2,000 North Carolinians to Suffolk when Burnside moved.10 On 
6 March, Magruder conceded the Inevitab ility  of the deployment and while 
cautioning that he would now be a s tric tly  defensive force, promised to
8Ib1d., 51.
9QB, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 484-85. I t  is important to 
understand the diversity of tasks Magruder faced. He was attempting to 
construct a bastion out of the swampy morass of the Peninsula. Every 
cubic foot of earth which had to be moved was done by slaves and 
soldiers. He was not digging ditches; these were fortifications of 
considerable presence. He was responsible for managing a variable 
workforce impressed from many sources. Operations in Gloucester and 
Matthews counties were woefully inadequate due to insufficient manpower. 
The Navy was commencing shipbuilding operations on the York River at 
Glass Island, and Magruder was requisitioned to provide manpower for 
those operations. Some of Magruder’ s troops volunteered for service 
upon the C.S.S. Virginia and many were detailed to serve the naval 
ordinance mounted along the rivers. The open hostility  between Benjamin 
and Magruder frustrated the la te r’ s efforts to articulate a Union 
strategy that turned out to be precisely what McClellan had been 
planning since January. Information on naval efforts at Glass Island 
are detailed in RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 69, in multiple correspondence 
between mid-February and late March.
100R, series 1, 9:56.
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obey orders.11 On 7 Harch, T. R. R. Cobb’ s Legion embarked from Kings 
Mill Wharf for Suffolk via City Point and the Petersburg railroad.12
Hagruder must have been frustrated by the contradictory signals he 
was receiving from Richmond. He was fin a lly  getting Negro labor in 
adequate numbers to prosecute the numerous tasks s t i l l  remaining; 
however, Richmond offic ia ls  repeatedly told him that he did not face any 
threat. S t i l l  Magruder continued to attack his departmental problems 
with an evangelical fervor. No detail was too insignificant to merit 
attention. A quick summary of administrative actions provided evidence 
documenting Magruder’ s personal involvement. In January, Magruder 
withheld approval of a Major Ned Richtor’ s leave application until he 
could submit his monthly reports correctly and on time; commanders were 
chastised to report soldiers’ d isabilities on the proper forms; 
suspicious deaths were investigated and death certificates issued; 
reports of survey for lost or damaged equipment were ordered; s tric t 
controls were placed on the importation of liquor; hospital staffing 
practices were challenged; and discipline meted when appropriate. There 
were forty-six court martials in February, including two that tried  
officers.13
Tasks with direct m ilitary implications were pressing the commander 
and he ordered his Provost Marshall in Yorktown, Stafford Cook, to use 
all the Negroes between Yorktown and the Poquoson River to fix  the main
" ib id ., 57.
12R£ 109, chapter 2, vol. 69, 7 March 1862.
13Ib id ., 4, 9, 13 January; 16, 22, 23, 27 February 1862; General 
Orders numbers 143, 146, 150, and 153.
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road. William Smith and Thomas Whitaker received similar orders for the 
roads around Williamsburg.14 Work continued on the earthworks at Lee’ s 
Mill and Minor’ s farm.15
The net result of Magruder’ s Industry can been seen from a candid 
assessment from Union General J. K. F. Mansfield 1n command at Fort 
Butler, Newport News. He reported that the rebels had 14 large 
columblad naval guns at Gloucester Point; 3 separate batteries of 
columblads on the water at Yorktown; 2 masked batteries of Dahlgren 
guns, two miles below Yorktown; 10 columblads at Ship’ s Point; and on 
the land side of Yorktown 10 other guns. Mansfield further reported the 
rebels had cotton and tar on the wharves to use aboard fire  ships.16 
This report undoubtedly influenced General McClellan’ s planning for the 
upcoming campaign and perhaps persuaded him of the need for siege 
ordinance as a backup plan.
The emergence of the Merrimack and the subsequent confrontations 
between her, her consorts and the Federal fleet polarized both Union and 
Confederate planning. On the Union’ s side, the Navy devoted herself 
without exception to the containment and neutralization of the 
Merrimack. This perverted McClellan’ s plans for a combined land and sea 
action to reduce and bypass Yorktown. The few gunboats Admiral Louis 
Goldsborough eventually provided were timidly managed and of no use to 
McClellan.
In Confederate circles, the limitations of the Merrimack were
14Ib id ., 24 February 1862.
15Ib id ., 28 February 1862.
160RN. series 1, 6:666-68.
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obvious; she was slow, had bad engines, and was confined to the deep 
waters of the central channels of Hampton Roads. She had been damaged 
In the struggle with the Monitor and had lost her ram prow and sprung a 
forward leak. Confederate o ffic ia ls  also realized that she drafted over 
20 feet and could not ascend the James River. While she returned to 
drydock, engineers doubled their efforts to modify and float her sister 
ship, C.S.S. Richmond.
As the threat on the lower Peninsula grew, General Lee returned to 
Richmond on 13 March as President Davis’ s advisor. Magruder reassessed 
his capability to manage the Peninsula and realized that c iv il authority 
had lost control and for the f ir s t  time determined that martial law was 
necessary to suppress lawlessness and punish murderers, thieves and 
bootleggers. General Huger had received similar authority on 
6 March.17 Davis agreed and authorized the declaration In the counties 
of Elizabeth City, York, Warwick, Gloucester and Mathews. Through 
administrative oversight, James City County was omitted and when 
Magruder requested that county be added to the l is t ,  he received 
approval with yet another stinging barb, " It  is a matter of regret that 
any want of particularity in specifying, what was required should now 
render a change necessary."18
Despite the rebuke, Magruder was fu lly  cognizant of the enemy’ s
17QB> series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 497.
18Ib id ., 502, 505, 518. Martial law provided Magruder the ab ility  
to suspend normal c iv il liberties . The m ilitary was now the law. A 
m ilitary police force was established, s t i l ls  for spirituous liquors 
were ordered destroyed, sale of liquor was controlled, Habeas Corpus was 
suspended, and confinement of civilians for up to one month at hard 
labor was authorized.
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possibilities. He told Cooper that he did not believe the Yankees would 
assault Norfolk d irectly. He believed they would move up the James 
River and cut Norfolk o ff by attacking the weaker defenses at Hardin’ s 
Bluff and Mulberry Island. To prevent th is, Magruder requested the 
redeployment of the Patrick Henrv. Jamestown and Teaser from Norfolk.19
Other authorities also perceived the threat and made 
recommendations. The Confederacy’ s chief engineer, Alfred Rives 
concluded that the Monitor rendered the existing water batteries 
ineffective and that Yorktown and Gloucester Point batteries should be 
reengineered to elevate them above the trajectory of the Monitor’ s 
guns. Conversely, a ll river batteries were deemed capable of 
demolishing wooden ships, an opinion that was shared by Yankee ship 
captains supporting McClellan. Rives advised Magruder that he believed 
the Confederates’ water communication with Richmond would be disrupted 
i f  the Monitor operated on the York River. Confederate counterforce 
options included development of armor piercing shells, water 
obstructions, and torpedoes.20
Magruder responded by increasing the readiness of his reduced 
department. General Orders number 159, issued on 13 March, instructed 
his commanders to be aggressive,
When any body of our troops, large or small meets with any 
body of the enemy’ s troops, however large, the commanding 
officer of the troops w ill cause the enemy to be immediately 
attacked, and the men w ill attack at once and furiously.21
19qr, series 1, 9:13-14; ORN. series 1, 7:: 754.
20q s , series 1, 9:62-64; QB, series 1, vol.. 51, part 2, 499-501
21or, series 1, 9:65.
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Later the sane day, he advised Colonel Alfred Cunnings counandlng 
his advance guard to hold Young’ s Mill without bringing on a fight. He 
also revealed for the f irs t  time his plans for tactical deception, "I am 
maneuvering to give the enemy the idea that we are in great force. . . .
I  have ordered a r t ille ry  and other troops there [Bethel] to show that we 
are in great strength.1,22
The next day Magruder gave Lee his departmental perspective. Once 
again the logic of his argument does him credit, regardless of the 
philosophic disagreement which appeared in Lee’ s response. Magruder 
said that while he was reduced to a defensive posture by the deployment 
of 5,000 soldiers to Suffolk, he had been actively demonstrating in the 
enemy's presence to discourage movements against him. He remarked that 
his Warwick River line was too long for his reduced force and with the 
m ilitia  picked over he would like  his men returned from Suffolk. He
also noted the pending expiration of the volunteers’ in it ia l tour of
service in April and suggested guidelines to prevent chaos when the 
units reenlisted.23 Lee immediately suggested Magruder shorten his 
defensive lines by building additional dams to flood the lands 
surrounding the Warwick River.24 He said the threat to Suffolk was 
s t i l l  too real to return Magruder’ s detachment.25 On 18 March, Lee 
told Magruder that there was no evidence McClellan would move on the
22J. B. Magruder, B artle tt’ s to Colonel Cummings, Young’ s M ill,
13 March 1862, ALS in John B. Magruder Papers, Eleanor S. Brockenbrough 
Library, Museum of the Confederacy, Richmond.
^OR, series 1, 9:65-67.
24Ib id ., 68.
25Ib id ., 70-71.
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Peninsula and he encouraged Magruder to "maneuver as to deceive and 
thwart him."26 The next day, 19 March, Magruder directed Colonel 
Johnston, chief of his cavalry, and Brigadier General McLaws to show 
themselves prominently.27 This Increased activity helped convince 
McClellan that Magruder was stronger than he really was.
Uncomfortable politicians pressed the Davis administration for 
reports on the security arrangements of Richmond. Engineer Alfred Rives 
provided President Davis with a satisfactory report that lauded the 
effectiveness of Magruder’ s efforts to advance the James River defensive 
line from Jamestown to Mulberry Island. Davis’ s report to Congress 
said,
The next position above [the mouth of the James River] 
defended by the work at Hardy’ s [Hardin’ s] Bluff and Mulberry 
Island possesses great importance from being the right flank of 
Magruder’ s chosen defensive line . . . The guns at Jamestown 
Island w ill probably be removed to the position [Mulberry] just 
referred to as soon as i t  is fu lly  prepared for them.
Magruder was s t i l l  uncomfortable with his arrangements and he again 
pressed Lee with a new strategy. Magruder was convinced the Monitor 
would move up the shallow northern bank of the James River with 20,000 
troops landing behind Randolph in Suffolk. He suggested the James River 
be completely blocked at Jamestown and the Merrimack be deployed near 
Fort Monroe. Under such an arrangement Magruder believed he could 
defend Williamsburg, Jamestown, and Yorktown.29 Unfortunately before
“ Clifford Dowdey and Louis Manarin, eds., The Wartime Papers of R. 
E. Lee (New York: Bramhall House, 1961), 132.
27B£ 109, chapter 2, vol. 68. Special Orders numbers 688 and 691.
280RN. series 2, 2:170.
^OR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 386-88.
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I l l
any action could be Implemented, McClellan began to move his force 
towards Fort Monroe.
Magruder recoiled when the presence of Helntzelman’ s I I I  Corps 
became known at Fortress Monroe. Except for the 10th Georgia regiment 
and some 500 cavalry, a ll Magruder’ s troops retreated Immediately to the 
Warwick River line . He advised Lee that his advanced line was s t i l l  the 
best line of defense and with 30,000 he could both defend his position 
and capture the Yankee garrison at Newport News. He implored Lee for a 
timely decision,
I f  heavy reinforcements are sent here, I would like  to know 
at once, that I may throw up fortifications at points which, i f  
we should not want them ourselves, i t  is extremely important 
that the enemy should not hold, such as from Langhorne’ s Mill 
to Bethel, and from Young’ s to Harwood’ s M ill, which are almost 
entirely impregnable i f  held by a sufficient number of troops 
but entirely untenable unless so manned.
Magruder’ s alacrity demonstrated his awareness of the enemy.
Updates concerning Yankee reinforcements were reported accurately. 
Hospitals were expanded and extra surgeons designated to detect 
skulkers.31 Special Orders number 697 sealed o ff water transport and 
restricted transport movements at Gloucester Point and Yorktown to those
“ ib id ., 389-91. Magruder was earnest in his plea, a number of 
sources w ill be cited la te r, but the testimony of one Yankee is 
appropriate here, "As we came out the woods at one point, we could see a 
deserted rebel fo rt in the middle of a swamp to the right of the road.
I t  was built square and in a substantial manner with barracks inside of 
i t ,  a ditch nine feet deep all around i t ,  f ille d  with water and an 
abatis, bushes, and stumps of trees. Near i t  was an inferior work 
partia lly  masked; the place could not have been stormed." Alfred 
Davenport, Camp and Field Life of the Fifth New York Volunteer Infantry 
(New York: Dick and Fitzgerald, 1879; reprint, Gaithersburg, MD: 
Butternut Press, 1984), 163.
31RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 69, Magruder to B. S. Ewell, 24 March 1862.
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personally authorized by Magruder.32
Magruder’ s task was made easier by the exceptionally d if f ic u lt  
terrain . Corson observed, "The mud around our quarters is knee deep and 
is very offensive."33 General McLaws wrote,
This country is so much cut up by these areas of the sea 
and inland rivers, with their accompanying marshes and boggy 
water tributaries, that i t  is impossible to move through except 
along the main roads. Thus, i t  is impossible to make use of a 
large force and the tremendous odds against us cannot be as 
formidable as elsewhere.
Regardless, Magruder would soon need help for his l i t t l e  army of 
11,000 and on 25 March he advised his friend Secretary George Randolph, 
that a council of war determined that 10,000 additional troops were
needed to make his line tenable. He wrote,
He yield the best line for Richmond and that i f  the 
Peninsula is lost, Norfolkmust necessarily fa ll and the 
Virginia must be captured.
Lee responded by asking General Joseph E. Johnston, whose army was 
pulling back from Manassas, i f  he could reinforce the Peninsula.36 
While awaiting an answer, Lee told Magruder to prepare for the worst 
case, a withdrawal behind the Chickahominy River, i f  McClellan were to 
pass his position by the river. Lee also refused to commit to the 
defense of the Peninsula until he was sure of McClellan’ s intentions,
I t  w ill no doubt be the policy of the enemy to disguise his
intention by threatening one point while preparing to attack
32RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 68. S.O. 697.
33Corson, 71.
^McLaws, Curtis Farm, to his wife, 31 March 1862, McLaws Papers.
350R, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 395.
“ ib id ., 397.
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the other . . .  use every means in your power to obtain 
Information on this point.
Hagruder Increased his vigilance by dispatching Captain Jefferson
C. Phillips and twenty of the Old Dominion Dragoons to Ship’ s Point on 
the Poquoson River. He Instructed commanders to remove resources to 
previously prepared bombproofs and develop retreat routes. He 
Instructed engineers to build a m ilitary road to expedite troop 
movements between points on the Warwick River line . All troops were to 
keep three days cooked rations.38 Yet he also Instructed his men to 
maintain the ir front "as i t  1s very important for us for the enemy to 
suppose that Harwood H ills  1s occupied.”39 Magruder’ s General Orders 
number 168 advised the army that 1t would fight on the Warwick River 
line. Infantry were reminded to support the a r t ille ry , and troops were 
exhorted to be prepared to move whenever necessary.40
Although Lee was not yet ready to commit to the Peninsula; Hagruder 
was prepared. Lafayette McLaws, in command of 13 regiments, summarized 
Magruder’ s considerable accomplishments,
This Peninsula presents a very unfavorable fie ld  for the 
operations of a large force, i t  is bounded as you know on one 
side by the York River and the other by the James River . . .
Yorktown is very completely fo rtifie d , to resist both an attack 
by land and by water. . . . [Mulberry Point] Battery is 
protected by land attack by a heavy work around an elevated 
point a half mile distant. When everything is completed, the 
place w ill be stronger than Yorktown. . . .  We have dammed up 
that river [Warwick River] at various points so that most of 
the country is flooded from a point under the guns at Yorktown
37Dowdey, 137.
“ RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 68, Special Orders numbers 700 and 702.
39Ib id ., Magruder to Colonel Winston, 27 March 1862.
40QR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 410-11.
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to the head of the tidewater of James River, so that when the 
works defending the dams are completed our direct front w ill be 
really strong. . . .  Our line of defense w ill run from Yorktown 
down Warwick River with Its  dams to Lee’ s M ill, thence across 
to Skiff Creek. Our troops being concentrated behind that line  
any part can reinforce any other.
The next two weeks marked the apogee of Magruder’ s m ilitary career. 
Lee was completely convinced that McClellan would attack Norfolk despite 
evidence to the contrary.*2 William Corson on picket duty at Young’ s 
Mill wrote, "The enemy have been more annoying than ever, running 1n our 
pickets nearly every day . . . our regiment evacuates and reoccuples 
this place upon an average, about three times a week."43 Magruder’ s 
cavalry reported the enemy in force near Bethel.44 Magruder asked 
Commodore Josiah Tattnall, Commander of the Merrimack, to attack troop 
transports near the James River and i f  successful, maneuver to the York 
River and attack there as well. He had previously critic ized the delay 
in returning the Merrimack to action and provoked an angry defensive 
response from Sydney Lee, commanding the Gosport Naval Shipyard.
Magruder appealed to Tattnall, "We have a country to save and no time 
for individual duels."45
Magruder was convinced of his vulnerability and he appealed 
directly to Randolph to bring both Johnston and Huger to the Peninsula. 
He insisted that McClellan would win i f  he were allowed to join up with
41McLaws, Curtis Farm, to his wife, 31 March 1862, McLaws Papers.
42QB, series 1, 9:455.
43Corson, 73-74.
^RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 275, Colonel Johnston to Magruder, 2 April
1862.
450RN. series 1, 7:755.
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other forces in front of Richmond.46
When McClellan moved on 4 April, he believed he could bypass 
Yorktown and move rapidly towards Richmond, however, Magruder was as 
prepared as McClellan was misinformed. After encountering unexpected 
sporadic f ire  from a Confederate redoubt of unknown strength at Lee's 
M111, Union General Erasamus Keyes was discouraged and he abandoned his 
march to the Halfway House between Yorktown and Williamsburg.
Magruder’ s security was so tight that Federal engineers had been unable 
to determine the true course of the Warwick River or the Confederates’ 
lin e .47
Once McClellan moved, Lee was under intense pressure to help 
Magruder. Until the help arrived, the Commander of the Peninsula was 
equal to the challenge and he acted to deceive McClellan and his 
intelligence chief, Allan Pinkerton. Of many commentaries, four typify  
the illusions created. Jubal Early wrote,
The assuming and maintaining of the line by Magruder with 
his small force in the face of such overwhelming odds [seven to 
one] was one of the boldest exploits ever performed by a 
m ilitary commander, and he had so maneuvered his troops by 
displaying them rapidly at different points as to produce the 
impression on his opponent that he had a large army.
An English v is ito r, Colonel Arthur Freemantle spoke with Magruder la ter
^QR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 422.
47General McClellan claimed the map provided him, which was 
prepared by Engineer Cram, misled him. In fact, the famous map did not 
accurately portray the course of the Warwick River. Consequently, 
McClellan’ s plans to seize a point across the rebels’ line of retreat 
were impractical and the resistance McClellan encountered forced him to 
recoil and reevaluate his offensive strategy.
^Jubal Early, War Memoirs (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1960), 59.
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and described Magruder*s artis try ,
Officers shouted conmands to imaginary units, a few carts 
were paraded past openings to simulate a long wagon tra in , 
soldiers marched continuously.
Colonel Jesse Gove of the 22d Massachusetts noted "A large body of
infantry was observed in their works apparently at evening parade, their
band playing Dixie."50 On McClellan’ s own s ta ff the French Prince de
Joinville wrote,
General McClellan . . . deceived by appearances did . . . 
not dare to thrust his sword through the slight curtain which 
his able adversary had spread before his vision.
Although Magruder succeeded in checking McClellan’ s early advance, 
because of previous shortfalls in the labor force, he had a lo t of work 
yet to finish on the earthworks. I t  was ironic that his predictions had 
proved correct. With limited resources and very l i t t l e  government 
support, he crafted the lower Peninsula into a defensible Gibraltar. He 
had tertia ry  defensive lines and multiple plans. Now that McClellan and 
his army were at hand, he was fin a lly  able to get the support he needed 
to turn dreams into tangible contingencies. Soldiers poured into his 
ranks, nearly 20,000 in the f ir s t  week.52 An 8 April appeal from 
Magruder to General Lee asked for 1,000 or more Negro workers to 
construct earthworks along his possible line of re treat.53 Magruder’ s
49Arthur J. L. Freemantle, The Freemantle Diarv. ed. Walter Lord 
(Boston: L itt le , Brown, and Company, 1954), 258-59.
50OR, series 1, vol. 11, part 1, 297.
51Richard Wheeler, Sword Over Richmond. An Eyewitness History of 
McClellan’ s Peninsula Campaign (New York: Fairfax Press, 1986), 119.
520R, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 436.
53Ibid, 430-431.
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appeal to the local citizenry, that "without the most liberal assistance 
In axes, spades, and hands to work, we cannot hope to succeed"54 
received generous support.
Unfortunately, Magruder was soon going to lose his command.
General Joseph E. Johnston was commander of the primary Confederate army 
in Virginia.55 During nearly eight months as he fronted McClellan, 
Johnston created schemes of grand strategy but took no combat action 
other than to withdraw from his positions near Centerville, Virginia, to 
a line behind the Rappahannock River.
On 25 March, when Lee asked Johnston i f  he could help Magruder or 
Huger, Johnston had balked. He believed the best way to handle 
McClellan and get him o ff the Peninsula was to attack countervalue 
targets 1n the North. Lee believed the destruction of the Union army 
should be the ir objective and Johnston was ordered to Richmond. Part of 
Johnston’ s army under D. H. H ill continued on to Yorktown and was soon 
established in Magruder’ s line on 11 April.
H ill was not what Magruder needed. H ill reported something 
entirely different than what McClellan saw,
The defenses [Warwick Line] were of the weakest character 
and the radical mistake had been made of leaving the dense 
timber standing almost within a stones throw of the redoubts 
. . . .  Yorktown its e lf  was surrounded by the most defective 
system of fortifications. The magazines were of the flimsiest
54Ib id ., 437.
55Johnston was one the senior generals in the South, but he proved 
to be vain and petty. When President Davis named fu ll generals,
Johnston was made subordinate to Robert E. Lee and others. Since 
Johnston had been second ranking officer in the old army and Lee was a 
Colonel, Johnston fe lt  slighted. He protested in a vigorous and mean 
manner. President Davis was so infuriated that he dressed Johnston down 
in a very curt le tte r which did not start "My Dear General."
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character and the gun which enfiladed one face would give a 
reverse fire  on another. Heavy details were kept at work day 
and night to remedy the defects.
Unfortunately for Magruder, Johnston was en route and he was senior 
to Magruder. War Department Special Orders number 6, dated 12 April 
1862, ended the l i f e  of Hagruder’ s department. Johnston visited the 
Peninsula on 12 April and he did not like  what he saw. After a one day 
survey, Johnston returned to advise President Davis that the entire area 
was unsuited for "offensive operations." While he conceded the Warwick 
River line would be strong against a frontal assault, Johnston believed 
i t  could be easily turned on either river. From Yorktown on 13 April,
H ill continued his tirade and wrote to Randolph,
I find this place to ta lly  unprepared for a siege. . . .
There can be no doubt that he 1s bringing up heavy siege guns
. . .  The light guns in redoubts numbers four and five w ill be 
knocked out in half hour.
As Magruder’ s command staggered toward its  termination, the 
interaction necessary to hold the Peninsula continued. After two weeks 
of debate in which Lee and others considered sending the Merrimack to 
the York River to relieve Yorktown, Commodore Tattnall advised Secretary 
Mallory that while the York River passage appeared impractical,
I shall act with proper prudence for with the Virginia at 
the mouth of the James River, the enemy’ s operations in that 
direction may be checked which w ill aid the plans of General 
Magruder as I understand them.
Magruder was s t i l l  working hard and staffer Joseph L. Brent 
recorded the progress of defensive works,
56QB, series 1, vol. 11, part 1, 601.
570R, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 439.
580RN. series 1, 7:223.
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Up the slopes of the bank, the engineers dug small ditches 
above and below the dams throwing out the earth to serve as 
breastworks on the river side and at the dams were thrown up 
large earthworks for a r t il le ry .59
At the same time on 14 April, 1n Richmond, Johnston and his lieutenants
Gustavus Smith and James Longstreet were arguing against a move to the
Peninsula. Unfortunately, Magruder was not Invited to the conference.
Why? One can only speculate that he was not part of the Confederacy’ s
primary fighting team; therefore, he was excluded from inner circles.
While Lee and Randolph specified the strategic implications of
Magruder’ s lines, only Magruder could provide the detailed knowledge of
the defensive character of the country. Magruder’ s exclusion was
another slap and a judgmental error.
Smith detailed the specifics of the Richmond meeting in his 
Confederate War Papers. Johnston and Smith agreed the Peninsula would 
confine the movements of their army, a fact which McClellan had already 
discovered. At Johnston’ s behest, Smith proposed a defensive force be 
assembled in front of Richmond, drawing a ll the available troops from 
the coastal defenses in Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina.
Smith argued that Magruder and Huger had sufficient forces for a defense 
of the lower Peninsula. I f  they were bypassed they would fa ll back to 
Richmond. Smith continued with Johnston’ s preferred strategy—an 
invasion of the North. Such a move would disrupt Union morale and cause 
the Lincoln administration to recall McClellan from the Peninsula.
Both Secretary Randolph and General Lee disagreed with Johnston’ s 
strategy. The maintenance of the Gosport shipyard was indispensable to
59Joseph L. Brent, Memoirs of the War Between the States (New 
Orleans: Fontana Printing Co., 1940), 101.
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Confederate strategy. Any disruption In production, no matter how 
temporary, would hamper the Confederacy’ s plans. Temporary Union 
possession of the Gosport would result In unacceptable damage to the 
Infrastructure of the shipyard. Lee continued by denying Johnston’ s 
proposal to withdraw troops from other states. He believed such action 
would cripple morale by permitting Federal occupation of Confederate 
te rrito ry  at l i t t l e  cost.60 The 14 April meeting lasted well into the 
evening and after hearing a ll the arguments President Davis overruled 
Johnston and ordered him to defend Magruder’ s line . While Johnston le f t  
the meeting secretly pledged to his own agenda,61 the Government’ s 
strategic concerns were clearly expressed 1n a le tte r Randolph wrote to
D. H. H ill on 25 April,
I f  the Peninsula were merely at stake, we should not 
hesitate to evacuate i t .  . . .B u t Norfolk would go, almost our 
entire Navy would be lost, an Immense amount of material would 
be captured and we should gain no better position nearer to 
Richmond for the defense of the c ity . There is much that can’ t  
be trusted to paper and I must request you destroy this.
The actions Randolph referred to were the completion of the C.S.S. 
Richmond and a series of gunboats which, with the Merrimack, would 
master Hampton Roads and break the blockade. Workers at Gosport were 
working day and night to complete her.63 Johnston must have been told
“ Gustavus Smith, Confederate War Papers (New York: Crawford 
Printers, 1884), 42-44.
61General Johnston bluntly stated he was able to accept the results 
of the meeting because of his conviction that circumstances would compel 
adoption of his strategy la ter. Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of 
M ilitary Operations (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1874), 116.
“ OR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 464.
“ ORN. series 1, vol. 7, 772-774, 779-80, 783-84.
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this when he went to Richmond.
Randolph la te r testified  to the Confederate Congress about 
Magruder’ s splendid preparations,
By availing himself of the Warwick River, a small stream 
which runs through a low, marshy country from near Yorktown to 
the James River, General Magruder constructed an entrenched 
line across the [13 mile] Peninsula, and with equal sk ill and 
Intrepidity had thus far successfully checked every attempt to 
break I t ,  though the enemy was vastly superior 1n numbers to 
the troops under his command. . . .  As a second line of 
defense, a system of detached works had been constructed by 
General Magruder near Williamsburg, about twelve miles 1n rear 
of the f ir s t  line, where the width of the Peninsula available 
for the passage of troops was only three or four miles. The 
advantage thus secured to our forces, i f  they should be 
compelled to retreat, w ill be readily appreciated.
I t  was readily apparent from the commencement of Johnston’ s 
command that he did not intend to defend Magruder’ s line. He stayed on 
the Peninsula only long enough to create an audit t r a i l .  On 22 April 
Johnston wrote to Lee,
Labor enough has been expended here to make a very strong 
position, but i t  h«is been wretchedly misapplied by the young 
engineer officers.
Not everyone shared Johnston’ s views. 18th Virginia Captain Henry T.
Owens wrote his wife, "Magruder is a capital general and has made the
strongest defenses here I ever saw."66
After Johnston arrived, s taff cooperation seemed to breakdown. 
Magruder was placed in command of the right wing, the largest in the 
army, but he could not get D. H. H ill to agree to swap some fie ld
“ Smith, Confederate War Papers. 52-53.
650E, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 455.
“ Captain H. T. Owens to Harriet Owens, 24 April 1862, ALS in Henry 
T. Owens Papers, Archives, Virginia State Library, Richmond.
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a rtille ry  that he had le f t  at Yorktown.67
Johnston apparently did not seek Magruder’ s opinion as former 
commander; consequently, he was le f t  the embarrassing option of 
communicating his Insights by mall. On 24 April Magruder encouraged the
commanding general to draw the Federals Into a controlled advance which
could be attacked.68 Johnston’ s plan was entirely different and on 
30 April, he repeated his 14 April plan In a le tte r to Lee,
We must, therefore, change our course, take the offensive, 
collect a ll the troops we have 1n the east and cross the 
Potomac with them, while Beauregard, with all we have In the
west, invades Ohio. Our troops have always wished for the
offensive, and so does the country.
When Johnston le f t  the Warwick River line on 3 May, he le f t  a 
frustrated and embittered group of Peninsula veterans. In the 32d 
Virginia, a locally recruited regiment, about 80 men deserted.70 Terry 
Jones noted in Lee’ s Tigers that the Tigers were so well entrenched that 
in one 24 hour period, 11 April, they had taken over 300 shells in camp 
at a cost of only three wounded.71 At Wynne’ s Mill James Williams 
wrote to his aunt,
We are not allowed to return fire  and i t  is the most 
provoking thing in the world. We so strongly fo rtified  that 
they can’ t  hurt us at a l l ,  and we haven’ t  ammunition enough to 
be wasting any, we are reserving our f ire  t i l l  they make a
67QB, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 451.
“ ib id ., 462-63.
“ ib id ., 477.
^Jensen, 61-62.
71 Jones, Tigers. 57.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
r123
general attack.72
The selge of Yorktown was basically devoid of significant 
m ilitary activ ity . The only noteworthy action occurred at Dam #1 
on 16 April. Here the Second Brigade of General William French 
Smith and five Vermont regiments, 2d, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th, 
surprised Colonel Robert McKinney’ s 15th North Carolina. They 
crossed the Warwick River and temporarily held the Confederate 
works; however, a counterattack under General Howell Cobb drove 
the Federals back and the action ended. The 3d Vermont suffered 
f i f t y  percent of the 165 Union casualties and the Confederates 
lost 43 killed  and wounded.73
Magruder did not make the retreat with his command. He had been 
sick and Johnston granted him a furlough to recover his health. General 
D. R. Jones directed the right wing on its  retreat.
The subsequent battle of Williamsburg, a rear guard action on 
5 May, provided another example of Johnston’ s misuse of the bounteous 
resources provided by Magruder. While Johnston and Davis exchanged 
written jabs after the war concerning Johnston’ s mismanagement of the 
Peninsula campaign and the battle of Williamsburg,74 two other credible 
sources tilte d  the scale of blame to Johnston. Colonel Richard Maury,
^Williams, Wynne’ s Mill to his Aunt Mary, 27 April 1862, Williams 
Papers.
^Battle reports are contained in OR, series 1, vol. 11, part 1, 
364-380, 415-22.
74Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government 
(New York: Appleton and Company, 1881), 2:94. Joseph E. Johnston, 
"Manassas to Seven Pines,"in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, eds. 
Clarence Buel and Robert Johnson, (New York: Century, 1888; reprint, 
Secaucus NJ: Blue and Grey Press, nd) 2:205.
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24th Virginia, wrote,
The prudent forethought of General Magruder had fo rtifie d  a 
line just below Williamsburg across the narrow Peninsula . . . 
the right and center which Longstreet occupied, but through an 
oversight or carelessness the le f t  remained open.
I t  remained for Maury, Early and the 24th Virginia to reclaim i t  from
General Winfield Hancock with a dramatic charge during the Battle of
Williamsburg. A concurring opinion was inadvertently written
independently by Gustavus Smith, Johnston’ s friend and second in
command,
His [General Magruder’ s] absence at this moment was the 
more to be regretted as i t  appears that the positions of the 
redoubts he had constructed were not a ll known to the 
commanding general [Johnston] and some of them being unoccupied 
were seized by the enemy and held subsequently to our 
disadvantage.
After 30 d iff ic u lt  days of seige operations, Magruder wrote a 
descriptive and heartfelt postscript for his department that was 
submitted the day of the Yorktown evacuation. His cred ib ility  was 
enhanced by his modest claims which were soon confirmed in enemy 
reports. Magruder noted,
1 had prepared as my real line of defense positions in 
advance at Harwood’ s and Young’ s M ills. Both flanks of this 
line were defended by boggy and d iff ic u lt  streams and swamps 
. . . .  The le ft  flank was defended by an elaborate 
fo rtification  at Ship’ s Point connected by a broken line  of 
redoubts crossing the heads of various creeks . . .  In my 
opinion, this advanced line with its  flank defenses might have 
been held by twenty thousand. With twenty-five thousand, I did 
not believe i t  could have been broken.
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Magruder then wrote about the Warwick line,
The line was Incomplete in Its  preparations, owing to the 
fact that a thousand negro laborers, whom 1 had engaged In 
fortifying were taken from me and discharged by superior orders 
In December last and a delay of nine weeks consequently 
occurred before I could reorganize the laborers for the 
engineers. . . . Every preparation was made In anticipation of 
another attack by the enemy. The men slept 1n the trenches 
under arms.
Magruder and his immediate staff departed the Army before the 
battle at Williamsburg and proceeded via steamer to Westover Plantation. 
Magruder was exhausted by the strain of the previous months.79 He did 
not believe i t  was necessary to evacuate the line in front of 
Williamsburg and his engineer Lieutenant Henry T. Douglas reported that 
he was very emotional.80
Unfortunately, Magruder’ s convalescent leave was too short. The 
action at Williamsburg stirred his blood and he wrote several letters to 
Richmond offering his views on an appropriate strategy. Unable to 
remain inactive, Magruder rejoined his command at Bottom’ s Bridge on 
9 May.81
Apparently, Magruder was not respected by Johnston’ s s ta ff so i t  is 
not surprising that he was not given a combat role in the main 
Confederate army. He appeared to be frozen out of discussions of policy 
and despite considerable expertise on the Peninsula was forced to resort
reIbid.
^Brent, 114.
“ H. T. Douglas to Mr. Bryan, 25 February 1909, TLS, Eleanor S. 
Brockenbrough Library, Museum of the Confederacy, Richmond.
810R, series 1, vol. 51, part 2, 532, 554; OR, series 1, vol. 11, 
part 3, 494-95.
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to correspondence to convey Ideas to the commanding general. The 
contrast between Magruder and Johnston helps explain Magruder’ s 
d ifficu lties . Both men were 55 years old, as was General Lee, Johnston 
had risen to Brigadier General, Lee to Colonel, and Magruder to 
Lieutenant Colonel 1n the old army. General McLaws wrote,
There is a very great contrast between the two commanders,
. . . General Magruder is fond of dress and parade and of 
company, conceals nothing and delights to have a crowd about 
him to whom he converses freely upon any and a ll subjects. He 
never moves from his headquarters without having five or six 
aides and a dozen «• more orderlies. . . .  can ta lk  twenty-four 
hours incessantly.
Of Johnston, McLaws claims,
Our commander-in-chief, General Johnston who is a very 
quiet, stern man, letting his plans to no one . . . w ill never 
speak on o ffic ia l matters but to the person interested, 
dislikes to have a crowd about him, never mentions m ilitary  
matters when away from his office—often rides o ff alone . . .
Dresses neat, but not pompous—interviews are yes/no with no 
detailed discussion of the matter.
When Magruder returned to active command on 9 May, he discovered 
his troops had been placed under overall command of Major General 
Gustavus Smith, Johnston’ s second-in-command and a personal friend of 
Johnston. Magruder understood that the arrangement was temporary to 
fa c ilita te  command and control during the retreat; however, sparks flew 
when Smith disregarded Magruder’ s advice and told him to lim it his 
correspondence to business hours unless a battle was imminent.
Magruder’ s temper flared and he retorted in a le tte r dripping with 
sarcasm. Magruder wrote to Smith that he led his command without regard
“ McLaws to his wife, 25 April 1862, McLaws Papers.
“ ibid.
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for duty hours, but he would comply with Smith's request.84 I t  is 
ironic that two men with health problems would compare and contrast 
command techniques; however, neither seemed to be effective.85
There is l i t t l e  doubt that Magruder had outlived his usefulness in 
Virginia. The absorption of his department Into Johnston's command and 
Johnston’ s unwillingness to entrust him with combat actions must have 
marked him for reassignment.
Magruder’ s friend Randolph believed the Confederacy lacked a cogent 
Trans-Mississippi policy and he worked hard to so lic it President Davis’ s 
support for a new department. When General Mansfield Lovell lost the 
port of New Orleans in April, a great cry went out for competent 
leadership. Richmond d ia ris t, Mary Chesnut, whose husband James was a 
government insider wrote, "Magruder is to supersede Lovell, . . .  On our 
side, Yankees are unlucky to say the least."86 Clearly, there was no 
hostility  towards Magruder in that declaration and apparently, he was 
well regarded. In fact, Magruder received a much greater plum—command 
of the newly created Trans-Mississippi Department.87
On 26 May, three days after the orders were given, Lee wrote to 
General P. 0. Herbert, commanding in Texas, and advised him of the 
formation of the new d is tric t comprised of Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana
W0R, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 528-29.
85Magruder’ s health problems persisted. Two weeks la te r, Smith 
suffered a nervous breakdown one day after Johnston’ s wounding at Seven 
Pines. This paved the way for Lee’ s elevation to command of the Army of 
Northern Virginia.
“ Chesnut, 228.
87QR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 528-29.
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(west of the Mississippi) and Texas, "Major General Magruder w ill be 
assigned to the command as soon as he 1s relieved from his present 
position."88 For Johnston, the news was a g if t ,  and he relieved 
Magruder before the Ink was dry on the orders. One of Johnston’ s aides, 
Major A. P. Mason advised General McLaws that there was no need to send 
a copy of recent orders to Magruder as he had been relieved of command 
with the army.89 In the presence of the enemy, Magruder was not w illing  
to leave yet, and he successfully appealed to Randolph to stay the 
orders. Johnston, who had placed McLaws In command, was furious and 
refused to take Magruder back. When Johnston refused to rescind the 
orders, Randolph issued Special Orders number 120, reassigning Magruder 
to Johnston.90 A few days la ter, the issue lapsed when both Johnston 
and Smith le f t  the army after the Battle of Seven Pines on 31 May and 1 
June. Johnston was wounded and Smith had a nervous breakdown. General 
Lee followed them In command.
Lee’ s command was like a breath of fresh a ir  for Magruder. Lee not 
only understood Magruder, but he appreciated the fine job he had done on 
the Peninsula. Magruder did not hesitate to offer his expertise and 
insight.91
Lee realized that army reorganization was needed. The Peninsula 
campaign had drawn together every significant Major General in Virginia
“ QB, series 1, 9:713.
^War Department, Rebel Records, "Correspondence of Confederate 
General and Staff Officers," Lafayette McLaws Papers, RG 109, A. P.
Mason to McLaws, 25 May 1852, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^OB, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 551.
’ ’ ib id ., 593.
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and North Carolina. There was so much need across the Confederacy; he 
undoubtedly planned to reassign many of the generals once McClellan was 
turned back.
Magruder’ s stock was very high with Lee. Since Lee had developed 
the defensive scheme for the South Carolina coast and had just departed 
South Carolina in March, he had a personal stake in her security. When 
General John C. Pemberton lost the confidence of the po litica lly  
significant South Carolina clique, a replacement was needed. Governor 
Pickens advised President Davis that Generals Huger, Longstreet, or 
Magruder would be acceptable. On 21 June, General Cooper recommended 
Magruder for the job; although he had pending orders to the Trans- 
Mississippi Department, Lee’ s 25 June indorsement to Davis said, "I 
hardly see how the removal of Pemberton can be avoided, Magruder is the 
best person [better than Longstreet or Huger?] who is available to 
relieve him."92
Why was Magruder so respected? Maybe i t  was his complete devotion 
to the cause; an 18 June le tte r  to McLaws said, "Take command until I 
arrive . . . Though quite sick I w ill be on the ground i f  anything of 
importance takes place."93
920R, series 1, 14:560.
^OR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 608.
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CHAPTER 5 
DEPORTED?
Magruder requested a delay in the execution of his orders to 
command the Trans-Mississippi Department from 23 May through 2 July.
One might be surprised i f  any general commanding 13,000 men in his home 
state facing an enemy force in excess of 100,000 men, 10 miles from his 
country’ s capital would volunteer to leave before the current campaign 
was over. I t  is a mistake to conclude that Lee "deported" Magruder to 
Texas following the "Seven Days" battles. S t i l l ,  events that occurred 
during the campaign may have expedited Magruder’ s desire to depart Lee’ s 
army.
After Johnston and McClellan fought to a standstill at the battle 
of Seven Pines on 31 May and 1 June, McClellan settled down to await 
reinforcements, specifically Irvin McDowell’ s Corps. McDowell had been 
withheld by Lincoln to provide a covering force for Washington. With 
McClellan in the vicin ity of Richmond, Lincoln decided on 8 June to 
permit McDowell to "cooperate" with him. This conditional support 
required McDowell to maneuver while remaining between Richmond and 
Washington. I f  McClellan wanted to use McDowell, he would have to 
extend his right flank towards the north near Mechanicsville. This 
maneuver forced McClellan’ s army to straddle the Chickahominy River.
McClellan chose the Corps of his friend Fitz John Porter to make 
the linkup. This divided the Union army with 36,000 men north of the
130
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Chickahominy, over 80,000 men south of the river and le f t  Lee with an 
attractive target. At Lee’ s behest, Major General Thomas "Stonewall* 
Jackson had engaged in a series of b r illia n t tactical marches and 
battles during late May and early June popularly known as the Valley 
Campaign of 1862. Jackson’ s success preyed on the Lincoln 
administration’ s insecurities concerning Washington. When Jackson 
fought at Cross Keys and Port Republic on 9 June, Lincoln ordered 
McDowell to regroup in the v icin ity  of Fredericksburg.
McClellan was unaware of the administration’ s decision and he 
continued to hold Porter’ s Corps "1n the air" on his right wing awaiting 
McDowell. After receiving valuable intelligence from cavalry commander 
J. E. B. Stuart, Lee secretly recalled Jackson from the Valley and 
determined to mass his army north of the Chickahominy River to strike 
Porter. The planned maneuver would not only destroy 30 percent of 
McClellan’ s force, but i t  would sever McClellan’ s supply depot at White 
House Landing. Speed was essential since Stuart, by riding around 
McClellan’ s army between 12 and 15 June, had alerted McClellan to his 
supply lin e ’ s vulnerability.
Lee contemplated McClellan’ s lethargy and deliberately decided to 
create an imbalance where the majority of his army would face Porter 
north of the Chickahominy River. Conversely, Lee bet that an entrenched 
minority of his troops could delude and defend against nearly 80,000 
bluecoats south of the Chickahominy River. Lee believed that he would 
be able to rapidly shift forces i f  McClellan became active. The man Lee 
selected to hold McClellan’ s attention was Bankhead Magruder.
On 24 June 1862, Lee’ s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Robert
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Chilton, sent confidential orders to Magruder to take charge of both 
Huger’ s and his own troops for the purpose of maintaining an active 
defensive posture to deceive McClellan as to Lee’ s activ ities . Magruder 
was In it ia l ly  ordered to attack 1f the opportunity presented Its e lf  and 
to pursue the Federals i f  they withdrew.1
After the war a mellow D. H. H ill wrote, "No one ever lived who 
could play o ff the Grand Seignior with a more lordly a ir than Prince 
John."2 Magruder was more than an actor; he was a professional 
soldier. He immediately consulted with his colleague, General Huger, 
and "devised many methods of exhibiting an aggressive strength that 
might deceive McClellan."3 Brent reported that Magruder examined his 
entire lin e , "He had a restless energy in preparation that provided for 
every contingency."4 Magruder and his men did not perceive any slight 
against themselves for being excluded from the fighting at 
Mechanicsville and Gaines Mill on 26-27 June. On the contrary, "We all 
considered i t  [their assignment] the post of danger and honor."5
In fact, i t  was a post of danger and high risk since Magruder and 
nis 25,000 men were a ll that stood between McClellan and Richmond. They
1War Department, Rebel Records, "Correspondence of Confederate 
General and Staff Officers," John Bankhead Magruder Papers, Lieutenant 
Colonel Robert Chilton to Magruder, 24 June 1862, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C.
2D. H. H il l ,  "Lee Attacks North of the Chickahominy," in Battles 
and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. Robert Johnson and Clarence Buel 
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performed splendidly,
Officers shouted commands to Imaginary units, buglers 
sounded meaningless calls, wagons rumbled back and forth over 
the same screened area to give the Impression of an endless 
train, soldiers were marched 1n circles by clearings 1n sight 
of the enemy and returned to the same scene again and again, 
campfires were bu ilt for non-existent soldiers and sound 
effects were utilized.
Magruder's tactics proved completely effective. Alexander Webb, a 
staff officer who would later win a general’ s wreath and a Congressional 
Medal of Honor at Gettysburg, wrote in a postwar analysis,
While the Battle of Gaines Mill was 1n progress, the 
enemy’ s force—25,000 strong under Magruder, by a succession of 
feints, advanced along different portions of the Union line, 
south of the Chickahominy. Furious outbursts of a rtille ry  fire  
and a resort to every device known which could lead to the 
belief that an attack in force was imminent.
McClellan’ s escape from the lines fronting Magruder was the f irs t  of
three incidents cited by critics which led to Magruder’ s "banishment."
In compliance with Lee’ s orders of 24 June, Magruder ordered an active
reconnaissance. Lafayette McLaws reported,
The troops were under arms by daylight. The lookouts 
posted in trees overlooking the enemy’ s camp near the railroad, 
reported that the works of the enemy were being strengthened.8
On 29 June, the Yankees had slipped away and Magruder was blamed.
Of course, other stolen marches occurred during the war, most notably 
when General Grant shifted his entire army from Lee’ s front at Cold 
Harbor in June 1864 to the south side of the James River. General
6Jeffrey L. Rhoades, Scapegoat General -  The Storv of Maior General 
Beniamin Huger. C. S. A. (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1985), 69.
Alexander S. Webb, The Peninsula. Campaigns of the Civil War 
Series (Charles Scribner’ s Sons, 1881; reprint, Wilmington, NC: 
Broadfoot, 1989), 135.
8RB, 9:340.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
McClellan was running and Lee was trying to slow him, disrupt his 
retreat, and destroy him between the rivers. After the war when Sir 
Fredrick Maurice edited Colonel Charles Marshall’ s diary, he defended 
Magruder saying troops are easily drawn out of hidden trenches.9
As Lee plotted to trap McClellan by assigning parallel and 
Intersecting lines of march, he ordered Magruder to move ahead and 
attack McClellan’ s rear guard. This set the stage for Magruder’ s second 
alleged fa ilu re . The 29 June Battle of Savage’ s Station was bravely but 
inconclusively fought.
Magruder’ s force was 13,000 or slightly more than half the size of 
a Union Corps. Although Magruder had commanded both Huger’ s and his own 
troops for the past few days, Huger was marching on a parallel track 
with a separate objective. On Magruder’ s le f t ,  but north of the 
Chickahominy were Jackson’ s troops.
While Jackson was under orders to cross the Chickahominy River and 
cooperate with Magruder, there apparently was no general order for
battle and Jackson spent a leisurely 29 June, a Sunday, reconstructing a
bridge. Jackson made no effort to find anywhere to ford the river.
When queried, he replied laconically that he had more important tasks to
attend to and would be unable to support Magruder.
What Magruder faced at Savage’ s Station was more than a rear guard. 
General Edwin V. Sumner led two Corps, with a third in the vicin ity .
His roughly 40,000 men outnumbered the attacking Magruder over three to
9Sir Fredrick Maurice, ed., An Aide-de-CamD of Lee. Being the 
Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometimes Aide-de-CamD. M ilitary  
Secretary and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee. 
1862-1865. (Boston: L itt le , Brown, and Company, 1927), 105.
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one. Rather than risk an unsupported frontal assault, Magruder sought 
and received a temporary diversion of two divisions from Huger’ s 
command. Magruder’ s lead division under the command of D. R. Jones 
reported the enemy was in strength in his front and that Jackson was not 
coming.10 According to Magruder, this intelligence foiled his plans 
because he had hoped to place Jackson and Huger on both of Sumner’ s 
flanks.11
When i t  became apparent that Magruder would not assault Sumner, 
Huger’ s divisions were returned to their line of march and Magruder was 
le f t  with his original force of 13,000 men. Magruder did not believe 
himself strong enough to launch a coup de main and so he fought a 
feeling engagement. Fearing the consequences i f  he were destroyed, he 
committed only Generals Kershaw’ s and Semmes’ s brigades. Despite the 
late hour, the fight was fierce. Augustus Dickert described i t  in 
Kershaw’ s brigade history,
The troops bounded to the front with a yell and made for 
the forest in front, while the batteries graped us as we rushed 
through the tangled morass. The topography of the country was 
such that our a rtille ry  could get no position to reply. . . .
Semites and Barksdale put in on our right; Cobb remaining as
10R£ 109, Magruder Papers, General D. R. Jones to Magruder, 29 June
1862.
"Magruder apparently believed that both Huger and Jackson were to 
cooperate with him. He did not know what force he faced, but he did not 
intend to engage in a frontal assault. Lee hoped that Magruder would 
attack furiously enough to slow McClellan’ s retreat and permit Lee’ s 
other troops to trap McClellan between the rivers where he could be 
destroyed. I f  Magruder’ s attack was aggressive enough, Lee believed 
McClellan would send reinforcements. Lee obviously did not know that 
Sumner, Franklin, and Heintzelman were facing Magruder. A postwar 
analysis by Joseph Cullen noted, " It  was increasingly apparent that 
Lee’ s s ta ff work le f t  much to be desired." Joseph P. Cullen, The 
Peninsula Campaign of 1862. McClellan and Lee Struggle for Richmond 
(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1973), 138-40; BE, 9:358.
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reserve, while the division of D. R. Jones which had been 
moving down on the le f t  side of the railroad soon became 
engaged. The enemy fought with great energy and vigor while 
the Confederates pressed them hard. . . . The graplng was 
simply dreadful, cutting, and breaking through the trees. 2
The historical perspective of the Battle of Savage’ s Station 1s one 
of Confederate fa ilu re . McClellan continued his precipitous retreat 
leaving the station with its  supplies and wounded to Magruder’ s troops. 
In retrospect, Lee clearly did not plan to fight a major engagement at 
Savage’ s Station or else he would have developed a battle plan. I f  he 
intended for Magruder to force Sumner back into McClellan’ s retreating 
column, i t  was an unrealistic expectation. Magruder could not have 
brought sufficient force to bear on Sumner unless he was able to ro ll up 
a flank; therefore, Lee’ s implied criticism, not received until the 
battle was over, seems to be inappropriate.13
Magruder had been i l l  several times during the past few months and 
was driving himself to exhaustion. He had fe lt  tremendous pressure for 
the past week. When le f t  in charge of the ruse de guerre for Gaines 
M ill, he executed b rillia n tly . He strained himself to remain vigilant 
and to detect any movements. He feared not only an undetected retreat,
1ZD. Augustus Dickert, History of Kershaw’ s Brigade with Complete 
Roll of Companies. Biographical Sketches. Incidents. Anecdotes, etc. 
(Newberry, SC: Elbert H. Hull Co., 1899), 128-29.
13Lee wrote Magruder after the battle, ”1 regret that you have made 
so l i t t l e  progress today in the pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap 
the fru its  of our victory, the pursuit should be most vigorous. I must 
urge you then again to press on his rear rapidly and steadily." OR, 
series 1, vol. 11, part 2, 687. Since Savage’ s Station was Magruder’ s 
f ir s t  legitimate test of arms, he no doubt perceived this as criticism  
and vowed to redouble his efforts. Considering he could not have 
carried the fie ld  in Sumner’ s presence, he had done the best he could. 
While Sumner did not want to quit the fie ld , he was ordered to and 
thousands of Yankee wounded were le f t  for prisoners.
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but expected a rapid counterpunch through his unsupported and 
undermanned line . Having carried the shadow of Richmond on his back for 
a year, he grimly dug 1n his heels to prevent any fatal tactical or 
strategic errors.14
Magruder did not sleep at a ll the night of 28-29 June and no sooner 
did he go to bed than "Stonewall" Jackson arrived at his command tent at 
3:30 A.M. on 30 June. Jackson failed to execute his orders to support 
Magruder and the opportunity had passed. McClellan was now crossing 
White Oak Swamp. Lee reacted to the situation and sought to get 
Magruder in front of McClellan near Malvern H ill .
Magruder’ s march on 30 June took him to the support of General 
Longstreet at Frayser’ s farm but was so long in completion that they 
were not engaged. I t  was on this march that Lieutenant Colonel Chilton 
and Magruder f irs t  crossed swords over the positioning of his force. 
Magruder was concerned that he would be unable to join up with General 
Holmes, whom he was ordered to support. Finally, late in day, Magruder 
was ordered into the line to relieve Longstreet who had fought at 
Frayser’s farm.15
McClellan had retreated masterfully and found himself under the 
protection of Union gunboats near Turkey Bend. Now he was able to 
concentrate a massive a rtille ry  park at Malvern H il l ,  near the Crew 
Farm. Thus far, Lee had been frustrated in his efforts to bag and
uMagruder was a student of war and he made several references to 
Napoleon’ s victory at Austerlitz. He feared a similar tactic where 
McClellan would allow him to overextend himself and then counterattack 
his strung out force beating i t  in detail.
15RR, 9:342.
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destroy McClellan. He was a skilled and aggressive o fficer who had 
pressed the youthful, Inexperienced McClellan. Now he made one of the 
great judgmental mistakes of his m ilitary career. He decided to "crush" 
McClellan. This battle was supposedly Magruder’ s third and fatal 
fa ilure .
The attack at Malvern H111 was an utter fiasco. The attack was 
premised on an effective Confederate counter battery f ir e .  Yet, very 
l i t t l e  a r t ille ry  was able to get to the battle fie ld , the chief of 
Confederate a r tille ry  was not even aware of the plan.16 Coordinated 
attacks were to begin with "a y e ll,"  but officers acted 
independently.17
Magruder, worn out, excitable and anxious had a major role in this 
his f irs t  fu ll scale battle. He got lost marching to the b a tt le f ie ld -  
having been ordered to march by the Quaker Road. He followed the advice 
of local guides and took a road that was locally known as the Quaker 
Road, but was not the one Lee intended. Following a countermarch, he 
arrived late on the fie ld . Duplicates of orders and delays in 
transmission caused Magruder to receive several orders to attack. The 
urgency fostered by their nearly simultaneous arrival generated the i l l -  
fated attack order.18 Magruder, weary to the point of incoherence and
16Jennings C. Wise, The Long Arm of Lee, with an Introduction by 
Gary Gallagher (Richmond: Owens Publishing, 1988), 226.
17There are countless versions of the assault at Malvern H il l .  One 
thing that is certain is that an order to in itia te  a battle with a yell 
is an invitation to disaster. There are numerous incidents of acoustic 
shadow. However, in this battle, the problem was getting to the 
battlefie ld  and in line of battle.
18Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenant. 1:599; OR, series 1, vol. 11, part 2, 
670-71.
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111 from medication relating to stomach maladies, appeared Incompetent 
and out of control. Both shortcomings were surely aberrations of his 
dynamic, Interactive personality.19 Fortunately nightfall ended the 
carnage. When queried by Lee as to why he had attacked the impregnable 
Malvern H111, Magruder responded tersely, "In response to your orders 
twice repeated." Lee had no response.20
McClellan’ s proclivity to continue retreating caused him to abandon 
Malvern H ill during the night of 1-2 July. This led Magruder and others 
to conclude the battle was won. The Seven Days Campaign was over.
Magruder suffered a bad night. Brent described him on the morning 
of 2 July,
General Magruder said there was no change in the situation 
and he believed the enemy to be in retreat. . . .  He looked 
badly and he told me he had hardly slept. Some of the veins in 
his face seemed swollen and were absolutely purple and he 
evidently suffered from the ch illy  weather.
Having seen the end of the campaign and perhaps miffed at Lee, Magruder
wrote to Secretary Randolph on 2 July,
I consider the period has arrived when I cannot . . .  ask 
the longer indulgence of the government in respect to the order 
assigning me to the command of the Trans-Mississippi 
Department.
19We know of Magruder’ s devotion to duty and have seen his 
willingness to offer strategic advice. This was the greatest crisis of 
his career and he was keyed up for i t .  However, the constant strain of 
the past fourteen months had exacted a to ll .  Magruder’ s staffer Brent 
adequately documented Magruder’ s illnesses. Magruder was not the only 
Confederate leader who suffered with an illness. Lee is believed to 
have demonstrated the in it ia l stages of heart disease in 1863.
20Douglas S. Freeman, R. E. Lee. A Biography. 4 vols., (New York: 
Scribner’ s Sons, 1934), 2:218.
21Brent, 231.
22QR, series 1, vol. 11, part 3, 630.
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In response, Magruder was relieved and ordered to Richmond.
Magruder had been assigned to the command of the Trans-Hississlppl 
Department on 23 May. Anticipating the needs of his new command, he 
sought support 1n men and supplies even before the Seven Days battles.
A le tte r of 26 June 1862 to Lee and Davis begged for a commitment of 
adequate resources for his department. He also noted that po litica lly  
important Missouri General Sterling Price had agreed to serve under 
him.23
The Trans-Mississippi region was the frontier of the Confederacy. 
Although the region had been ignored to this point, Secretary Randolph 
had impressed upon President Davis its  importance. Davis had agreed to 
the new department and named Magruder to head i t .  Independently, 
Confederate leaders in the Trans-M1ssisslppl region contemplated the 
same action. On 9 June 1862, General Van Dorn suggested the 
establishment of a separate department with popular Missouri General 
Sterling Price in command.24
When Price was told that Magruder was detailed for the command, he 
was incensed and in mid-June made a tr ip  to Richmond to confront Davis 
in person. A stormy meeting resulted in Price’ s resignation and Davis’ s 
acceptance of i t .  Davis was a politician and egos were salvaged when 
Price was offered the second-in-command.25
^QE. series 1, 13:845.
24J. R. Perkins, "Jefferson Davis and General Sterling Price," in 
Confederate Veteran Magazine, vol. 19 (reprint, Harrisburg, PA:
National Historical Society, 1989), 473-74.
251bid.,  Steven E. Woodworth, Jefferson Davis and His Generals. The 
Failure of Confederate Command in the West (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas Press, 1990), 150.
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Although the Seven Days battles had successfully driven McClellan 
from the gates of Richmond, the casualties were ghastly. The army's 
proximity to Richmond permitted thousands of versions of the action to 
leak Into the c ity . Everyone had a hero and a v illa in . Rebel war clerk 
Jones recorded, "Magruder is said to have led a division into action at 
Malvern H ill ,  i t  is said contrary to the opinions of other 
commanders."26 Sally Putnam wrote, "In this fight [Malvern H i l l ] ,
General Magruder was accused of rashness and many declared he was under 
the intoxicating influence of ardent sp irits ,"27 and a day or two later  
Putnam noted, "Public opinion reflected rather severely on General 
Magruder and General Huger. I t  was said i f  Magruder had been less rash 
. . . The Federal army would have never reached the security of their 
gunboats."28 On 10 July, Mary Chesnut observed, "Public opinion is hot 
against Huger and Magruder for McClellan’ s escape."29
Staff officers also formed opinions that found their way to print. 
Howell Cobb’ s biographer noted that one Georgia source, most like ly  a 
newspaper, claimed heavy Georgia casualties were caused by Toombs’ s, 
Cobb’ s and Magruder’ s drunken behavior on the b a ttle fie ld .30 Charles 
Marshall recorded his disappointment believing the Federal army should 
have been destroyed but was not due to a lack of coordinated leadership. 
He blamed Magruder who he believed should have known the roads well as
26Jones, Diary. 140.
27Putnam, 148.
28Ib id ., 149.
^Chesnut, 266.
30Simpson, 157-58.
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1t was his department.31 Robert E. Lee’ s daughter Charlotte wrote her 
sisters a day after a v is it from her father, "Poor McGuder f slcl the 
Dept fslcl people say he 1s to be court martlaled for being drunk at the 
time he ordered the charge [Malvern H i l l ] ." 32
This disappointment was not seriously credited by President Davis 
who was more upset over the loss of the shipyard at Norfolk.33 
Magruder was oblivious to the gossip and he prepared to depart for his 
new command via tra in . On 11 July before he was to leave, Lieutenant 
Colonel Chilton was constructing a le tte r which cast a shadow on his 
career. Chilton understood Lee’ s distress over McClellan’ s escape, as 
did Marshall. Chilton was personally convinced of Magruder’ s 
Incompetence and he expressed his concerns In writing to General Cooper, 
In Richmond,
The more I have thought upon the subject of Magruder’ s 
mission, the more strongly convinced am I of the sad justice to 
be In flicted upon the people of the Southwest by sending 
someone so utterly incompetent and deficient as is Magruder 
. . . .  since matters appear to be progressing successfully 
there [Texas], i t  is a hazardous operation to send a marplot 
there to reduce us to disgrace. . . . D. R. Jones charges him 
with something worse than incompetency. . . . General Lee 
concurs in my belief of his incompetency, but w ill not act
31Maurice, 96.
32Charlotte Lee, Richmond to her sisters, 19 July 1862, ALS in Lee 
Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond.
330n 6 July, Davis wrote his wife, "My great g rie f at the loss of 
the Virginia is renewed and redoubled by our want of her now in the 
James River. The timber for the completion of the Richmond was burned 
at Norfolk and the work on her has thus been greatly delayed. I t  is 
uncertain when she w ill be finished." Jefferson Davis, Jefferson Davis. 
Constitutionalist. His Letters. Papers, and Speeches, ed. Dunbar 
Rowland, 10 vols. (Jackson, MS: Department of Archives and History, 
1923), 5:291.
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unless directly asked by the President.34
This scathing attack was Immediately relayed to President Davis who 
promptly recalled Magruder to Richmond.35 Upon Magruder’ s return, 
Chilton Immediately forwarded to him a copy of his le tte r  to Cooper. 
Magruder seethed at the charges of an Inferior m ilitary officer and the 
m ilitary Inequality may have been the only reason he did not challenge 
Chilton to a duel.
Even before Magruder began to assemble his rebuttal, Chilton was 
qualifying his comments. A 20 July le tte r to President Davis c larified  
his position; Chilton had sent the le tte r without Lee’ s knowledge 
because of Lee’ s caution about expressing opinions Involving others. 
Chilton continued, "This opinion of mine 1s not based upon what I have 
heard General Lee state but my observation of facts which I knew must be 
within the knowledge of General Lee."36 Chilton then postulated 1n his 
le tte r to Magruder that "I w ill state General Lee had no knowledge 
whatsoever of this le tte r and my Impression with regard to his 
concurrence In my views was and is conjectural."37
Magruder’ s pride was hurt by Chilton’ s charges and he refused to 
credit them. A le tte r of 24 July to Davis advised that he was acting
^ la r  Department, "Compiled Service Records of Confederate General 
and Staff Officers," Robert Chilton File, ££ 109, Robert Chilton to 
General Samuel Cooper, Richmond, 11 July 1862. National Archives, 
Washington, D.C.
35Davis, 5:294.
^Compiled Service Records, Chilton F ile , Chilton to Jefferson 
Davis, Richmond, 20 July 1862.
37Ib id ., Chilton to General Magruder, Richmond, 20 July 1862. 
Chilton Records.
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rapidly to secure o ffic ia l reports which he hoped to have the next day. 
He asked Davis not to assign anyone else to his command,38 but the 
political pressures to assign someone to the command were extreme and 
Davis superseded Magruder with General Theopholls Holmes.39
Chilton hoped his charges would result 1n a Court of Inquiry, but 
neither Magruder nor the President required I t .  I f  Davis had wanted to 
cashier Magruder this was his opportunity. Instead he permitted 
Magruder to submit his o ffic ia l report 1n response. Davis’ s postwar 
writings tend to discredit any vendetta against Magruder/0
Magruder’ s subordinates ra llied  to his defense. Personal letters  
and o ffic ia l reports from T. R. R. Cobb, Lafayette McLaws and D. R.
Jones confirmed Magruder’ s beliefs.41 Although Freeman criticized  
Magruder’ s report as self-serving and fanciful, he did concede that 
Magruder had maturely and methodically refuted the allegations.42
Magruder’ s report dated 12 August 1862 was privately published 1n 
an effort to counter vicious rumors surrounding his recall. I t  was a 
comprehensive and credible document. Magruder received fu ll cooperation
mRG 109, Magruder Papers, Magruder to Jefferson Davis, Richmond, 
24 July 1862.
39Davis, 5:301.
^Davis heaped lavish praise on Magruder in the Rise and Fall of 
the Confederate Government. Specific examples are cited later in the 
chapter.
41RG 109, Magruder Papers, General T. R. R. Cobb to General 
Magruder, Richmond, 23 July 1862.
42Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:608.
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from Lee and Lee’ s subordinates.43 Magruder even presented sworn 
affidavits and medical reports.**
On 13 August, Magruder formally submitted his report simultaneously 
to Davis and Lee. Magruder asked Davis, i f  the report was satisfactory, 
to consider restoring him to his command to smother the slander that was 
circulating.*5 Lee hurriedly reviewed Magruder’ s report and provided 
specific rebuttals. He did not c ritic ize  Magruder and even offered a 
lukewarm endorsement,
General Magruder appears to have greatly exerted himself to 
accomplish the duty devolved on him, and I can bear testimony 
to the alacrity he displayed in its  execution. He had many 
d ifficu lties  to contend with I know. I regretted at the time 
and s t i l l  regret that they could not have been more rapidly 
overcome. I feel assured, however, that General Magruder 
intentionally omitted nothing he could do to ensure success.
Magruder had weathered the storm. The army was away from Richmond
on the Second Manassas Campaign. Magruder was now ready to resume a
command position, but the question was where? Randolph believed a
return to Lee’ s army could be awkward and he recommended that Magruder
become the deputy commander of the Trans-Mississippi, "I think his
energy in conjunction with General Holmes’ s prudence could produce good
*3R£ 109, Magruder Papers, General Magruder, Spottswood Hotel, to 
General Lee, in the fie ld , 2 August 1862.
**J. Bankhead Magruder, Report of His Operations on the Peninsula 
and of the Battles of Savaae Station and Malvern H ill near Richmond 
(Richmond: Charles H. Wynne, 1862), 34.
*5RG 109, chapter 2, vol. 232 1/2, Magruder, Richmond, to Jefferson 
Davis, Richmond, 13 August 1862.
“ RE, 9:364.
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results.*47 Davis having fin a lly  calmed the Sterling Price beehive, 
remarked, ”1 doubt the propriety of disturbing the unity of the Trans- 
Hi ssisslppl department under existing circumstances."48
Over the next six weeks, Magruder lobbied for the vindication which 
reassignment would produce. The decision process was undoubtedly 
delayed by the dramatic moves of the Confederate armies In the fie ld , 
but 1t gave him the opportunity to marshall additional support. On 
5 September, an anonymous le tte r  to the Editor of the Richmond Whig made 
a strong defense against the slanderous rumors, "Some so base as to 
prohibit a gentleman from answering them."49 The le tte r  pleaded for 
patience,
That report has been made and when submitted w ill ,  I am 
confident, prove a complete refutation . . .  I t  1s certainly 
rather remarkable that General Magruder’ s Incompetency for 
command should only be discovered after more than a year’ s 
service in a very important position during which he had won 
the f irs t  victory gained over the enemy, had secured the 
Confederate capital against attack, and Southeastern Virginia 
against invasion . . .  and had fin a lly  been assigned by the 
President who knew his services and appreciated his merits to 
an exceedingly responsible and important command in a distant 
portion of the Confederacy.
In late September, Magruder’ s name was included with Lee, Johnston,
Jackson and other general officers in a series of Congressional
resolutions praising the army’ s achievements from the Seven Days
George W. Randolph, War Department, to Jefferson Davis, Richmond, 
26 August 1862, ALS in Pritchard Von David Collection, Eugene C. Barker 
Texas History Center, University of Texas, Austin.
^ Ib id .
49"Letter to Editor of Whig." Richmond Enquirer. 5 September 1862, 
page 1.
50Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
battles.51 Thus encouraged, Magruder wrote Davis on 29 September 
suggestlrg a separate command in Texas and the New Mexico territo ries  
subject to General Holmes overall command. Magruder pleaded that his 
continued Inactivity after his vindication was a source of personal 
embarrassment.52 Two weeks la te r, Magruder was assigned to the command 
he requested.53
Magruder thrived In Texas and earned the praise of the country for 
his stunning success In recapturing Galveston and the Yankee gunboat 
Harriet Lane. Clerk Jones wrote a fitt in g  tribute when he recorded,
B rillian t achievement at Galveston and i t  was Magruder’ s 
work . . .  he has always had a penchant for desperate work. So 
we shall expect to hear of more gallant exploits in that 
section.
In mid-January, President Davis wrote Magruder a congratulatory le tte r  
and wished him continued success in the future.55
Lieutenant Colonel Chilton experienced d ifficu lties  from Magruder’ s 
Congressional supporters. George Randolph told Magruder in a personal 
le tte r  of 21 February 1863 that vindication was forthcoming.56 A month 
la ter, Chilton was denied promotion to colonel and brigadier general
51*Resolutions of Congress," Richmond Examiner. 20 September 1862.
52Jchn B. Magruder, Richmond, to Jefferson Davis, Executive Office, 
29 September 1862, ALS from Samuel Richey Collection of the Southern 
Confederacy, the Halter Havighurst Special Collections Library, Miami 
University, Oxford, Ohio.
53Jones, Diarv. 194.
54Ib id ., 235.
55Davis, 5:424.
56B£ 109, Magruder Papers, George W. Randolph, Richmond, to General 
Magruder, Texas, 21 February 1863.
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because of his "slanders1 against Magruder. A May 1863 Court of Inquiry 
Investigated the propriety and Integrity of Chilton’ s actions 1n writing 
to General Cooper. They refused to permit testimony concerning 
Magruder’ s performance at the Seven Days; but, Chilton was exonerated 
and no judgment was rendered on his accusations.57
When the war ended, Magruder refused to seek a pardon or parole and 
he escaped to the Confederate colony In Carlotta, Mexico. After serving 
the Emperor Maximilian as a Major General, he returned to Texas. I t  was 
rumored he returned to his drinking habits and he died alone 1n 
February, 1871.58
57Chilton Court of Inquiry, Chilton Records, National Archives.
“ Warner, Generals In Gray. 207-8.
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CHAPTER 6 
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT
John Bankhead Magruder served the United States Army for 30 years 
before the Civil War. Perspectives change and the activ ities  of a fun 
loving young lieutenant in a peacetime army should not be judged 
harshly. Promotions were slow and many people must have enjoyed the 
animated Magruder. When the Mexican War came, Magruder was aggressive 
and dynamic. The 24 year old lieutenant was now a serious experienced 
42 year old graduate of the United States M ilitary Academy. In 
recognition of his performance, he received three promotions and a 
series of challenging leadership roles between 1848 and 1861.
When the secession issue was joined, he honorably le f t  the United 
States Army and accepted a leadership role in his home state. Magruder 
was not only commissioned a fu ll colonel, but he was named to a council 
of prominent Virginians to select other qualified citizens for 
leadership positions.
John Bankhead Magruder’ s record is clearly presented in postwar 
analyses. His historically negative image as "Prince John" emerged in 
Douglas Southall Freeman’ s monumental analysis of southern leadership 
R.E. Lee and the companion, but d istinctly different series Lee’ s 
Lieutenants. Of Magruder, Freeman writes without a citation:
He held that bombardment of the enemy might be infrequent 
but that bombardment of the Secretary of War should be 
incessant. His early dispatches doubtless were read with
149
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eagerness. Soon the sight of one of them was to evoke 
groans.
I f  this was Magruder’ s epitaph, one would conclude he was bombastic 
and frivolous, but fortunately the record was rich in contradictory 
evidence. Freeman’ s own meticulous notes le f t  1n the archives of the 
Virginia State Library reveal a shallowness of sources that did a 
disservice to this prominent son of Virginia. Magruder was not inept as 
some historians suggested2 nor was he as significant as others 
proposed.3 Instead, Magruder emerges as an Important secondary leader, 
a conscientious man and meticulous soldier.
Current historiography has produced credible efforts to vindicate 
"scapegoats." Revisionist historians are reducing "demigods" to great 
generals and raising underated leaders to levels of public acceptance. 
The late Dr. Thomas Connelly authored Lee. The Marble Man. while Charles 
Schackleford recently penned George Wythe Randolph and the Confederate 
E lite . William Piston’ s published doctoral dissertation examined James 
Lonastreet. Lee’ s Tarnished Lieutenant and Jeffery Rhoades wrote 
Scapegoat General. The Storv of Maior General Beniamin Huger. C.S.A.. 
These works are useful to an understanding of the real war within the
’Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:16.
2There are numerous instances of casual slanderous commentary 
concerning Magruder. Evan Robert Corn; "Daniel Harvey H ill and 
the Peninsula, Maryland, and Chickamauga Campaigns," (M. A.
Thesis, University of North Carolina, 1961) 57. Referring to 
Savage’ s Station "The clash failed to produce any tactical 
results, except for revealing another case in which Macgruder’ s 
[sic] ineptness allowed McClellan to break away unscathed."
3Edward A. Pollard, Lee and His Lieutenants (New York: E.B.
Treat and Co., 1867), 847; Eulogy of John B. Magruder delivered by 
John B. Cary to Lee Camp #1, Grand Camp of Confederate Veterans, 
Department of Virginia, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond.
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Civil War. Then, as now, politics and social cliques played a 
significant role.
Unfortunately for Magruder no fu ll length biography exists.4 
Thomas Settles examined Magruder's m ilitary career In his 1972 doctoral 
dissertation at Texas Christian University. Dr. Settles’ s topic was so 
broad he was unable to present a detailed analysis of Magruder’ s 
principal contribution to the Confederate cause, the early defense of 
the Virginia Peninsula. Settles also misinterpreted some sources and 
was unable to uncover others that are now available. In 1989, Penn 
State Professor Gary Gallagher penned a short artic le  for "Civil War" 
that accurately summarized Magruder’ s career through the Seven Days 
battles.5 He only used the O fficial Records and he restated Freeman’ s 
and Settles’ s themes.
"Prince John" has a regal, almost comical a ir reminiscent of 
medieval times. I t  certainly does not mix with the martial sounding, 
"Stonewall," "My Old War Horse," "The Rock of Chickamauga", or "Fighting 
Joe." Many casual students of the war routinely accept the summary 
judgments of lite ra ry  legends such as Bruce Catton, Shelby Foote and 
Douglas S. Freeman. These early treatsies provided stereotypes that are 
frequently perpetuated in disciples’ books.
This thesis examined Bankhead Magruder in the context of his
4T. R. Hay, Locust Valley, New York, to Virginia Historical 
Society, 23 July 1961, TLS in the Virginia Historical Society,
Richmond. Mr. Hay wrote of his intention to publish a manuscript 
on Magruder’ s l i f e .  However, Settles 1972 dissertation expresses 
thanks to Mr. Hay for the data which he shared during interviews.
Mr. Hay apparently never published the book.
5Gary Gallagher, "The Fall of Prince John Magruder," Civil 
War. XIX, 8-15.
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environment. There was l i t t l e  contemporary analysis of the drudgery of 
command 1n the quiet Peninsula sector. This resulted In an 
understatement of Magruder’ s contributions In Virginia. Yet, Magruder 
clearly met the terms of his commission.6 Nothing happened 1n the 
Federal camp that was not analyzed and reported. The Inactivity of the 
Federal army was not his fau lt. To the extent possible, he held the 
Yankees at the tip  of the Peninsula and prevented adequate Intelligence 
from reaching McClellan for his 1862 Peninsula campaign. As commander 
of the Department, he meticulously completed a basic defensive network 
and greatly expanded I t  to the extent manpower and supplies permitted.
He worked tirelessly to train his staff and subordinates. Accusations 
of micromanagement appeared overstated, since subordinates at a ll levels 
proved to be Inexperienced 1n m ilitary matters.
Magruder w illingly took on the Richmond bureaucracy and forced 
support for his command. While i t  appeared he exceeded his authority in 
impressing slaves and activating the mi 1111a, he properly viewed them as 
resources to accomplish his mission.
Limited m ilitary encounters prevent a fu ll and impartial evaluation 
of his m ilitary sk ills . Magruder was not the only Civil War general who 
bungled his early combat assignments. Such a l is t  included Lee, Grant 
and Sherman. Subsequent successes in Texas were small in scale and are 
not a proper measure of his combat leadership capacity.
Magruder found himself embroiled in controversy, but basically 
excluded from strategic decisions. Men such as Joseph E. Johnston and 
George McClellan overshadowed him. An argument could be made that
6CB, series 1, 2:865.
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Johnston could have been cashiered 'or treason. I f  Davis expected a 
fight on the lower Peninsula, he certainly erred 1n permitting Johnston 
to retain his command. In consideration of Johnston’ s preferred 
strategy to Invade the North and Lee’ s clear understanding of 
Confederate goals on the Peninsula, Lee should have received command.
Postwar analyses of contemporaries, combined with reports of 
professional soldiers, placed Magruder and his efforts 1n perspective. 
The following are representative of the hundreds of laudatory comments 
uncovered 1n the research: Federal Navy commander John Mlssroon 
commenting on the York River batteries, "The works of the enemy are 
excessively strong and powerfully armed. Their cannon are managed and 
served with surprising accuracy."7 Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
Gustavus Fox testified  to Congress, "Wooden vessels could not have 
attacked the batteries with any degree of success. The forts at 
Yorktown were situated too high; were beyond the reach of naval guns."8 
Federal engineer Lieutenant Cyrus B. Comstock on the quality of the 
Gloucester Point battery, "The finished portion of the work was well and 
carefully done. . . .  The strength of the work is nearly the same as 
that of the work enclosing Yorktown."9
Magruder boasted of his forward line of defense. Chief Union 
engineer General John G. Barnard told Congress, "The works prepared by 
the enemy to resist any landing south of Yorktown . . . such as that at
7Webb, 67.
8Congress, Joint Committee, The Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, Part I .  Army of the Potomac. 37th Congress, 3d 
Session, 31 March 1863, 630.
9QR, series 1, vol. 11, part 1, 338.
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Ship’ s Point and others near the mouth of Wormley Creek were of 
considerable magnitude."10 Major Albert J. Myer, Federal signal 
officer wrote,
Reports were received of reconnaissances made along the 
lines 1n front. Earthworks seemed to be found everywhere, and 
everywhere bodies of the enemy vigilant and of unknown numbers 
resisted and threatened assault. . . .  To pass from the right 
to the le f t  of our lines, following the narrow and winding 
earth roads and the miles of corduroyed ways through the woods 
was a journey of several hours. . . . bearing often upon an 
enemy whose lines and forces hidden by other trees and shrubs 
were invisible.
The Warwick River line was considered the least defensible of the 
three, but 1t was also intimidating. General Erasamus Keyes reported, 
"The works at Lee’ s Mill were apparently very strong. The force of the 
enemy was entirely unknown owing to the d ifficu lty  of the approach."12 
Barnard summarized the line as "far more extensive than may be supposed 
. . . every kind of obstruction which the country affords such as 
abatis, marsh, inundation, e tc ., was s k illfu lly  used. The line was 
certainly one of the most extensive known to modern times."13
The most impressive of Magruder’ s works was Yorktown. McClellan’ s 
aide-de-camp wrote,
They are strong but not neat. They might have been taken 
by storm with terrib le loss . . . that immense connected 
fo rtification  with its  numerous salient angles, on which their 
heaviest guns were mounted is at once a beautiful and a 
wonderful work. The ditch is deep, but dry, the parapet is 
d iff ic u lt  to scale . . . Trees which were standing a year ago 
have been cut down to give free range to their a r t ille ry . Deep
10Committee on Conduct of War, 397.
11Qg, series 1, vol. 11, part 1, 228.
12Committee on Conduct of War, 598.
13£B, 12:558.
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gorges and ravines are inside and about these fortifications.
This natural advantage furnished good cover for their troops 
against a r t ille ry  fire  and rendered the position d iff ic u lt to 
assault.
Barnard added, " It  w ill be seen therefore, that our approaches were 
swept by the f ire  of at least forty-nine guns."15
Johnston’ s determination to evacuate the Peninsula, based on the 
pending bombardment and a desire to spare the useless loss of
Confederate l i f e ,  moved Robert E. Lee’ s m ilitary secretary A. L. Long to
astutely comment, "Since Magruder’ s position was never put to the test,
the difference of opinion respecting i t  must be reconciled by
speculative criticism ."16 However, Jefferson Davis praised the work 
writing,
By availing himself of the Warwick River . . . [Magruder] 
constructed an entrenched line across the Peninsula and with 
equal s k ill and intrepidity had thus far successfully checked 
every attempt to break i t .  . . . Magruder had constructed 
batteries at both places [Yorktown and Gloucester Point] which 
by their crossfire presented a formidable obstacle to the 
ascent of ordinary vessels.
Union newspaper editor, William Swinton, who wrote a history of the Army
of the Potomac, commented on the Union Chief of A rtille ry ’ s claim that
the Confederate batteries would have been silenced in 12 hours,
This opinion is not ju stified  by subsequent experience in 
the war, for the rude improvised earthworks of the Confederates 
showed an ab ility  to sustain an indefinite pounding. General 
Johnston’ s evacuation of Yorktown seems to have been prompted
u Ib id ., 5:7.
15Ib id ., 12:558.
16A. L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee (Secaucus, NJ: Blue 
and Grey Press, 1983), 154.
17Davis, 2:83-84.
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by a like  exaggeration of the probable effect of a 
bombardment.
Elsewhere in his volume, Swlnton concluded after Interviewing Johnston 
that,
Had General Johnston 1n place of becoming alarmed at the 
preparations against him determined to fight 1t out on the line  
of the Warwick, there 1s; l i t t l e  doubt he might have prolonged 
the siege indefinitely.
President Davis in February 1865 drafted a le tte r detailing why he would
not give Johnston another independent command. He said Johnston had
failed on numerous occasions. Concerning Yorktown he wrote, "General
Johnston soon announced the position untenable and made another hasty
retreat and with a heavy loss of munitions and armament."20
The last of Magruder’ s defensive works was the Williamsburg line
which Lee had fretted about the previous year. While Freeman called
Fort Magruder "feeble,"21 E. Porter Alexander and Alexander Webb
disagreed. Webb wrote,
Fort Magruder stood in his [McClellan] immediate front 
commanding the junction of the le f t  on Hampton road . . .  and
18William Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. A 
Critical History of Operations in Virginia. Maryland, and 
Pennsylvania from the Commencement of the Close of the War. 1861-5 
(Secaucus, NJ: Blue and Grey Press, 1983), 107n.
19Ib id ., 111-12. In 1878, Brevet Brigadier General John C. 
Palfrey estimated Yorktown might have held out another month. He 
speculated on what results might have been occurred had Johnston 
decided to hold the position. John C. Palfrey, "The Siege of 
Yorktown," in Campaigns in Virginia. 1861-62. Papers read before 
the M ilitary Historical Society of Massachusetts in 1876. 1877. 
1878. and 1880. ed. Theodore F. White (Boston: James R. Osgood 
and Company, 1881; reprint, Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing, 
1989), 151-52.
2O0£, series 1, vol. 47, part 2, 1304-11.
21Freeman, Lee’ s Lieutenants. 1:175.
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the main Yorktown road. . . .  To the right and le f t  the smaller 
redoubts, twelve 1n a l l ,  formed an Irregular line nearly across 
the Peninsula. Resting on creeks and marshes, with a belt of 
clearing In their front, they could have proved, 1f properly 
manned and supported, a formidable barrier. The approaches to 
the line were singularly disadvantageous for the attacking 
party.22
I t  seems obvious that the Confederacy may have had the capability 
to delay and prolong the Union advance Indefinitely. Johnston’ s ego, 
cowardice, or misunderstanding of the Confederacy’ s strategic needs 
seemed to be the only reasons Norfolk and Gosport were prematurely lost. 
I t  remained for President Davis to write a f it t in g  epitaph,
Late in 1862, General John B. Magruder, a s k illfu l and 
knightly soldier, who had at an earlier period of the year 
rendered distinguished service by his defense of the Peninsula 
between the James and York Rivers, Virginia was assigned to the 
command of the Department of Texas.
What of the controversies involving Magruder 1n the Peninsula 
campaign and the Seven Days battles? Current historiography clearly 
leans toward vindicating most of the officers involved; however,
Johnston was indicted by his own writings and those of his 
contemporaries. He is certainly a candidate for a revisionist study and 
reduction in stature. Gustavus Smith does not merit serious 
consideration as a commander. I t  seems he was the thorn in Magruder’ s 
side rather than vice versa. Jackson proved he was human and has 
received just criticism for his failures at Mechanicsville, Savage’ s 
Station and White Oak Swamp.
^Webb, 74-75; E. P. Alexander, "A Sketch of Longstreet’ s 
Division," SHSP, 10:40.
^Davis, 2:233.
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Lee was clearly to blame for the debacle at Malvern H111.24 Lee 
had a b r illia n t plan, but 1t was far too complicated for the terrain or 
the experience of his s ta ff.2* S t il l  Seven Days was a clear strategic 
victory. The threat to Richmond was removed and the Union army 
leadership so Intimidated that McClellan’ s army was effectively 
destroyed. I t  did not reconstitute its e lf  for ten weeks, returning to 
action only in the Maryland campaign.
The Seven Days battles did not cause Magruder to be "deported1 to 
the Trans-M1ss1ss1pp1 Department. The assignment was a calculated move 
of a qualified officer to support the Secretary of War’ s strategic 
vision. Texas A & M University President, Frank Vandiver, effectively 
chal lenged the assumption that the Trans-Mississippi was a dumping 
ground for failed officers or that Magruder had been fired . He 
contended that Magruder adequately demonstrated his competence in Texas 
and that he was i l l  and exhausted during the Seven Days campaign.26
Lee is uniformly criticized by analysts of Malvern H ill . 
Webb said, "In truth, there seems to have been few orders issued 
on the f ir s t  by the rebel general-in-chief," 164. Webb notes Lee 
failed to take advice not to attack and was ignorant of the roads 
needed to maneuver, 157. E. P. Alexander believes Lee should have 
rescinded the orders, E. P. Alexander, M ilitary Memoirs of a 
Confederate (New York: Scribner’ s Sons, 1907), 161-64.
^Cullen’ s criticism is concise, "What was needed even more 
than good maps was competent staff work . . .  and simple rather 
than complicated maneuvers, . . .  In this battle Lee’ s strategy 
was poor and his tactics unsound." Cullen, 166, 168.
26The western theaters were often considered a dumping ground 
for inept officers. However, many highly regarded officers ended 
up there to include Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor. This too may 
be an appropriate topic for a more detailed study. Vandiver’ s 
arguments are persuasive. Frank E. Vandiver, Rebel Brass. The 
Confederate Command System (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1956), 31, 
59-64.
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Why did Hagruder request to leave the army the day after Malvern 
H111? Perhaps he was exhausted and fed up with everyone, Including Lee. 
Brent noted 1n his memoirs,
[Magruder sent Information to Richmond but was] disbelieved 
and disregarded. [However, he] exhibited the greatest care 1n 
providing for a ll emergencies and devoted himself to a careful 
study how he could strengthen his position. . . .  He fu lly  
realized that he was defending one of the passes to Richmond 
with very Inadequate forces for the purposes.
Magruder went to Texas as an honored man. He was not disgraced and 
he received tributes. General A. L. Long wrote,
Shortly after the retreat of General McClellan, General 
Magruder was appointed to command of the Department of Texas, 
which from Its  remoteness and extent was of great Importance.
This exhibition of confidence on the part of the Confederate 
government furnishes undeniable proof of the high estimation in 
which Magruder was held and the able manner in which he 
performed his duties shows that his ab ility  was correctly 
estimated.
0. M. Roberts wrote for Evan’ s volume on Texas for Confederate M ilitary  
History.
The new commanding general had acquired fame for the skill 
with which on the Peninsula of Virginia he checked for weeks 
McClellan’ s invading army before miles of entrenchments, armed 
in part with Quaker guns.29
Was the sobriquet "Prince John" fair? Was he a bon vivant? Lee’ s
Colonel Walter Taylor wrote,
He was a typical soldier, the most picturesque that I ever 
saw. I t  was a real treat to see General Magruder in fu ll 
m ilitary costume. . . . There was in his manner and deportment
27Brent, 100-101.
“ A. L. Long, "Memoir of General John Bankhead Magruder," 
SHSP. 12:110.
^Evans, Confederate M ilitary History. Texas by 0. M. 
Roberts, 79.
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a great fascination for those about him.30 
Colonel R. G. Lowe of the Louisiana Battalion wrote;
Prince John was equal to any emergency. A soldier by 
nature, he had the dash and bearing of a Rupert and a Crichton 
combined. . . . Events subsequent to this time so overshadowed 
the defense made on the Warwick that Magruder’ s work has been 
lost sight of.
English Colonel Freemantle met Magruder in Texas and described a party 
thrown at Magruder’ s mess,
Magruder wears a red woolen cap and f i l l s  the president’ s 
chair with great aptitude. I t  was 11:30 P.M. before I could 
tear away from this agreeable party.
Magruder, the man and the soldier, was noble and e lite . Lowe 
wrote, "Prince John knew no such words as re treat.*33 Hampton 
secessionist, Baker Lee claimed,
[Referring to the Peninsula] I t  tru ly  required a man not in
the common role of men to suit the situation. Magruder proved 
himself to be such a man. . . . With Magruder i t  was not a 
question of strength in arms but of strength in s k il l ,  in 
audacity, in m ilitary diplomacy. He was equal to i t  a l l .
General Dabney Maury, a founder of the Southern Historical society, paid
f i t  tribute when he wrote,
Magruder was so b r illia n t and gallant in social l i f e  that 
his remarkable talents were not appreciated. He received less
credit for his remarkable genius for war than he deserved. I
W a lte r H. Taylor, General Lee. His Campaigns in Virginia 
1861-65 with Personal Reminiscences (Norfolk: Nusbaum Book and 
News Company, 1906), 51.
31Colonel R. G. Lowe, "Magruder’ s Defense of the Peninsula," 
vol. 8, Confederate Veteran Magazine (reprint, Harrisburg, PA: 
The National Historical Society, 1988), 108.
32Freemantle, 29.
33Confederate Veteran. 8:105.
^Baker Lee, "Magruder’ s Peninsula Campaign in 1862," 19:63.
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wish I could do justice to a man so b r illia n t, so brave, and so 
devoted to Virginia.
I t  seems unnecessary to add more words but i t  says much about the 
nature of the subordinate leaders and men of this great C ivil War. 
Colonel Benjamin Ewell was Magruder’ s predecessor 1n command on the 
Peninsula; a resident of Williamsburg; President, and savior of postwar 
William and Mary; and Joseph E. Johnston’ s Chief of S taff. Of Magruder 
he wrote,
He was a humane, honorable man, above intrigue. A brave, 
judicious—although easily excited--and on the whole a 
successful soldier.
35Confederate Veteran Magazine. 5:171. 
“ Benjamin S. Ewell, "Reminiscences," p. 12.
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